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INTRODUCTION*
This comment is the tenth in a series of annual efforts by the
Law Review to provide students and practitioners with a survey of
significant developments in the field of labor relations law.' The
subject matter of the Survey consists of decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts which clarify, add substance to,
or repudiate prior policy in the application of the Labor Management
Relations Act,' the Norris-La Guardia Act,' and other relevant federal
statutes.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to offer in depth analysis or
criticism of all cases reported. Some developments, however, were of
unusual significance, and thus warranted rather detailed treatment.
For instance, the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, upheld the
power of federal courts to provide injunctive relief to enforce no-strike
agreements.4 The Court also began to establish standards under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment testing.°
Significant developments also occurred in the courts of appeals.
The effect of arbitration on Title VII rights,' the extent of the Board's
remedial powers under section 10(c) of the LMRA,7
 and the stan-
dards for requiring recognition of unions without elections have been
the subject of a number of controversial decisions.'
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Professor Richard S. Sullivan of
the Boston College Law School, and to Mr. Robert F. Fuchs, Regional Director of
Region One of the National Labor Relations Board, for their helpful comments on a
number of cases discussed herein. The criticisms which appear in this Survey do not, of
course, necessarily reflect the opinions of either Professor Sullivan or Mr. Fuchs.
The previous comments are: 1969-1970 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 11
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 916 (1970); 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 785 (1969) ; Recent Decisions on Jurisdictional Problems, 9
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1059 (1968) ; 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 771 (1967) ; 1965-66 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 909 (1966); 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Labor Rela-
tions Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 815 (1965) ; Recent Developments in Labor Law,
5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 629 (1964) ; Recent Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 661 (1963) ; Labor's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules,
3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
2 29 U.S.C. ill 141-87 (1964).
8 29 U.S.C. i§ 101-15 (1964).
4 See p. 1083 infra.
5 See p. 1059 infra.
See p. 1073 infra.
7 See p. 1122 infra.
S See p. 1037 infra.
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I. BOARD AND COURT JURISDICTION
A. Board Jurisdiction
1. NLRB Jurisdiction over Colleges and Universities
	 -
In Cornell University,' decided during the Survey year, the
NLRB for the first time asserted jurisdiction over a non-profit institu-
tion of higher education. In taking this action, the Board specifically
overruled the long-standing policy enunciated in TruStees of Columbia
University.2
 Under the Columbia University doctrine, the Board
would not assert jurisdiction over any activity which was "non-com-
mercial in nature and intimately connected with the charitable pur-
poses and educational activities of [an] institution." 3
The Board's holding in Columbia University was influenced by
the legislative history of Section 2 (2) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.4
 This section specifies those persons who are "em-
ployers" for purposes of the Act, and thus subject to the Board's
authority. The section also specifically excludes certain activities,
such as the operation of non-profit hospitals, from the law's purview.
Other non-profit activities were not accorded this explicit legislative
exemption, but the Board noted that a conference report on the bill'
which enacted section 2(2) indicated a congressional belief that the
Board would decline jurisdiction where a non-commercial, non-profit
organization was involved.° Accordingly, in Columbia University, and
in numerous cases that followed, the Board uniformly declined to
assert jurisdiction where a connection could be demonstrated between
the labor activity in question and the charitable or educational func-
tion of the institution.' -
In Cornell, the Board emphasized that its prior refusal to assert
jurisdiction over this type of activity was entirely discretionary. It
noted, for instance, that the congressional conference report relied
upon in Columbia University singled out only non-profit hospitals
for statutory immunity. Thus, the Board reasoned that the determina-
tion of whether jurisdiction should be asserted over other types of
non-profit enterprises remained within the discretion of the Board. 8
1
 183 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
2 97 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
8 Id., 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
4 29 U.S.C. 152(2) (1964).
5 Ii. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947).
97 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
7 See, e.g., Leland Stanford University, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 59 L.R.R.M. 1161
(1965) (jurisdiction declined over federally subsidized linear accelerator center because ac-
tivities of center were related to educational purposes) ; University of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B.
No. 169, 56 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964) (jurisdiction declined over federally subsidized marine
science institute because activities were primarily educational rather than commercial).
8 183 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271-272.
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Essentially, the Cornell decision resulted from a "change in cir-
cumstances." The Board seemed greatly impressed by the fact that
today, educational institutions have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. The extent of . this impact is evidenced by the fact that in
the United States there are over 1,450 private colleges and universities
which employ more than one-half million individuaLs.° The Board
pointed out, for instance, that the combined annual income and ex-
penditures of these institutions exceeded $12 billion." The impact
on commerce of individual institutions also was found to be great.
Cornell, for example, was cited as the largest single employer in Tomp-
kins County, New York, with assets of over $282 million and annual
expenditures in excess of $142 million."
Additional factors which, according to the Board, warranted re-
consideration of the Columbia University doctrine included the ex-
panded involvement of the federal government in higher education,
and an increased congressional concern for according employees of
non-profit institutions the same statutory benefits available to em-
ployees in the profit-making sector. Also, the Board noted that "union
organization is already a fait accompli at many universities." It con-
cluded that this development, together with the eruption of labor dis-
putes at several universities, and the lack of any indication that they
will not recur, militated against continuing the Columbia University
doctrine."
The legality and wisdom of the Board's decision in Cornell seems
unquestionable. Many of the functions involved in the operation of
an institution of higher learning, though tangentially related to the
educational process, are essentially activities necessary to the conduct
of any business. As such, unless there is substantial justification, it is
patently unjust to deny workers at non-profit institutions the protec-
tion and benefits accorded by the Act. Additionally, the tremendous
growth of higher education during the past two decades, with the
concomitant increase in the effect this class of activity has on inter-
state commerce, certainly suggests that the Board's continued discre-
tionary refusal would be improper.
When the Board rendered its decision in Cornell, it refrained
from announcing any specific standards for general application. It
merely pointed out that the figures elucidated at the hearing clearly
established that Cornell University produced a sufficient impact on
° The Board noted, for instance, that presently included on college payrolls are 247,
000 full-time professors and 263,000 full and part-time nonprofessional employees. Id.,
74 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
12 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271.
11 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
12 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1275.
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interstate commerce to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction. Determi-
nation of a dollar volume standard, the Board stated, would be left for
future adjudication." Later, however, the Board changed its position,"
and decided to utilize its rule-making powers under the Administrative
Procedure Act."
In accordance with these procedures, the Board published an-
nouncements of its proposed rule in the Federal Register, and invited
testimony from interested parties." After evaluating the responses,
the Board announced that it would assert jurisdiction in any proceed-
ing arising under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act involving any private
non-profit college or university which has a gross annual revenue from
all sources (excluding only contributions which, because of limitations
by the grantor, are not available for use for operating expenses) of
not less than $1 million." Under this standard, the Board estimates
that eighty percent of all private colleges and universities and ninety-
five percent of nonprofessional personnel will be brought under the
Act."
2. NLRB Jurisdiction over Non-Profit Nursing Homes
In Drexel Home, Inc.," decided during the Survey year, the
NLRB asserted jurisdiction over a non-profit nursing home. In addi-
tion, the Board officially abandoned the non-profit status of an activity
as a determining criterion for refusing to assert jurisdiction.
The genesis of the Drexel case occurred during the latter part
of 1967 when the Drexel employees were organized by the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The union
petitioned the NLRB for certification as the exclusive bargaining
agent but the regional director dismissed the petition. On review, the
regional director's action was sustained by the Board.2° Both the
regional director and the Board justified the dismissal by referring to
University Nursing Homes, inc.," where the Board asserted jurisdic-
tion over a proprietary nursing home, but implicity excluded non-
profit establishments.
Following the Board's dismissal of its certification petition, the
union filed a complaint in federal district court charging the Board
13 Id.
14 74 Lab. Rd. Rep. 270 (1970).
15 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
10 35 Fed. Reg. 11270 (1970).
17
 29 C.F.R. 103.1 (1970).
18 186 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 75 L.R.R.M. 1442 (1970) (notice of Issuance of rule).
10 182 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 74 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1970).
20 For a discussion of the Board's rationale see AFSCME, Council 19 v. NLRB, 296
F. Supp. 1100, 69 L.R.R.M. 2275 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
21 168 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 63 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1967).
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with arbitrary and discriminatory action. The complaint specifically
alleged that the Board illegally distinguished non-profit from pro-
prietary nursing homes. The complaint requested that the court compel
the Board to assert jurisdiction. The Board countered the union's
complaint with a motion to dismiss.
In a memorandum opinion which was severely critical of the
Board position, the district court denied the Board's motion. 22 In the
text of its opinion, the court considered the nature of the Board's dis-
cretionary authority to refuse to assert jurisdiction. It conceded that,
under Section 14(c) (1) of the Act, the Board may
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of
the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is
not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its
jurisdiction. . . 2a
The court noted, however, that the Board had already determined in
University Nursing Homes that this class of employers had a sufficient
impact on commerce to warrant an assertion of jurisdiction. The
refusal to assert jurisdiction over I the Drexel home, therefore, consti-
tuted an impermissible discrimination against an entire category of
employers within that class.
Rather than contest the matter further, the Board reconsidered
its position and announced in Drexel Homes that it would entertain
the union's petition. In addition, the Board thoroughly repudiated
the non-profit status of an activity as a determining jurisdictional
factor. The Board stated:
[W]e reject the . . . arguments that an institution's effect on
commerce may be measured by its nonprofit status, its title,
its religious affiliation, or its occupants. Therefore, . . • we
are constrained to agree with the Court that the Employer's
nonprofit status is irrelevant and that no proper basis exists
for declining the assertion of jurisdiction in this proceeding
under the provisions of Section 14(c) (1) of the Act. 24
22 296 F. Supp. 1100, 69 L.R.R.M. 2275. The court conceded that, as a rule, judicial
review of Board actions in representation petitions cannot be obtained in a district court.
Citing Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 23 L.R.R.M. 2357 (2d Cir. 1949), however, the court
observed that a district court may intervene if the Board action results in plaintiff's denial
of a constitutional right. In the present case, the union had complained that the Board's
action contravened its statutory right to represent the Drexel employees. The union also
asserted that the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over non-profit nursing homes, while
extending it to proprietary ones, violated Section 2(2) of the Act. 296 F. Supp. at 1104,
69 L.R.R.M. at 2278.
23 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964).
24
 182 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1235,
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The decision in Drexel is in keeping with the position adopted in
Cornell; that is, jurisdiction will be asserted or denied on the basis
of the impact which the activity in question has on interstate com-
therce, without regard to the profit status of the employer.
3. NLRB Jurisdiction over Law Firms
While Cornell and Drexel illustrate the NLRB's willingness to
abandon previously enunciated discretionary policies and to assert
jurisdiction where circumstances warrant, the Board need not enter-
tain all disputes that arguably fall within its jurisdiction." During
the Survey year, a trial examiner for the NLRB recommended that
the Board exercise its discretionary authority and refuse to assert
jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving a law firm."
The dispute that gave rise to the trial examiner's recommendation
involved three secretaries who complained to the NLRB that they
had been discharged from a Phoenix, Arizona law firm for engaging
in activity allegedly protected under the Act. The firm's motion to
dismiss the secretaries' complaint was denied, and the case was placed
before the trial examiner. The Board instructed the trial examiner
to limit the hearing to the jurisdictional issues involved.
At the hearing, the law firm argued that for a number of reasons
it would be improper for the Board to assert jurisdiction. For instance,
the firm asserted that the practice of law is local in character, and thus,
labor disputes involving lawyers or law firms lack the requisite impact
on commerce called for in the Act. The firm also argued that since
legal secretaries have access to privileged communications, they are
confidential employees and, therefore, should be exempted from the
Act. Any other result, the firm urged, would impair the clients' right
to effective representation. - -
The General Counsel countered these arguments by noting that
like many others, this particular law firm met the Board's existing
jurisdictional standards for non-retail operations. 27 Further, the Gene-
ral Counsel alleged that the practice of law can no longer be considered
an essentially local enterprise. With respect to the confidential status
of the secretaries, the General Counsel stated that their responsibilities
did not warrant the use of that term as defined by the Board for pur-
poses of-exclusion from the Act." It was also contended that assertion
25 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964).
20 75 Lab. Rel. Rep. 350, 351 (1970).
27 Id.
28 -Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.13, No. 114, 75 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1970), ex-
presses the Board's current definition of "confidential employee" for purposes of exclusion
from the provisions of the Act, The definition includes "Loinly employees who assist and
act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate manage-
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of jurisdiction would in no way , deny clients effective representation.
The General Counsel concluded by noting that refusal to assert juris-
diction over law firms would deny thousands of persons the protection
afforded by the Act."
The trial examiner conceded the strength of the arguments ad-
vanced by both parties, but was convinced that the' possible conflict
between the privilege accorded attorney-client communications and
the information demands that might be required if law firms were
subject to Board jurisdiction outweighed the considerations advanced
by the General Counsel. For example, the mere attempt to establish
the degree of interstate business in which a firm is engaged could
generate a demand for confidential information." The problems en-
tailed in such possibilities, the trial examiner noted, are magnified by
the fact that secretaries and stenographers employed by law firms
are considered to be within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
The trial examiner considered these possibilities undesirable and
recommended that jurisdiction be declined.
B. District Court Jurisdiction to Order Decertification Election
In Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co.,1
 a United States
District Court determined that it had jurisdiction to order the NLRB
to conduct a decertification election. The employees' petition for the
election had been held in abeyance for over two years soley because
of the Board's "blocking charge" rule. Under this rule, the Board will
take no action on matters pertaining to representation so long as there
are unfair labor practice charges pending against the employer.'
ment labor relations policies affecting directly the Employer's own employees." 185
N.L.R.B. No. 114, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1196.
29 75 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 351.
90 In order to establish that a given firm has met the Board's jurisdictional stan-
dards, it might be necessary to disclose information pertaining both to the identity of an
attorney's clients and the size of his fee.
1 313 F. Supp. 105, 74 L.R.R.M. 2206 (ND. Ala. 1970), motion to dismiss and mo-
tion for summary judgment denied, 313 F. Supp. 105, 74 L.R.R.M. 2319 (N.D. Ala.
1970).
2 The "blocking charge" rule, which the Board relied upon to justify its failure to
process the employees' petition, is contained in Appendix B of the Board's Field Manual:
The [NLRB] has a general policy of not proceeding in any representation cases
. . . or union deauthorization case . • • where charges of unfair labor practices
affecting some or all of the same employees are concurrently pending and where
the charging party is a party to the 	 case.
The pendency of a charge, as used here, includes all stages in the life of a charge
up to and including a dismissal, on the one hand; or, on the other, up to and in-
cluding a court decree with which there has not been full compliance, -
Section 11730 of NLRB Field Manual as cited by the court at 313 F. Supp. at 107, 74
L.R.R.M. at 2208.
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The events leading up to Templeton began in late 1964 when the
International Typographical Union (ITU) demanded recognition on
the basis of signed authorization cards. The company refused and the
union called a strike. The strike failed to induce the employer to grant
recognition, but it did generate employer unfair labor practices that
led to the issuance of a card-based bargaining order. The order was
enforced' and negotiations commenced. When the negotiations failed
to produce agreement, the union filed additional unfair labor practice
charges with the Board, and petitioned for the institution of contempt
proceedings against the company.
In early 1968, a number of Dixie employees who were not union
members filed a decertification petition. The Board, however, refused
to act on this petition because of the unresolved unfair labor practice
charges against employer. The employees then filed a class action in
federal district court, alleging that the Board's refusal to process the
decertification petition deprived them of their statutory rights under
both the Labor Management Relations Act 4 and the Administrative
Procedure Act.' The Board responded to the complaint by moving to
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. The court, however, deter-
mined that the jurisdictional criteria set forth by the Supreme Court
in Leedom v. Kyne° had been met, and, therefore, denied the Board's
motion.
Under Leedom, a district court can entertain a suit involving the
NLRB if there has been unlawful Board action that has inflicted an
injury upon the plaintiff for which the law, apart from the review
provision of the Act, affords a remedy.' Addressing itself to the first
of these criteria, the Templeton court found that there could be no
doubt that the Board's action was both unlawful and the cause of
injury to the plaintiff. Section 9(c) (1) of the Act, the court noted,
accords employees a statutory right to a decertification election.' This
3 International Typographical Union v. NLRB, 371 E.2d 347, 63 L.R.R.M. 2534
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
4 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
5 5 U.S.C. 1 551 at seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
° 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
7 Id. at 188.
8 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964). This section provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such reg-
ulations as may be prescribed by the Board—
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor or-
ganization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of em-
ployees ... (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has
been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bar-
gaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in [the Act] ;
. . . .
[T]he Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause
1034
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right had been denied for over two years solely because of a Board
rule issued unilaterally by the General Counsel pursuant to the au-
thority conveyed by Section 3(d) of the Act° to establish "instruc-
tions" for "guidance" purposes." The court emphasized the limited
effect that should be given the rule by pointing out that the Board
itself did not consider the blocking charge "instruction" to be of any
legal significance. 1.1
Because of the severe substantive effects of the blocking charge
rule on employees' rights generally, the Templeton court made it clear
that the Board should have adhered to the rule-making procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act in its formulation. Adopting the
rationale of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,' 2
the Templeton court noted that the rule-making procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act were intended to assure fairness and
mature consideration by administrative agencies when formulating
rules of general application. Therefore, there was " 'no warrant in law'
for the Board's utilization of an internally generated rule or 'instruc-
tion' to deprive [the] plaintiffs of their statutory rights.""
The court next addressed itself to the second part of the Leedom
test and noted that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
conferred jurisdiction upon district courts for the purpose of com-
pelling agencies to perform functions which were "unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed.' Concluding that two years was
adequate time for the Board to have disposed of the unfair labor
practice charges and to conduct a decertification election, the court
found that the failure to do so, or even to indicate that it had any
inclination to do so, clearly established the type of recalcitrance at
which section 10 was directed.
While the analysis offered in Templeton provides a persuasive
argument for requiring the Board to give priority to representation
matters, the rationale behind the "blockage rule" also should be con-
sidered. The Board attempts to conduct elections under laboratory
conditions. Unremedied unfair labor practices may very well interfere
with those laboratory conditions. Thus, in one respect, it is important
that the Board dispose of the unfair labor practice charges. On the
other hand, in a case such as Templeton, where the incumbent union
to believe that a question of representation . . . exists, it shall direct an election
by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof. (Emphasis added.)
9
 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964).
10 There was no dispute regarding the employees' compliance with the prerequisites
for a valid decertification petition. 313 F. Supp. at 111, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2211.
11 Id.
12 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
13 313 F. Supp. at 112, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2212.
14 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
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has achieved its recognized status through a card-based bargaining
order, and thus has never been subjected to a secret ballot test of
employee support, undue delay in processing a decertification petition
may well do a disservice to the employees. Perhaps, as the district
court suggests in Templeton, resort to the rule-making procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act will lead to an effective compromise.
II. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Authority of Regional Director to Determine
Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Section 9 of the Labor Management Relations Act' sets out the
powers and obligations of the NLRB in representation disputes. Un-
der this section, whenever a representation petition is filed, the Board
must investigate and, if it appears that a valid dispute exists, schedule
a hearing on the matter? The hearing may be conducted by an officer
or employee of a regional office, but according to section 9(c) (1), his
function is limited to compiling a record of the proceedings to be
forwarded, without comment, to the Board for final disposition. 8
In 1959, however, Congress amended Section 3 (b) of the Act' to
permit the Board to delegate to regional directors certain powers pre-
viously exercised only by the Board. This amendment specifically
included the power
to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and
determine whether a question of representation exists, and
to direct an election or take a secret ballot . . . and certify
the results thereof .. .
In Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 6 decided during the Survey year,
the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the First and Second
Circuits over the scope of the regional directors' powers under section
3 (b). The narrow issue was whether a regional director's unit determi-
nations are subject to mandatory plenary review by the Board. A
unanimous Court held that they were not.
The dispute in Magnesium Casting concerned three employees
whom the company claimed were supervisors under Section 2(11) of
the Act, and thus excludable from the bargaining unit. The regional
1 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
2
 29 U.S.C.
	 1 5 9(c) ( 1) (1964).
Id.
4 29 US.C. § 153(b) (1964).
5 Id.
6 401 U.S. 137 (1971).
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director, acting pursuant to a designation of authority from the Board,
found the three to be properly within the unit. The employer asked
the Board to review the regional director's findings, but its petition was
denied. An election was held and the union was certified as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the employees.
Thereupon the employer invited an unfair labor practice charge
by refusing to bargain with the newly certified union. Relying on a
Second Circuit decision, Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. NLRB,'
the company claimed that the Board could not find an unfair labor
practice based upon a regional director's representation determination
without first granting plenary review. The Board rejected the com-
pany's arguments and, noting that it disagreed with the Pepsi-Cola
decision, found a violation of section 8(a) (5) and issued a bargaining
order. The First Circuit enforced the order.°
In affirming the Board and the First Circuit, the Supreme Court
noted that in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB 9
 it had held that
matters once fully litigated before the Board in a representation pro-
ceeding could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing.1° Therefore, the sole issue in Magnesium Casting concerned the
power of the Board to delegate to regional directors the authority to
make such final determinations.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, noted that the legislative
history of the 1959 amendment indicated that Congress intended to
utilize the regional directors' expertise concerning unit determinations
to lighten the Board's workload and to expedite its processes. If it were
not for the 1959 amendment, Justice Douglas pointed out, the Board
would have to decide the almost two thousand representation cases
per year that were currently disposed of by regional directors."
Justice Douglas concluded that Congress had made a clear choice,
and under section 3 (b) the Board need exercise only discretionary
review of the determinations of the regional director.
B. Recognition Without Election
1. The Law Before Gissel
A fundamental element of a union organizational drive is the
solicitation of signed statements from employees authorizing the
7 409 F.2d 676, 70 L.R.R.M. 3185 (2d Cir. 1969).
8 427 F.2d 114, 74 L.R.R.M. 2234 (1st Cir. 1970).
9 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
10 Pittsburgh Plate Glass was decided before the 1959 amendment of section 3(b).
11 Justice Douglas noted that of 1,999 representation decisions issued in fiscal 1969,
1,872 were rendered by regional directors and 127 by the Board. 401 U.S. at 142.
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union to act as their exclusive bargaining agent. Acquisition of authori-
zation cards from thirty percent of the employees in an appropriate
unit permits the union to petition the NLRB for a representation
election.' If the union is successful in the representation election, the
Board will certify it as the exclusive representative of the employees,
and will instruct the employer to commence bargaining.' A Board-
conducted election, however, is not the only procedure available to
a union which is attempting to establish a bargaining relationship with
an employer. A union instead may solicit authorization cards from a
majority of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit, present
these cards to the employer as evidence of the employees' sentiment,
and request immediate recognition as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. The statutory authority for this method of acquiring recog-
nition is found in Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.° This section obligates
the employer to bargain with the representative of his employees sub-
ject to the provisions of section 9(a). 4 Section 9(a) requires that
the representative shall be selected by a majority of the employees,
but does not require Board certification.
A closely supervised Board election is concededly the preferable
procedure for assessing employee sentiment .° Consequently, employers
faced with a card-based demand for recognition are often reluctant
to grant immediate recognition to the union, and instead prefer to
wait until the union is certified following a Board-conducted election.
The Board itself prefers the election procedure as a means of
ascertaining employees' representation desires, and, as a rule, will
not accept authorization cards as evidence of a union's majority
status.° Nonetheless, on occasion the Board will forego an election in
favor of a card check. If the card check reveals that a majority of the
employees in the unit have designated the union as their representative,
the Board will order the employer to commence bargaining.?
Because the accurate determination of a union's majority status
is of vital concern to employees and employers alike, it would seem
that the Board would resort to the concededly inferior card check
method only in limited and clearly defined circumstances. Unfortu-
nately, this has not been the case. During the past two decades, the
NLRB has issued card-based bargaining orders in a manner that has
1 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
8 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(5) (1964).
4 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1964).
5 See, e.g., Aaron Bros. Co.. 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
6 Id.
7 See discussion at pp. 1039-45 infra.
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generated confusion, discontent and litigation. 8
 By 1969, the Board's
practices had even led to a sharp split among the courts of appeals.°
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.," the Supreme Court reviewed
the practice of issuing card-based bargaining orders and resolved the
circuit conflict in favor of the Board. It was hoped the Gissel decision
at last would clarify the uncertainty in this area of labor law. However,
during the Survey year, a number of decisionS of the Board and the
courts of appeals indicated that Gissel has not provided the harmony
that was anticipated. In some cases, the Board and the courts differed
markedly in their interpretation of Gissel. The NLRB seems to be of
the opinion that it retains the same prerogatives that it had prior to
this decision of the Supreme Court. The courts of appeals, on the other
hand, are not so willing to read Gissel as a carte blanche affirmation
of Board discretion in the authorization card area. This . discussion
will trace the development of the Board's policy toward card-based
bargaining orders up to and including Gissel, and will analyze the
recent decisions of the Board and courts in an attempt to define the
present areas of conflict.
For many years, the NLRB's policy toward card-based bargain-
ing orders focused upon the employer's frame of mind when he re-
jected the union's recognition demand. If the employer maintained a
"good faith doubt" that the union actually represented the majority
of the employees, the Board would permit him to test his doubts in
an election." If, however, the initial refusal to bargain was predicated
upon "bad faith," the Board would resort to the authorization cards.
In Joy Silk Mills v. NLRB," the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia described the Board's position as follows:
[Ain employer may refuse recognition to a union when
motivated by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority
status. . . . When, however, such refusal is due to a desire to
gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority;
the refusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation
8 For an excellent discussion of the litigation that has arisen due to the Board's
issuance of card-based bargaining orders, see Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75
Yale L.J. 805 (1966).
0
 Affirming the Board's policy was NLRB v. Sinclair Oil, 397 F.2d 157, 68 L.R.R.M.
2720 (1st Cir. 1968). Opposing the Board's policy were NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
398 F.2d 336, 68 L.R.R.M. 2636 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's Inc., 398 F.2d 337,
68 L.R.R.M. 2638 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339,
68 L.R.R.M. 2639 (4th Cir. 1968).
10 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
liNLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 1-A L.R.R.M. 585 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
12 185 F.2d 732, 27 L.R.R.M. 2012 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914
(1951).
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of the duty to bargain set forth in section 8(a) (5) of the
Act."
The doctrine advanced in Joy Silk Mills was applied by the
Board to two types'of cases. 14 The first featured conduct by the em-
ployer, contemporaneous with the initial refusal to bargain, that
tended to establish bad faith. For example, the employer might refuse
even to consider the union's card offering," or, as in the case of Fred
Snow & Sons," the employer might agree to be bound by a card
check, but then renege and insist upon an election when the results of
the check substantiate the union's claim.
In the second class of cases, the Board would look to employer
conduct subsequent to the initial refusal to bargain. If the Board de-
termined that there were violations of sections 8(a) (1) or 8(a) (3), it
would draw an inference that the prior refusal to bargain was not due
to a good faith doubt of the union's majority, but was merely a delay-
ing tactic to give the employer time to undermine the union's majority
status."
The Board's application of the Joy Silk doctrine left employers
faced with card-based recognition demands, yet who still desired a
Board-conducted certification election, in a rather precarious position.
Failure to consent to a card check could be construed as a sign of bad
faith, and thus lead to a bargaining order. On the other hand, if a card
check were conducted, the employer would be bound by the result.
Furthermore, if the employer questioned any of the employees in or-
der to verify that the cards accurately reflected their wishes, his ac-
tions might be construed as unlawful interrogation in violation of sec-
tion 8 (a)(1). This in itself could give rise to a bargaining order under
Joy Silk." Compounding the employer's dilemma was the fact that the
Joy Silk test operated as a per se rule. 1° That is, any unfair labor prac-
tice, however slight; committed by an employer, gave rise to an infer-
ence that the refusal to bargain was in bad faith. 2°
Bargaining orders issued under the Joy Silk doctrine often gave
18 Id. at 741, 27 L.R.R.M. at 2018.
14 For a thorough discussion of the Board's application of the Joy Silk doctrine see
Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 805, 810 (1966).
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. C.J. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476, 61 L.R.R.M. 2406 (7th Cir.
1966).
16 134 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687, 51
L.R.R.M. 2199 (9th Cir. 1962).
17 See, e.g., New England Liquor Sales Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 61 L.R.R.M. 1315
(1966).
18 NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 66 L.R.R.M, 2596 (4th Cir.
1967).
19 See Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 805, 814 (1966).
20 Id.
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rise to litigation. Especially subject to criticism were bargaining orders
predicated upon an inference of bad faith drawn from the employer's
unfair labor practices. In Aaron Bros. v. NLRB," the Board modified
the Joy Silk doctrine. Under this new policy, only the more serious un-
fair labor practices—those that tended to undermine the union's ma-
jority—would result in a bargaining order.
A prerequisite to the finding of a violation of section 8(a) (5), and
to the issuance of a bargaining order, is a determination by the Board
that the cards actually established that the union represents a major-
ity." In making this determination, the Board will discount any cards
found to have been obtained through fraud or coercion. 23 Even where
the cards are concededly uncoerced, there remains some question as to
the subjective motivation of the employee in signing. This stems from
the fact that an employee may have thought that he was contributing
merely toward the thirty percent showing needed to secure a Board
election."
For a number of years, the Board was receptive to any evidence
supporting a charge that contested cards were signed for the limited
purpose of securing an election. Upon an offering of such evidence the
disputed cards would not be included when deciding the union's major-
ity status." The present Board policy, which was announced in Cum-
berland Shoe Corp.," is considerably less discriminating. Under Cum-
berland, any card which on its face authorizes the union to act as
bargaining representative for the signer will not be discounted unless it
is established that the signer was told that the sole purpose of the card
was to seek an election. 27 This sole purpose test, however, is rather se-
vere in that it does not pursue the subjective intent of the card signer.
The Board, however, has cautioned trial examiners against too mech-
anical an application of the Cumberland rule. At all times, the Board
emphasizes, trial examiners should endeavor to assure employee free
choice."
The Joy Silk and Cumberland decisions received considerable
21 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1966).
22 The duty to bargain does not arise unless the union is the majority representative.
But see J. P. Stevens v. NLRB, — F.2d —, 76 L.R.R.M. 2817 (5th Cir. 1971), where the
Board issued a bargaining order as a remedy for an employer's "egregious" unfair labor
practices. Granting enforcement, the court of appeals stated that the order was warranted
even if the union never attained majority status.
23 Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963).
24 The issue of the employees' subjective intent becomes more complex when
ambiguous authorization cards are used, i.e., cards that indicate that they may be used
both to gain an election and to designate the signer's bargaining representative.
25 Englewood Lumber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 48, 47 L.R.R.M. 1304 (1961).
28 144 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963).
2T Id., 54 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
28 Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968).
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criticism from the courts29
 and from law review commentators." In
Gissel Packing Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify
the law regarding card-based bargaining orders. In Gissel, the Court
consolidated for decision three opinions from the Fourth Circuit, and
a conflicting opinion from the First Circuit 8 1 In each of these cases,
the union presented to the employer authorization cards which pur-
portedly established that a majority of the unit employees had desig-
nated the union as their representative. Without exception, the em-
ployers refused to recognize the unions and countered with intensive
anti-union campaigns. In the course of the anti-union drives, the em-
ployers engaged in conduct which the unions alleged violated Sec-
tions 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. In two of the cases, the union
also charged the employers with violating section 8(a) (5), and sought
immediate recognition through a 10(c) bargaining order. The other
two unions proceeded to election and were defeated. They too then al-
leged section 8(a) (5) violations and requested bargaining orders. In
each case, the Board found in favor of the union, and ordered the em-
ployers to engage in collective bargaining upon request. The employers
refused, and the four cases were appealed to the respective circuits.
The First Circuit accepted the Board's assertion that the 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (3) violations warranted the finding of an 8(a) (5) violation, and
the issuance of the bargaining order. The Fourth Circuit, however,
cited to the rationale of NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 82 and de-
nied enforcement of the bargaining order. In S.S. Logan, the Fourth
Circuit decided that authorization cards were inherently unreliable as
an indication of employee wishes, and thus could not give rise to a duty
to bargain." Therefore, the court concluded that a bargaining order
could not properly be issued on a card majority.
The Supreme Court, in Gissel, specifically reversed the Fourth
20
 See S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967);
Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 64 L.R.R.M. 2849 (5th Cir.
1967) (enforcement denied).
80 There have been a number of comprehensive treatments of the Board's pre-
Gissel authorization card policy. Articles critical of the policy include: Browne, Obliga-
tion to Bargain on Basis of Card Majority, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 334 (1969); and Comment,
Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 805 (1966). Articles more receptive to the
Board's policy are: Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an Election,
65 Mich. L. Rev. 857 (1967); Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a
Card Majority, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 349 (1969); and Comment, Union Authorization Cards:
A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order to Bargain?, 47 Texas L. Rev. 87 (1968).
81 See note 9 supra.
82 386 F.2d 562, 66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967).
83 In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Haynsworth, speaking for the court, noted
that unions successful in obtaining authorization cards from 30 to 50% of the employees
won only 19% of the elections; those holding cards from 50 to 70%, won 48% of the
elections; those holding cards from over 70% won 74% of the elections. Id. at 565, 66
L.R.R.M. at 2598.
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Circuit and affirmed the Board's current policy on authorization card-
based bargaining orders. In arriving at its decision, the Court did not
look to the Joy Silk-Aaron Bros. doctrine previously employed by the
Board, but instead relied upon a new policy. Under the Board's new
policy, the Court noted, the Joy Silk doctrine was virtually abandoned
and now
an employer's good faith doubt is largely irrelevant, and the
'key to the issuance of a bargaining order is the commission
of serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the elec-
tion processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair
election."
The Court interpreted this policy as meaning that an employer
could respond to a union's card-based recognition demand with a sim-
ple "no comment" and, regardless of his subjective motivation, insist
upon an election. The Court qualified this interpretation, however, by
noting that under the new policy the Board would not tolerate a refusal
to bargain where the employer had actual knowledge of his employees'
support for the union."
With this policy in mind, the Court addressed itself to the long-
questioned issues presented in Gissel. Initially, the Court stated that a
valid bargaining relationship could be effectuated through procedures
other than a Board-conducted election." Citing its decision in United
Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.," the Court emphasized
that when there is no "bona fide dispute" as to the union's majority, a
duty to bargain arises. Thus, a refusal to fulfill this obligation is a vio-
lation of section 8(a) (5) that may be remedied by a bargaining or-
der."
The Court also held, contrary to the position taken by the Fourth
Circuit, that authorization cards are not "inherently unreliable" as in-
dicia of employee desires." Therefore, the Court agreed with the
Board that when the election process has been interfered with, a card
check might be the only way of determining employee choice." Thus,
Gissel clearly and specifically decided that a duty to bargain can arise
without a Board election, and that union authorization cards solicited
84 395 U.S. at 594.
a5 Id. The Court considered Fred Snow & Sons to be that type of case.
3° In S.S. Logan, the Fourth Circuit had advanced the argument that the 1947
Taft-Hartiy Amendments, which provided that an election was necessary prior to Board
certification, precluded bargaining orders based upon authorization cards.
31 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
3° 395 U.S. at 597-98.
" Id. at 601-04.
40 Id. at 602. The Court's affirmation of the use of authorization cards was limited
to situations in which the cards themselves were not ambiguous, and clearly stated that
they were to designate the union as representative. 395 U.S. at 606.
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in accordance with the Board's standards are reliable to provide an al-
ternate route for determining majority status.
The controversial portions of the Gissel opinion concern those sit-
uations in which the Board, by issuing a 10(c) bargaining order, may
compel an employer to bargain with an uncertified union. In oral argu-
ment the Board explained its policy to mean that a bargaining order
would issue where the employer had committed "independent and sub-
stantial unfair labor practices disruptive of election conditions," or
where the employer, had actual knowledge of the union's status from
sources independent of authorization cards. 41 However, because all of
the cases consolidated in Gissel involved unfair labor practices, the
Court chose to address itself only to the former issue.'
The Court pointed out that both the Board and the lower courts
were in agreement that " 'exceptional' cases, marked by 'outrageous'
and 'pervasive' unfair labor practices," can validly give rise to a bar-
gaining order." The Court went so far as to indicate that where the
violations were so coercive that they could not be remedied, a bargain-
ing order would be appropriate, although the union had never acquired
majority support." The heart of the Gissel decision, however, is con-
tained in its analysis of the Board's powers in cases involving less seri-
ous unfair practices. On this issue, the Court stated:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's
use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases
marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still
have the tendency to undermine majority strength and im-
pede the election processes. The Board's authority to issue
such an order on a lesser showing of employer misconduct is
appropriate, we should reemphasize, where there is also a
showing that at one point the union bad a majority; in such
a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free
choice becomes as important a goal as deterring employer
misbehaviour. In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its
discretion, then, the Board can properly take into considera-
tion the extensiveness of an employer's unfair practices in
terms of their past effect on election conditions and the like-
lihood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board finds
that the possibility of erasing the effect of past practices and
of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of tra-
ditional remedies, though present is slight and that employee
41 See discussion at p. 1043 supra.
42 395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
43 Id. at 613.
44 Id.
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sentiment once expressed through cards would on balance, be
better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order
should issue. 4°
The Gissel Court emphasized that there exists another category of
cases involving minor unfair labor practices that have little effect on
the election process. In these cases, a bargaining order is inappropri-
ate."
It would seem apparent from the above analysis that the Court
prefers the election procedure, and approves of resorting to cards only
where a fair election cannot be assured. It is also clear that the Court
has left this determination to the NLRB.47 In its discussion of the
Board's authority to issue bargaining orders the Court gave no indica-
tion as to what specific factors, if any, the Board should consider when
evaluating the lingering effect of an employer's unfair practices on the
electoral atmosphere. The absence of such a clearly defined standard
has generated much of the post-Gissel litigation.
2. The Law After Gissel
In NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc.," the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by
the Board because of the Board's alleged failure to adhere to the
Supreme Court's decision in Gissel. The events upon which the bar-
gaining order was predicated occurred in 1965. The employer, Ameri-
can Cable, operated a community antenna television business in
Mississippi with seven employees and a general manager. The union
contacted the employer and requested immediate recognition as the
employees' exclusive bargaining representative. It offered to prove its
its majority status by a show of authorization cards. The employer
denied the union's request and commenced activities that the Board
found violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3).4° These violations, to-
45 Id. at 614-15.
46 Id. at 615.
41 According to the Fourth Circuit, bargaining orders are unduly harsh remedies
in this type of situation because "in the great majority of cases a cease and desist order,
with the posting of appropriate notice" would expunge the effects of unfair labor
practices and permit a fair election. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570,
66 L.R.R.M. 2596, 2603 (4th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court, however, observed that
the NLRB, and not the courts, should evaluate the effects on the election process of
unfair labor practices. In fashioning its remedies under section 10(c), the Court con-
tinued, the Board "draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own .. . ."
Consequently, its determinations are to be accorded special respect by reviewing courts.
395 U.S. at 612 n.32.
48 427 F.2d 446, 73 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1970).
49 American Cable Sys. Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 63 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1966). In
American Cable, the employer violated { 8(a)(1) by interrogating employees about their
union affiliation, by suggesting that they form a company union, and by promising
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gether with the fact that the union possessed valid cards from the
majority, caused the.Board to find that the employer's refusal to bar-
gain was in bad faith, and, therefore, in violation of .section 8(a) (5).
Accordingly, the Board issued an order requiring American Cable to
bargain with the union on request."
The company refused to comply with the order, and the Board
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for enforcement!'
The court determined that the employer had violated sections 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3), but refused to endorse the Board's finding of a sec-
tion 8(a) (5) violation because it was phrased in terms of good or bad
faith, instead of the standard set forth in Gisse/.52 Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to the Board for further findings in accor-
dance with the Gissel standards.
The Board responded by affirming its prior ruling." In arriving
at this decision, however, the Board did not rely upon its earlier find-
ing that American Cable had acted in bad faith. Instead, it found that
the violations of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) were so egregious and
pervasive that a bargaining order was warranted. The Board also
found that by engaging in the unfair labor practices the employer had
undermined the union's majority, and thus made an election a less re-
liable method of ascertaining employee sentiment than a check of au-
thorization cards.'"
The Board again petitioned for enforcement, and once again the
court of appeals remanded for a determination of the precise nature of
the present election atmosphere." The court took this action because
upon the previous remand, the Board had refused to consider evidence
offered by the American Cable Company proving that there had been
a complete turnover of employees since the 1965 unfair labor prac-
tices, and that the only management official involved in the incident
benefits and threatening reprisals. Section 8(a)(3) was violated when two employees were
discharged after admitting their union affiliation.
Go Id., 63 L.R.R.M. at 1298.
51
 NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 414 F.2d 661, 71 L.R.R.M. 2979 (5th Cir.
1969).
52
 Id. at 663, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
55
 American Cable Sys., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 72 L.R.R.M. 1524 (1969).
64 Id.
55
 NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 73 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir.
1970). The court's opening remarks indicated its displeasure with the Board's disposi-
tion of the previous remand:
In the first act of what we trust will be only a two-act play and not a
drama of Shakespearian proportions, we remanded this case to the National
Labor Relations Board for additional findings in light of NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co  [We have] determined that these findings of the Board are
still insufficient under the teachings of Gissel to justify a bargaining order ... .
Id.
1046
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
had departed. The company argued that these factors indicated that a
free election could now be held.
In finding the refusal of the Board to consider this evidence im-
proper, the court distinguished American Cable from NLRB v. L.B.
Foster Co." which held it to be inappropriate for an appellate court to
consider developments which occur between the issuance of a bargain-
ing order and the enforcement proceedings. The Faster case, the court
noted, did not involve a remand for additional findings, whereas Amer-
ican Cable did.
The American Cable court also refused to follow precedent hold-
ing that developments such as loss of union majority occurring subse-
quent to an unfair labor practice do not warrant denying enforcement
of Board orders." Justification for this practice is based upon the be-
lief that the unlawful refusal of an employer to bargain with the rep-
resentative of his employees "disrupts the employees' morale, deters
their organizational activities, and discourages their membership in
unions." 58
 Therefore, the loss in the union's majority might be the di-
rect result of the employer's wrongful conduct, and any consideration
given to the change in status would permit the employer to benefit
from his wrongful refusal to bargain."
The court in American Cable expressed the opinion that this rea-
soning was inapplicable due to the policy espoused by the Supreme
Court in Gissel. According to the Fifth Circuit, Gissel placed card-
based bargaining orders in a special category. They were now
an extraordinary remedy available to the Board to overcome
the polluting effects of the employer's unfair labor practices
on the electoral atmosphere. The order is not a traditional
punitive remedy, but is a therapeutic one. It is not, therefore,
the type of remedy which is automatically entitled to en-
forcement at any time after the occurrence of the unfair la-
bor practice. . . . On the contrary, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that an open free election rather than a bargaining
order is the preferred remedy if such an election is possible.
We think it clear from the foregoing that the Court in Gis-
sel clearly contemplated that no bargaining order should be
issued unless at the time the Board issues such an order it
finds the electoral atmosphere unlikely to produce a fair
election."
56 NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 72 L.R.R.M. 2736 (9th Cir. 1969).
87 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339
U.S. 563 (1950) ; Franks Bros. Co, v. NLRB; 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
58 321 U.S. at 704.
59 Id.
00 427 F.2d at 448, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2914.
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It was for the purpose of determining the current electoral atmosphere
that the Fifth Circuit had remanded the case initially. The Board,
however, merely applied the Gissel standards to the electoral atmos-
phere as it existed in 1965—a response the court viewed as a "litany,
reciting conclusions by rote without factual explication!'" -
The Board issued its response to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of Gissel in its decision in Gibson Products Co.°2 In Gibson, the Board,
after a consideration of American Cable, stated, "[w]e respectfully
disagree. In our view, the holding of the court misconceives the ra
tionale of the Gissel decision. . . ."" The Board noted that adoption
of the American Cable rationale would unduly limit the situations in
which bargaining orders might issue. According to the Board, the va-
lidity of determining the need for a bargaining order by an analysis
of the electoral atmosphere as it existed at the time of the unfair labor
practice, is evidenced by the Supreme Court's affirmation, "without
qualification," of the principle that a union's loss of majority status
between the time of the unfair labor practice. and Board's decision will
not render an order inappropriate." The Board was also of the opinion
that the Court in Gissel had rejected what appeared to be the underly-
ing consideration of the American Cable decision. That is, that the im-
position of a bargaining order when the employees may no longer
desire the union is an unduly harsh remedy that works to the detri-
ment of their section 7 rights." The Board pointed out that in Gissel
the Court stated that "a bargaining order is designed as much to
remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct"
It appears from Gibson that the Board considers a union to be
vested with an absolute right to a card-based bargaining order if at
any time an employer's unfair labor practices become serious enough
61 Id.
62
 185 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 75 L.R.R.M. 1055 (1970).
03
 Id., 75 L.R.R.M. at 1056.
64 Id. The Board cited from Gissel:
We have long held that the Board . . has authority to issue a bargaining
order without requiring the union to show that it has been able to maintain
its majority. . . . [T]he Board has the same authority even where it is clear
that the union, which once had possession of cards from a majority of the
employees, represents only a minority when the bargaining order is entered.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 610.
03 Id. Section 7 also guarantees to employees the right to refrain from union
activity. In American Cable, the court of appeals seemed to be alluding to this when
it concluded its decision.by stating:
Since Gissel teaches us that authorization .cards are not as trustworthy as ballots
all concerned must be particularly careful lest the principles of majoritarianism
in union representation be unnecessarily frustrated by the cavalier use of
bargaining orders.
NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 73 L.R.R.M. 2913, 2914-915 (1970),
00 185 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1056.
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to cloud the outcome of an election. Although this interpretation may
seem to conflict with the language in Gissel which instructs the Board
to use its "traditional remedies" to erase the effects of past practices,
it is submitted that it is in keeping with Gissel's rationale. For if an
employer's unfair practices are so severe that, at the time they are
committed, they cannot be corrected by the traditional Board reme-
dies, valid authorization cards then become the best source for ascer-
taining employee sentiment. The fact that it takes some time for the
Board to process the action should not change this fact any more than
would Board delay in counting the ballots cast in an election.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court noted that the propriety of a bar-
gaining order in cases not involving egregious unfair labor practices
would depend upon whether the Board found that these lesser unfair
labor practices were, nonetheless, serious enough to make it unlikely
that they could be offset by traditional remedies and thus permit a fair
election." The Court also emphasized that "{i]t is for the Board and
not the courts ... to make that determination, based on its expert esti-
mate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices
of varying intensity."" During the Survey year three circuits dissented
from the finality of Board determination in this type of case. The Sec-
ond and Eighth Circuits rejected completely a Board finding that em-
ployer unfair labor practices interfered with the election process, and
refused to enforce the bargaining orders;" the Seventh Circuit, al-
though granting enforcement of the Board's bargaining order, ordered
modification of the Board's order to include notice to employees that
they could petition independently for a new election."
In Drives, Inc.," the Board set aside a consent election, wherein
the union had been defeated, on the grounds that the employer's unfair
labor practices influenced the outcome." The Board also determined
that the employer's misconduct was so prejudicial to the union that a
fair election could not now be conducted, and, therefore, issued a bar-
gaining order. On petition for enforcement, the court of appeals ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the initial finding by the Board that the
employer's misconduct contributed to the union defeat. The court sug-
gested that valid arguments advanced by the employer in opposition
to the union, rather than the unfair labor practices, may have induced
the employees to vote against the union. 73 Accordingly, the court re-
67 395 U.S. at 614.
88 Id. at 612 n.32.
69 NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 76 L.R.R.M. 2288 (2d Cir. 1971);
Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940, 76 L,R.R.M. 2613 (8th Cir. 1971).
70 NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354, 76 L.R.R.M. 2296 (7th Cir. 1971).
71 172 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 68 L.R.R.M. 1428 (1968).
72 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 143.
78 440 F.2d at 365, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
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jected the Board's finding of a section 8(a) (5) violation. The court
did agree, however, that the conduct of the employer subsequent to the
election was such as to preclude a fair determination of employee sen-
timent by ballots. The court noted that under Gissel the election at-
mosphere is the crucial factor in determining the legitimacy of a bar-
gaining order. Thus, the court agreed to grant enforcement.
The Drives court was concerned that the union might never have
represented a majority of the employees. In Gissel, the Supreme Court
had considered this possibility, and stated that a bargaining order
might still issue because the disenfranchisement was only temporary.
If the majority truly did not want the union to represent them, the
Gissel Court reasoned, they could petition the Board for an election."
The issue of majority disenfranchisement was considered especially
important in Drives because of the possibility that the union's election
defeat was not precipitated by employer misconduct, but merely re-
flected the true, uncoerced desires of the employees. For this reason,
the Drives court felt it important to assure that the employees accu-
rately understood their right to petition for an election, and thus or-
dered the modification of the Board order."
In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.," the Second Circuit was faced
with the issue of whether the employer's unfair labor practices were
serious enough to warrant issuance of a bargaining order. The events
which gave rise to the litigation occurred in 1967, when a union at-
tempted for the third time to organize a General Stencils plant." The
union presented the employer with signed authorization cards from
a majority of the employees and demanded immediate recognition.
When the employer refused, the union filed a complaint with the
Board charging the employer with violations of sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (5). The case went before a trial examiner who agreed with the
union that certain section 8(a) (1) offenses had occurred. He con-
cluded, however, on the basis of pre-Gissel reasoning, that a finding
of a section 8(a)(5) violation was not warranted. The trial examiner's
decision rested on the fact that the employer presented sufficient evi-
dence to establish his "good faith doubt" as to the union's majority
status, and that the section 8(a) (1) violations were not so great as to
justify rejection of this evidence. Accordingly, the trial examiner did
not recommend issuance of a bargaining order.
When the Board reviewed the trial examiner's decision, the Gis-
sel standards were in force. Looking to these standards, the NLRB
74 395 U.S. at 613.
75 440 F.2d at 367, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2307.
76 438 F.2d 894, 76 L.R.R.M. 2288 (2d Cir. 1971).
77 In the two previous attempts, the unions lost Board-conducted certification
elections. Id. at 896, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2289.
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determined that the employer's conduct was "of such a nature as to
have a lingering effect and make a fair or coercion-free election quite
dubious, if not impossible."" Therefore, the Board ordered the em-
ployer to bargain with the union on request.
On petition for enforcement, the court of appeals sharply criti-
cized the Board's handling of the case. Initially, the court disagreed
with the Board on its findings pertaining to the section 8(a) (1) viola-
tions. The Board had based its charge, in part, upon the employer's
unlawful interrogation of three employees. Two employees were ques-
tioned about their union membership, and a third about a conversation
he had with an NLRB agent. The court, however, pointed out that an
employer's questioning will not constitute unlawful interrogation un-
less it meets the five-part test formulated in Bourne v. NLRB." Ap-
plying this test, the court determined that the employer had not
violated the Act by attempting to ascertain his employees' union senti-
ment. Accordingly, it refused to enforce that part of the Board's cease
and desist order which applied to this activity. The court did find,
however, that there could be no justification for the employer's interest
in the conversation with the NLRB agent, and, therefore, sustained
the Board on that issue. The Board also had claimed that the employ-
er's threats to close the plant, or reduce existing economic benefits in
the event of a union victory, were violations of section 8(a) (1). The
court evaluated these findings and determined that they were substan-
tiated."
With these findings in mind, the court considered whether a bar-
gaining order was warranted under the Gissel standards. In consider-
ing this aspect of the case, the court noted that it was aware of the ad-
monition in Gissel that the Board is to determine how severe an effect
unfair labor practices have on the election atmosphere, and that be-
cause of the special knowledge and expertise the Board possesses, its
78 General Stencils, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 71 L.R.R.M. 1652, 1654 (1969).
79 332 F.2d 47, 56 L.R.R.M. 2241 (2d Cir. 1944). The court held that interrogation
was not threatening unless It met "certain fairly severe standards." These were found
to include:
(1) The background, i.e., is there a history of employer hostility and dis-
crimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., did the interrogator appear to
be seeking information on which to base taking action against individual
employees?
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e., how high was he in the company
hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g., was the employee called from
work to the boss's office? Was there an atmosphere of "unnatural formality?"
(5) Truthfulness of the reply.
Id. at 48, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2242.
80 438 F.2d at 900, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
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choice of remedies must be accorded "special respect."' The court
emphasized, however, that this admonition was not meant to overrule
completely the Supreme Court's statement in Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB" to the effect that reviewing courts have a responsibility un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act" "to prevent capricious deter-
minations by administrative agencies."" Comparing General Stencils
to three other post-Gissel cases" which involved similar or more seri-
ous unfair labor practices, and in which the Board did not issue bar-
gaining orders, the court concluded that "[b]argaining orders are not
immune from the great principle that like cases must receive like
treatment."" Because no justification or explanation had been offered
for the dissimilar treatment accorded General Stencils, the court re-
fused to enforce the Board's order.
It seems quite clear that the Supreme Court, when it emphasized
the deference to be accorded Board decisions, did not intend to rele-
gate the courts of appeals to the role of "rubber stamping" agency de-
terminations. Under the Second Circuit's holding in General Stencils,
not only will the Board have to establish the existence of unfair labor
practices, but in close cases, it also will have to offer evidence of why
a bargaining order is required.
In Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB," a case which bore some
factual similarities to General Stencils, the Eighth Circuit also refused
to enforce a Board bargaining order. In addition, the court announced
a set of guidelines which it would employ when evaluating the propri-
ety of future bargaining orders.
The Arbie Company was found by the Board to have violated
Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. The section 8(a) (1) vio-
lations, which consisted of the interrogation of employees and the
threat of economic reprisals, were substantiated by the record, and
thus were affirmed by the court. The section 8(a) (3) violations re-
lated to the discharge of two employees; one for "bad attitude" and
the •use of improper language in front of a female employee, the other
for drinking beer while driving a company vehicle. Both employees
had been active in the union's organization drive. The court thought
that the evidence supported a finding that the "bad attitude" discharge
81 Id. at 901, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
82 340 U.S. 474 (1951).	 •
88 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970).
84 438 F.2d at 904, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2296.
85 Stout Co., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 73 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1969); Schrementi
Bros., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No 147, 72 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1969); and Blade-Tribune Pub. Co.,
180 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 73 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1969), cited in 438 F.2d at 903, 76 L.R.R.M. at
2295.
86 438 F.2d at 904-05, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2296.
87 438 F.2d 940, 76 L.R.R.M. 2613 (8th Cir. 1971).
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was actually motivated by the employer's desire to discourage union
activity, thus constituting a section 8(a) (3) violation. It disagreed
with the Board, however, on the beer-drinking incident. According to
the court, the enforcement of safety rules is properly considered by
employers, even when it involves the discharge of a union adherent."
The court proceeded to evaluate the effects of the employer's un-
fair labor practices on the election atmosphere, and determined that
they had not reduced the union's majority, but, on the contrary, had
spurred on the organizational effort. The unfair labor practices, the
court noted, preceded the union's most successful card solicitation
period."
Because there was no indication that a fair election could not be
held, the court concluded that a bargaining order was not supportable
under the Gissel standards. Furthermore, the court felt that enough
cases bad been decided since Gissel to •set down the following guide-
lines for enforcement:
(1) Where the underlying facts affirmatively show that the
unfair labor practices have in fact undermined a union ma-
jority, typically evidenced by the union losing an election or
the employees seeking to withdraw from the union following
the occurrence of the conduct in question, we grant enforce-
ment;
(2) Where the record is silent concerning the actual impact
of the employer's unfair labor practices, we defer to the
Board's exercise of discretion and grant enforcement; and
(3) Where the evidence establishes that the unfair labor
practices produced little or no impact upon the employees'
allegiance to the union, we deny enforcement."
It was hoped that the Gissel decision would end the confusion sur-
rounding card-based bargaining orders. Drives, General Stencils and
Arbie show clearly that Gissel has failed in this respect. The continued
uncertainty, however, can be attributed to the Board's unwillingness
to explain in any detail its decision to issue a bargaining order in a
given case. In General Stencils, the Second Circuit suggested that the
NLRB implement its rule-making powers under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and develop at least general guidelines for the benefit
of unions, employers and the courts.' Absent this, the court suggested
that a comparable statement issue from the full five-man Board, or, at
the very least, that individual decisions be accompanied by a compre-
88 Id. at 943, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2615.
80 Id. at 944, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2617.
90 Id. at 945, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2617.
ill 438 F.2d 894, 901-02, 76 L.R.R.M. 2288, 2293.
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hensive explanation of why the bargaining order remedy was selected.
This suggestion is indeed well founded. If the Board is fulfilling its ob-
ligation under Gissel to evaluate each case to determine the extent of
damage on the electoral atmosphere as a result of an employer's unfair
practices, it should not be overly burdensome for it to share its anal-
ysis with the courts and the interested parties.
3. Bargaining Orders Based upon Independent Knowledge
In Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.," the NLRB issued a bargaining
order in the absence of any employer unfair labor practices. The Board
justified its action on the basis of the language in Gissel indicating that
an employer has a duty to recognize a union when he possesses knowl-
edge of its majority status from sources independent of authorization
cards.
The unit over which the representation dispute centered con-
tained four employees, all of whom had signed unambiguous authori-
zation cards. The union presented these four cards to a management
representative with a demand for immediate recognition. The repre-
sentative conceded that the cards were genuine, but insisted that the
President of the company had to be consulted prior to the signing of
any recognition agreement. When contacted, the President expressed
the opinion that an election held less than one year before, in which
the union was rejected,93 more accurately expressed employee senti-
ment. Accordingly, he refused either to grant the union recognition or
to bargain with it.
Meanwhile, the company official to whom the cards were first
shown conducted a personal poll of the four employees involved. All
four reaffirmed their desire that the union represent them for collective
bargaining purposes. Later, when the employees learned that the Pres-
ident had refused to recognize the union, they reemphasized their de-
mands by walking off the job and picketing." When the company offi-
cial again questioned the four employees, the union filed a complaint
with the Board charging the employer with conducting interrogation
in violation of section 8(a) (1).
The union complaint was investigated by a trial examiner who
concluded that the section 8(a) (1) charge was unfounded. However,
the trial examiner did find that the employer had factual knowledge of
92 182 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 74 L.R.R.M. 2113 (1970).
92 The unit in which the earlier election was held was larger than the present one.
Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
94 The strike began on April 25, 1968, less than one year after the prior election,
which had been held on April 27, 1967. The company argued that the picketing was
in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(13) of the Act. The Board, however, did not consider
it necessary to resolve this question because the strike continued after April 27, 1968,
at which time it became protected activity. Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1115 n.I2.
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the union's majority status, which, under "controlling Board law .. .
rebuts any claim by an employer that it entertains a good faith doubt
as to [the employees' representative]."" Accordingly, he recom-
mended that a bargaining order be issued. After the trial examiner is-
sued his decision, the Supreme Court decided Gissel. Therefore, when
the Board decided to ,adopt the examiner's recommendation, it looked
to Gissel to determine if a bargaining order was permissible.
The Board noted that in Gissel the Supreme Court left unan-
swered the question of whether an employer who rejected a union's
recognition demands, and refrained from committing unfair labor
practices that would tend to impede the election process, could always
demand an election determination of a union's status." The Board
pointed out, however, that the Gissel Court implicitly affirmed the pro-
priety of foregoing an election where it could be established that the
employer had actual knowledge of the union's majority status. It was
noted, for instance, that Gissel expressly reaffirmed United Mine
Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 91 where the Court held that a
"Board election is not the only method by which an employer
may satisfy itself as to the union's majority status," and that
"Mn the absence of any bona fide dispute as to the existence
of the required majority of eligible employees the employer's
denial of recognition of the union would have violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (5) of the Act.""
In addition to this specific approval by the Court of non-election-
created bargaining relationships, the Board also cited the Court's
approving reference to the authorization card policy that had been
announced in Gissel during oral argument. Under that policy, an
employer who possessed "knowledge independently of the cards that
the union represented a majority 7°" could not refuse a union request
for recognition. The Board then looked to the facts in Pacific Abra-
sive and concluded that the information gathered from the indepen-
95 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. 1114.
99 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1115. To support this proposition, the Board cited to Gissel
where the Court stated:
We thus need not decide whether, absent election interference by an employer's
unfair labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for one
himself; whether, if he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the
Union chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in the latter situation, he
is bound by the Board's ultimate determination of the card results regardless of
his earlier good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a Union-sought
election if he makes an affirmative showing of his positive reasons for believing
there is a representation dispute.
395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
91 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
oa 74 L.R.R.M. 1115, citing 351 U.S. 62 n.8., id. at 69.
99 395 U.S. at 594.
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dent polling of the card signers, together with their walkout and pick-
eting, precluded the employer from asserting that there was any "bona
fide dispute" with respect to the union's majority status. The Board
reasoned, therefore, that a bargaining order was appropriate.
Although Pacific Abrasive emphasized evidence from sources in-
dependent of authorization cards, it still left the employer with a icy
Silk type task of establishing a good faith doubt in order to justify an
election. In Wilder Manufacturing Co.,'" the Board clarified its inde-
pendent knowledge test.
In 1965, the union presented eleven signed and two unsigned au-
thorization cards to the general manager of the Wilder Company, and
requested recognition as the production and maintenance employees'
bargaining representative."' The general manager examined the cards,
but insisted that he was not authorized to grant the union's demand.
However, he did promise to provide an answer the following day. Un-
satisfied with this response, all of the employees who had signed cards
walked off their jobs and began picketing. On the next day, the gen-
eral manager reported to the officers of the company both the union's
demand and the independent actions of the employees in support of
the union. He also reported that of the thirty individuals employed by
the company, only ten or eleven were on the picket line. He suggested
that this indicated that the union did not represent a majority. The
officers of the company decided to deny recognition. The union then
charged the employer with violating Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
An NLRB trial examiner found that the appropriate bargaining
unit consisted of eighteen employees and that the employer knew that
the union represented an uncoerced majority of this number. Accord-
ingly, the trial examiner concluded that the employer did not have a
"good faith doubt" when it rejected the union's recognition request,
and, therefore, under the principles of Joy Silk, it had violated sec-
tion 8(a)(5). 02 A bargaining order was the suggested remedy.
The Board, however, in a decision issued prior to Gissel, refused
to adopt the recommendation of the trial examiner and dismissed the
complaint. It noted that under the Joy Silk rationale, the General
Counsel has the dual burden of establishing that the union did in fact
represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit and that
the employer's refusal to bargain stemmed from "bad faith." Evidence
of bad faith, the Board suggested, would be either a complete rejection
of the collective bargaining principle or the commission of unfair labor
practices intended to undermine the union and dissipate its majority.
100 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1970).
101 See Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 69 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1968).
102 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. 1322 n.5.
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The trial examiner's record in Wilder, the Board stated, indicated that
the employer had neither rejected the collective-bargaining principle
nor engaged in any interference, restraint or coercion of employees in-
tended to undermine the union. Further, the Board noted that there
was no evidence of any conduct by the employer which would prevent
the holding of a representation election. Therefore, the Board found
that the charge of bad faith was unsubstantiated."'
The General Counsel appealed the Board's decision to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. While the appeal was
pending, Gissel was decided. Because Gissel had not definitively ad-
dressed itself to situations devoid of unfair labor practices, the court
of appeals chose to remand Wilder to the Board for reconsideration.
Looking to the same record upon which its earlier decision was based,
the Board determined that under Gissel a section 8(a) (5) violation
had occurred because of the employer's "independent knowledge" of
the union's majority. As in Pacific Abrasive, the Board found that
evidence existed from sources other than the authorization cards suffi-
cient to convey to the employer "convincing knowledge" of the union's
majority status. According to the Board, the active demonstration of
union support made by the card signers clearly established that the
employer had the requisite knowledge. Unlike in Pacific Abrasive,
however, the Board implied that, in addition to a finding of indepen-
dent knowledge, there would have to be an absence of any genuine
willingness on the part of the employer to resolve any "lingering
doubts" of the union's majority by resort to the Board's election pro-
cedures. In Wilder, the Board noted, the company had neither filed for
an election on its own, nor suggested to the union that it seek Board
certification. The importance which the Board accorded this apparent
rejection of the election process is evident:
In the interest of encouraging all parties to avail themselves
of our election procedures, we would not be inclined to enter
a bargaining order if, absent independent unfair labor prac-
tices, the record supported a finding that Respondent had in
good faith indicated a willingness to utilize those procedures,
since, as the Supreme Court has said [in Gissell a Board-
conducted election is indeed the "preferred route" for deter-
mining employee desires.'"
Thus, it appears from Pacific Abrasive and Wilder that when an
103 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 323.
104 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1024-025. This interpretation is supported
by the statement in Pacific Abasive that the participation by all four employees in
the strike and picketing precluded any "bona fide dispute." 182 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 74
L.R.R.M. at 1115.
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employer is faced with substantial evidence of the union's representa-
tion status from sources independent of the authorization cards, he
will be subject to a bargaining order even though he commits no unfair
labor practices. Such an order can be avoided only if he takes affirma-
tive action to bring into play the Board's election machinery.
On the other hand, Pacific Abrasive may stand for the proposi-
tion that when a very small unit is involved, and the members unani-
mously demonstrate union support, the Board will forego an election
in favor of a bargaining order despite a willingness on the part of the
employer to utilize the Board's procedures. Wilder, then, would mean
that in cases where the unit is somewhat larger, and the independent
showing of union support is substantial, but not unanimous, the Board
will proceed to an election if the employer expressed any lingering
doubts and takes affirmative action toward resolving the dispute.
The Board's interpretation of "independent knowledge" was de-
fined further in Redmond Plastics, 105
 where the Board issued a bar-
gaining order despite the absence of election-interfering unfair labor
practices, and over the employer's request for a Board-conducted elec-
tion. In Redmond, the union presented the authorization cards to the
President of the employer company and requested immediate recogni-
tion. Meanwhile, twelve employees remained off their jobs on instruc-
tions from the union. The President checked the authorization cards
and expressed the belief that the union did in fact represent the em-
ployees. Furthermore, he indicated that he recognized the union, and
settled upon a specific date to commence bargaining. Later, however,
the President consulted with his attorney who advised him to seek an
election. Although he still did not doubt the union's majority status,"°
the President then refused to bargain with the union and instead
sought the recommended election.
The Board found that the facts as presented in the record com-
ported with the well established principles of Fred Snow & Sons.un In
Snow, the employer had agreed to be bound by an independent card
check, but when that check substantiated the union's claim of majority
support, the employer reneged and demanded an election. The Board
concluded from this that the employer had no reasonable doubt of the
union's majority and, therefore, issued a bargaining order. In Red-
mond, the Board noted that the facts were stronger than those in
Snow. Not only had the President substantial independent evidence of
union support, but he actually had recognized the union and had
loci 187 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 76 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1970). As was the case in Wilder and
Pacific Abrasive, the Redmond decision followed a reconsideration in light of Gissel.
106 The Board noted that even after petitioning for an election, the President
continued to profess his belief that the Union had majority status.
107 134 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687, 51
L.R.R.M. 2199 (9th Cir. 1962).
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agreed upon a date to commence bargaining. Consequently, the Board
felt that any claim of "good faith doubt" such as to justify an election
was "clearly contrived and wholly specious and should, therefore, be
given no credence.'"" The Board concluded that to ignore this clear
evidence "would be to make a mockery of the Board's orderly election
processes .. . ." 1"
Chairman Miller disagreed with the majority's conclusion. He
was of the opinion that the employer had not agreed to recognize the
union, and, therefore, the election request was proper. Citing to Gis-
sel, Miller emphasized that an employer "may, but need not, accept
cards as proof of majority status."' 1 ° Then, turning to the Wilder de-
cision, he noted that the Board would not issue a bargaining order even
where an employer is presented with evidence in addition to the au-
thorization cards so long as the employer expresses a willingness to
utilize the election process. For these reasons, Chairman Miller felt the
complaint in Redmond should be dismissed.
The crucial element of Redmond is the factual determination by
the majority that the President of the employer company had actually
granted recognition to the union. This factor brought the decision out
from under the policy statement contained in Wilder which suggests
that any reasonable doubt entertained by an employer is entitled to
resolution by a Board election so long as the employer refrains from
unfair labor practices and actively suggests or seeks use of the Board
procedures. Although Chairman Miller properly cited to Gissel when
he noted that an employer may but need not rely upon cards, Red-
mond establishes that if he does choose to rely upon cards that choice
is irrevocable.
III. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. Discrimination in Employment Testing
The general purpose of Title VII of the Civil. Rights Act of 19641
is to eliminate all employment practices which discriminate against,
or impose limitations upon, employees or job applicants because of
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' However, the pro-
108 87 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1037.
no Id.
110 Id.
42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1964).
2 The scope of Title VII is set out in fl 703(a) as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color;
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
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ponents of Title VII recognized that there are certain justifiable em-
ployer practices which unavoidably result in discrimination against
employees. One such employer practice is the legitimate use of employ-
ment testing which necessarily results in discrimination against mem-
bers of racial minorities who have been deprived of competitive
educational advantages. When it became apparent that broad anti-
discrimination prohibitions such as those found in Title VII could be
construed as prohibiting all legitimate yet discriminatory testing,°
Congress reacted by adding an explicit exception from prohibition under
Title VII for bona fide employment testing in Section 703 (h), which
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer ... to give and to act upon the results of any profes-
sionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, in-
tended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or nation origin.4
The application of section 703 (h) has resulted in controversy
with respect to the meaning of "professionally developed ability test"
within that section. At least one court has held that this phrase in-
cludes any general intelligence test that has been prepared by a qualified
test expert. 5 However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion° (EEOC) has held that to come within section 703 (h) a test must
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
8 Apparently the enactment of § 703(h) was prompted by congressional reaction
to a finding of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Committee. A black job applicant
was required to take an intelligence test prior to being hired. The applicant contended
that his subsequent rejection was due to the allegedly discriminatory effect of the test.
The hearing examiner held that the testing practice was unlawful. Myart v. Motorola,
Inc. (set out in full in 110 Cong. Rec. 5662-664 (1964)). This decision was interpreted
by Congress as implying that all employment tests which discriminate, regardless of
their legitimate use, could be found to be unlawful employment practices. This result
was declared to be beyond the intended purpose of Title VII by the supporters of
703(h). See 110 Cong. Rec. 13492 (1964) (remarks of Senator Tower).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
5 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
The EEOC is the agency created to administer Title VII. Its powers are limited
to the authority to accept complaints alleging violations of Title VII, to hold hearings
on the alleged violations, and to act as mediator and counsel in attempts to effect
voluntary settlement by the employer. The EEOC is limited to these informal methods
and possesses no powers of enforcement. 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e-5(a) (1964). If informal
mediation fails, the only recourse available to the EEOC is to notify the complainant
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be related to a specific skill or ability that the job applicant will
require.'
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' the Supreme Court upheld the
interpretation of the EEOC that tests must be job-related to come
within the section 703 (h) exception. The employer, Duke Power Co.,
had, prior to the effective date of Title VII, overtly discriminated
against black employees by limiting their employment to the lowest
paying department in the company (the labor department). In 1955,
Duke instituted the requirement of a high school education for initial
assignment to any department except labor, and for transfer within the
company to higher paying departments. In 1965, after the effective
date of Title VII, the company added the additional requirement that
for initial assignment to any department except labor, a job applicant
must score satisfactorily on two standardized professionally developed
aptitude tests as well as have a high school education. Shortly there-
after, Duke began a policy of allowing incumbent employees without
a high school education to transfer to higher paying departments by
scoring satisfactorily on the aptitude tests. The required scores on the
tests corresponded approximately to the national median score at-
tained by high school graduates.
The Court found that whites scored better on the standardized
tests used by Duke than did blacks. This disparity was traced to the
history of inferior education available to blacks because of the long-
standing practice of segregated schooling. Thus, the consequences of
the testing program at Duke were found to operate with built-in
discriminatory effects toward blacks. The Court held that the discrim-
inatory impact of these tests brought them within the prohibition of
Title VII whether or not the testing requirement was motivated by
discrimination on Duke's part.
Having found that the testing requirement was a discriminatory
practice within the general prohibition of Title VII, the Court con-
sidered the employer's contention that the tests came within the
specific exception granted by Section 703 (h). In construing section
703(h), the Court adopted the EEOC's interpretation that tests within
that section must be job-related. The Court stated:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or mea-
suring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress
of his personal right to bring an action in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)-(f)
(1964).
7 The EEOC requires that employers be able to prove that "the test is predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise
or are relevant to the job or jobs . being evaluated." EEOC Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 12334, § 1607.4 (c) (Aug. 1, 1970).
8 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded
that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. . . . What Congress has
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person
for the job and not the person in the abstract .°
The Court noted that the tests used by Duke were adopted with-
out any significant attempt to determine their effectiveness in mea-
suring one's ability to perform on the job. Neither test was designed to
evaluate the ability to perform a specific job or a category of jobs. One
test used was designed to measure general intelligence, while the other
measured basic mechanical ability. However, Duke contended that
such general criteria were needed to evaluate employees for the com-
pany's announced policy of advancement within the company. The
Court rejected this argument as unsupported by the evidence since it
was shown that employees without a high school education who had
not taken the tests nonetheless satisfactorily advanced within the
company. Therefore, because the testing requirements were not related
to job performance, the Court found the testing practice beyond the
exception provided by Section 703(h) and prohibited by Title VII.
The decision in Griggs clearly recognizes the congressional intent
that not all standardized employment tests which produce a discrim-
inatory effect are prohibited by Title VII. Moreover, while the Court
in Griggs did adopt a requirement of job-relatedness for otherwise
prohibited tests to come within the section 703(h) exception, the Court
did not indicate that a test must measure the ability to perform a
specific job to be lawful. The Court stated that
it is unnecessary to reach the question whether testing
requirements that take into account capability for the next
succeeding position or related future promotion might be
utilized upon a showing that such long range requirements
fulfill a genuine business need.'
Thus, the Court has left open the question of whether a standard-
ized general intelligence test might in some circumstances be ade-
quately job-related. However, the position of the EEOC seems to be
that the job-relatedness requirement is satisfied only by a correlation
of the testing criteria to fairly specific employment skills." The
9 Id. at 436.
10 Id. at 432.
11 The EEOC's position has been stated as follows:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test"
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Court's reliance in Griggs upon the expertise and the authority of the
EEOC indicates that the EEOC interpretation may be followed in
future cases. If the Court does adopt the narrower interpretation of the
EEOC, it is suggested that few employment needs will be approved as
justifying the use of general intelligence tests or basic aptitude tests
that are inherently discriminatory toward minority groups."
B. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
An exception to the basic anti-discriminatory provision of Title
VII is provided where an employer can establish that discrimination
by sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) for his
business. Section 703 (e) of Title VII establishes the BFOQ exception
as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. . . . 1
The scope of the exception granted by section 703 (e) was con-
sidered by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.' Plaintiff Diaz had applied for a job as a flight cabin
attendant with Pan Am but was rejected pursuant to Pan Am's policy
of hiring only females for that position. He then filed a complaint with
the EEOC charging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex by
Pan Am. The EEOC found reasonable cause to support the complaint
but was unable to reach a voluntary settlement with Pan Am. Diaz then
brought a class action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida alleging that Pan Am had violated Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination in hiring .8 The district court
found that Pan Am's actions were within the exception granted by
to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the
particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords
the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular
job or class of jobs. (Emphasis added.)
EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued August 24, 1966, cited in 401
U.S. at 433 n.9.
12 For a more complete discussion of discriminatory employment testing, see Com-
ment, Employment Testing Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 B.C. Ind.
& Corn, L. Rev. 268 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
2 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
3 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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Section 703 (e) and, consequently, were not in violation of Title VII.
The district court accepted Pan Am's contention that the qualifications
for cabin attendant should be recognized as including the non-
mechanical duties of "providing reassurance to anxious passengers,
giving courteous personal service and, in general, making flights as
pleasurable as possible. . . ." 4
 The court accepted the evidence offered
by Pan Am that females as a class were superior to males in providing
these non-mechanical services. In addition, Pan Am offered the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist that an aircraft cabin presents a unique envi-
ronment giving rise to special psychological needs in passengers. The
court agreed with Pan Am's contention that these special needs are
better met by females than by males. Pan Am further supported its
argument that females were superior to males as cabin attendants by
means of a survey which demonstrated that Pan Am's passengers
overwhelmingly preferred females as cabin attendants.
However, the district court held that evidence establishing that
females were on the average superior to males as cabin attendants
would not in itself justify a finding that sex was a BFOQ for that
position. If it were practicable to select those exceptional males who
could perform adequately as cabin attendants, then Pan Am could not
justify its refusal to consider any male for the job. However, the court
held that the requirements of section 703 (e) are satisfied if it is highly
impracticable to select employees on an individual basis with no
discrimination by sex. The court found that while it might be theoreti-
cally possible to select those few males who possess the traits required
of a cabin attendant, such selection is not practical under hiring prac-
tices now available. Thus, the court held that to eliminate sex as a
qualification for cabin attendant would remove "the best tool available
for screening out applicants likely to be unsatisfactory and thus reduce
the average level of performance."5 Therefore, since the sex require-
ment was reasonably designed to improve the performance of Pan
Am's flight attendants, the practice of hiring only females for that
position was reasonably necessary to the operation of Pan Am's
business within the meaning of section 703 (e).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this finding
and held that Pan Am's refusal to hire males for the position of flight
cabin attendant was not a BFOQ as provided by Section 703(e) and
was, therefore, prohibited by Title VII. This holding was based upon
the following strict interpretation of section 703(e):
[T]he use of the word "necessary" in section 703 (e) re-
quires that we apply a business necessity test, not a business
4 Id. at 563.
Id. at 567.
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convenience. test. That is to say, .discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively.°
The court held that the primary business of Pan Am was to trans-
port passengers safely by air from one place to another. The presence
of female cabin attendants was recognized by the court as lending to a
more pleasant environment during air travel. However, this effect was
held to be "tangential to the essence of the business involved." 7 In
support of this conclusion the court noted that at the time suit was
instituted Pan Am employed two hundred and eighty-three male
stewards on certain foreign flights .° Therefore, the court held that
since having male cabin attendants would not affect Pan Am's ability
to provide safe transportation, the exclusion of male applicants from
consideration for that position was not "necessary" within the meaning
of section 703(e).
Based upon this finding, the court held that proof that all or
substantially all men could not adequately perform the non-mechanical
tasks of cabin attendants would fail to justify discrimination against
males as a BFOQ. The court held that "it must not only be shown that
it is impracticable to find the men that possess the abilities that most
women possess, but that the abilities are necessary to the business, not
merely tangential."° Similarly, the court rejected evidence of passenger
preference for females as grounds for justifying the rejection of all
males applying for jobs as cabin attendants. The court held that
"customer preference may be taken into account only when it is based
on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service
it offers." 1°
Thus, because the non-mechanical functions of cabin attendants
were seen as merely tangential to Pan Am's business, the court con-
cluded that sex was not a BFOQ for that position. However, the court
did not rule out the possibility that Pan Am could lawfully reject job
applicants on the grounds that they did not possess these abilities. The
court stated:
We do not mean to imply, of course, that Pan Am can-
not take into consideration the ability of individuals to per-
form the non-mechanical functions of the job. What we hold
isthat because the non-mechanical aspects of the job of flight
6
 442 F.2d at 388.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 389.
10 Id.
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cabin attendant are not "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation" of Pan Am's business, Pan Am cannot exclude all
males simply because most males may not perform ade-
quately. 11
The Diaz court correctly recognized that the legislative history of
section 703 (e) is minimal and offers no clear guidelines for the applica-
tion of that section. However, an examination of the legislative history
suggests that section 703 (e) was designed to have broader application
than that indicated in the Diaz decision. The proponents of section
703 (e) offered the following as examples of employer practices that
would fall within the BFOQ exception:
. . . the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook,
the preference of a professional baseball team for male
players, and the preference of a business which seeks the
patronage of members of particular religious groups for a
salesman of that religion.' 2 •
Applying the Diaz rationale, it would seem that the "essence" of the
business operation of a major league baseball team is playing competi-
tion baseball. Further, it is unlikely that sex could be established as an
essential quality for playing baseball. Since sex, therefore, would be
"tangential" to the athletic ability required, the Diaz court would
presumably require that major league teams interview female job
applicants to determine if they as individuals are able to perform
adequately as professional baseball players.
The narrowness of the Diaz opinion becomes even more apparent
when one tries to envision those businesses whose "essence . . . would
be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." 13 It is
difficult to imagine such occupations beyond the obvious examples of
topless waitresses, actors and actresses, washroom attendants, or fitters
of girdles and bras." These occupations could hardly have been viewed
by Congress as needing legislative action to justify the exclusion of job
applicants by sex, since in practice it would be highly unlikely that any
individual member of the excluded sex would apply or could qualify
for such a job. It is, therefore, unrealistic to infer from the passage of
section 703 (e) the narrow range of intended application determined by
the court in Diaz. Moreover, the requirement in Diaz that sex affect
the "essence" of a business before discrimination is lawful under sec-
11 Id. at 388.
12 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum submitted by Senators
Clark and Case).
13 442 F2d at 388.
14 See Note, Sex Discrimination and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 12
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tion 703(e) appears to contradict the language of the section itself.
Section 703 (e) requires that sex be "reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise." (Emphasis
added.) However, the Diaz court, in effect, read the section as
requiring that sex be absolutely necessary to the normal operation of
the business involved.
It is suggested, therefore, that the court in Diaz was incorrect in
interpreting section 703 (e) as requiring that sex be essential to a
particular business to come within that section. A requirement that sex
have a reasonably necessary relationship to a particular business is
more consistent with the language of section 703 (e) and the implicit
assumption that Congress did not intend the passage of section 703 (e)
to be merely a gesture with no practical application. However, the
result in Diaz appears to be correct even in terms of a requirement of
reasonable, rather than absolute, necessity. The Diaz court is perhaps
overly restrictive in holding that "Mlle primary function of an airline
is to transport passengers safely" and that a pleasant environment is
"merely tangential" to the airline business. 15 However, it does appear
that a sufficiently pleasant environment can be reasonably maintained
without the necessity of rejecting all male candidates for the position
of cabin attendant. Pan Am's policy of rejecting all male applicants
for this job is, therefore, beyond the limits of reasonable necessity
imposed by section 703 (e).
In Diaz, the issue of whether there was in fact discrimination on
the basis of sex within the terms of section 703 (a) was never in doubt.
However, the threshold question of what types of employment prac-
tices constitute discrimination on the basis of sex was raised before the
Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 1° A female job
applicant had been rejected in accordance with the employer's policy
of not hiring women with pre-school-age children. However, at the
time of her rejection, the employer did employ men with pre-
school-age children. In an action alleging a violation of section 703 (a),
the district court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
The court of appeals noted that the prohibitions of Title VII are
limited to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. It was held that "[w]hen another criterion of employ-
ment is added to one of the classifications listed in the Act, there is no
longer apparent discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.'" In the instant case, the court noted, the job
10 442 F.2d at 388.
le 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
rt 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (1969).
18 411 F.2d at 3-4.
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applicant had been disqualified not only because she was a woman, but
also because she had pre-school-age children. The court reasoned that
this "two-pronged qualification"" was not discrimination on the basis
of sex within the meaning of section 703 (a).
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that the court of
appeals had erred in construing section 703 (a) "as permitting one
hiring policy for women and another for men—each having pre-
school-age children."20 However, the Court noted that such family
commitments could have more effect upon the job performance of a
woman than of a man and that, therefore, sex could arguably be a
BFOQ under section 703 (e) in this instance. Since the court of appeals
had not considered the employer's policy as being within Title VII at
all, however, the record did not provide a sufficient factual basis for
consideration of the possible application of Section 703(e). The Court,
therefore, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded
for a fuller development of the record and consideration of the issues
in light of section 703(e).
The result reached by the Supreme Court is clearly a proper
interpretation of the basic scope of section 703(a). Title VII was
designed to reach all employer practices which do in fact discriminate
on the basis of sex regardless of their superficial appearances. To hold
that an employer may avoid the prohibitions of Title VII by simply
adding an additional factor such as having children to the underlying,
determinative factor of sex would insulate many covert discriminatory
practices that Title VII was intended to eliminate. Such a "sex-plus"
standard is indeed a "palpably wrong" interpretation of the intended
scope of section 703 (a) 21
IV. ARBITRATION
A. Exhaustion of Grievance and Arbitration Procedures
As a Prerequisite for Judicial Remedies
Section 203(d) of the LMRA1 expressly declares that voluntary
settlement is the approved method for the resolution of disputes con-
cerning collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, it is now
settled law that the congressional grant in Section 301 of the LMRA2
1° Id. at 4.
20 400 U.S. at 544.
21 416 F.2d at 1259 (dissenting opinion).
Section 203(d) provides in part:
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement ....
29 U.S.C. 4 173(d) (1964).
2 29 U.S.C. 185 (1964).
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of federal court jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective
bargaining agreements was "a direction to develop a federal common
law in connection with the rights of the parties"' to the agreement. The
development of federal law in section 301 suits led to the Supreme
Court's recognition, in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills,' that arbitration is the favored method for the settlement of
labor disputes. The importance of arbitration was further emphasized
by the holding in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 5
 that under normal
circumstances an aggrieved employee must attempt to seek redress
through available contract grievance procedures before he may bring
suit under section 301.
In Maddox, an employee brought suit in a state court to recover
severance pay under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
between the employee's union and the employer. The employee had
been laid off as a result of a mine shutdown, and he based his suit upon
a clause in the collective bargaining agreement which required the
payment of severance pay in the event of a permanent shutdown. The
contract also provided for grievance procedure leading to binding
arbitration of contract disputes. The employee made no attempt to
utilize the contractual grievance procedure and recovered a state court
judgment in his favor.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the issues were to be
decided in accordance with federal law in compliance with the statu-
tory policies of the LMRA. The Court concluded that the state court
decision must be overturned since implementation of the policies of the
LMRA requires that employees exhaust available contract grievance
and arbitration procedures before seeking judicial redress. The Court
described the controlling policy considerations as follows:
Congress has expressly approved contract grievance proce-
dures as a preferred method for settling disputes and stabi-
lizing the "common law" of the plant. . . . And it cannot be
said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance proce-
dures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved
employee until the employee has attempted to implement the
procedures and found them so.
A contrary rule which would permit an individual
employee to completely sidestep available grievance proce-
dures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. In addi-
tion to cutting across the interests already mentioned, it
8 Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 139 (D. Mass.
1953).
4 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish
a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of
employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be
made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method
of settlement.'
The requirement of exhausting contractual grievance procedures
before bringing suit was again discussed by the Supreme Court in 1967
in Vaca v. Sipes.' There, an employee brought suit in a state court
against officers of his union, alleging that he had been discharged by
his employer in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and
that the union had arbitrarily refused to take his grievance through the
fifth and final step of the grievance procedure to arbitration. The em-
ployee had a strenuous job at a meat packing plant and had been dis-
charged on the grounds of poor health. He had initiated grievance
procedures, and, at the fourth step in that process, was sent by the
union to a physician. Upon receiving an unfavorable report from the
physician, the union decided not to take the grievance to arbitration.
The employee then sought redress in the state courts and eventually
was awarded damages against the union.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision against the union, hold-
ing that as a matter of controlling federal law the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the charge that the union had acted arbitrarily and in
bad faith in breach of its duty of fair representation.' The Court also
discussed the right of an employee to sue an employer for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement and stated that
if the wrongfully discharged employee himself resorts to the
courts before the grievance procedures have been fully ex-
hausted, the employer may well defend on the ground that
the exclusive remedies provided by such a contract have not
been exhausted. Since the employee's claim is based upon
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, he is bound by
terms of that agreement which govern the manner in which
contractual rights may be enforced. For this reason, it is set-
tled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust ex-
clusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by
the bargaining agreement.°
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in United States Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles" considered the exhaustion requirements
6 Id. at 653.
7 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
8 Id. at 193.
a Id. at 184.
10 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
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developed in Maddox and Vaca in light of the right of seamen to sue
for wages and damages under 46 U.S.C. § 596, which provides:
The master or owner of any vessel making coasting voy-
ages shall pay to every seaman his wages within two days af-
ter the termination of the agreement under which he was
shipped, or at the time such seaman is discharged, whichever
first happens; and in case of vessels making foreign voyages
.. . within twenty-four hours after the cargo has been dis-
charged, or within four days after the seaman has been dis-
charged, whichever first happens .... Every master or owner
who refuses or neglects to make payment in the manner here-
inbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the
seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day
during which payment is delayed beyond the respective peri-
ods, which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim
made before the court. 11
The respondent seaman was employed by the petitioner ship
owner for a six-month period at a monthly wage under a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the respondent's union and the ship owner.
The ship on which the seaman was employed anchored off South
Vietnam the day after the seaman's shipping papers had expired. The
owner conceded that the ship was delayed in Saigon harbor because of
the congested condition of the harbor. During the delay, Saigon port
officials refused to grant quarantine clearance to the ship's crew mem-
bers. However, the respondent seaman insisted that he be discharged
or granted shore leave. Both requests were denied. Shortly thereafter,
the ship received clearance and entered the harbor. After a few days
of unloading cargo, the ,respondent seaman and other crew members
were discharged and given vouchers for their wages.
Upon his return to the United States, the seaman notified his
union's local that he challenged the ship owner's refusal to honor cer-
tain wage claims relating to the period after his request for shore leave
had been denied. Respondent was advised by local union officials to
contact his union representative and utilize the grievance procedures
leading to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. How-
ever, the seaman instead chose to institute suit in federal district court
under the maritime jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 12
 The
district court relied upon Maddox and granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the district court on the ground that the
11 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1964).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
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Maddox requirement of exhaustion of grievance procedure does not
apply to seamen bringing suit under section 596.'a
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, with four members dissenting,
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, and held that the seaman
could maintain suit under section 596 despite his failure to utilize the
grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court held that there is no indication from the passage of Sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA that grievance procedures and arbitration were
meant to replace the right of recovery under Section 596. Moreover,
the holding in Maddox was distinguished by the Court on the ground
that in that case the employee's right to recover was non-statutory. In
the instant case, the employee's right to recover was based upon an ex-
press judicial remedy under section 596. The Court concluded that
since the legislative history of section 301 "is silent on the abrogation
of existing statutory remedies of seamen in the maritime field, we con-
strue it to provide only an optional remedy to them." 14 Thus, the Court
held that seamen are not bound to bring suit under section 596 as their
exclusive remedy for wage claims, but may choose the processes of
grievance and arbitration. Moreover, it was held that failure to choose
contractual grievance procedure as a method of settlement will not bar
a suit under section 596.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by three other Jus-
tices, argued that the seaman's recovery under section 596 was depen-
dent upon questions of fact° or interpretation of provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement with respect to whether the respondent
was paid all wages due to him in a timely manner. The dissent viewed
these questions as being "particularly within the competence of the
contractually established grievance procedure of the collective-
bargaining agreement." 1° Thus, since the availability of the remedies
under section 596 was seen to rest upon issues within an applicable ar-
bitration clause, the dissent urged that under the holding in Maddox
13 408 F.2d 1065, 1071 (4th Cir. 1969).
14 400 U.S. at 357.
15 These underlying factual questions included:
(a) whether the respondent performed overtime work with the authorization
of the master; (b) whether the crew was confined to ship because of the
actions of government officials and if so whether respondent can base his claim
on the alleged failure of the master to show the required documents to the
crew, and (c) whether the ship arrived "in port" . . . so that respondent was
entitled to discharge and payment, or, in the alternative, whether the fact that
respondent's shipping articles expired by their terms .. . entitled him to dis-
charge against petitioner's claim that where the cargo is still aboard in such
cases the articles are automatically extended. An additional question is rat what
time] respondent was "paid" . . . since the penalty accrues only until the date
of payment.
Id. at 371 (dissenting opinion).
16 Id.
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the seaman was required to exhaust the available internal contractual
remedies before bringing suit.
The majority's holding in Arguelles has the effect of preventing
the enforcement of mandatory grievance procedures against seamen in
disputes over wage claims that are within section 596. 17 The exception
from the duty to be bound by contractual obligations that the Court
has created for certain wage claims by seamen in Arguelles is question-
able in light of strong policy considerations favoring the arbitration
process and the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements. It is
suggested, therefore, that the Court's limitation of Maddox to employee
claims resting solely upon contractual rights should not be extended
beyond the instant case of a direct application of section 596. In all
other cases, the dissent's view that Maddox applies "at least where .. .
the availability of the statutory remedy rests on disputed issues that
are cognizable under the arbitration clause," 18 should be followed. To
do otherwise and extend the majority's. narrow limitation of Maddox
may have "devastating implications for the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements.""
B. Arbitration of Civil Rights Disputes
The question of whether an arbitrator's award bars an employee
from bringing suit on the same dispute under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' has resulted in a conflict of opinions between the
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. In Dewey v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co.,2 the Sixth Circuit held that an arbitrator's final
award forecloses a later suit on the same matter under Title VII.
Dewey was an employee of Reynolds at a "job type" plant which pro-
duced aluminum products on order to meet delivery dates set out in
customers' contracts. Overtime work had been done on a voluntary ba-
sis at the plant until Reynolds signed a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the union representing Dewey, which agreement contained
a provision regulating overtime work assignments. Under the contract,
the company had the right to establish overtime schedules binding all
employees who could not demonstrate a significant reason why they
should not be bound. It was also provided in the contract that any em-
ployee assigned overtime work could arrange for another qualified em-
ployee to substitute for him. Dewey refused to work on a Sunday be-
17 See Note, Union Grievance Procedure Not Mandatory Substitute for Wage
Statute, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 305, 308-09 (1967).
18 400 U.S. at 374 (dissenting opinion),
19 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247 (1970).
1 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e et seq. (1964).
2 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 566 (1971).
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cause of his religious beliefs. Since he refused to work, and since he
failed to find a replacement, he was discharged.
Dewey then filed a grievance, under the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, which was processed and resulted in an
award by an arbitrator denying Dewey's claim. He later filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
claiming religious discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC found
reasonable cause to believe that Reynolds had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against Dewey and authorized suit in a federal district court.
The district court rejected Reynolds' argument that the suit should be
dismissed on the grounds that the arbitrator's award was a bar to the
action. The district court then found that Reynolds had unlawfully
discriminated against Dewey and ordered that he be reinstated with
back pay.3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court decision, holding that Reynolds had not unlawfully discriminated
against Dewey,' and that the arbitrator's award should have been up-
held as final settlement of the dispute. The court noted that if the ar-
bitrator had upheld Dewey's claim, Reynolds would not have been per-
mitted to relitigate the award in a court action. The court reasoned
that to allow Dewey to bring suit when the employer could not have
done so would destroy the effectiveness of arbitration since employers
would not agree to arbitration clauses which have the effect of binding
them.but not their employees.
Moreover, the court held that the arbitrator had proper jurisdic-
tion of the dispute since it arose from an interpretation of the contract.
The fact that the award adjudicated both contractual and statutory
rights was seen by the court as being within the approved practice of
settling mixed questions of law and fact by arbitrators. Therefore, in
light of the need to preserve the efficacy of the arbitration process, and
since the court saw no national policy for ousting arbitrators from ju-
risdiction over questions involving civil rights issues, it was held that
the complaint should be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hutchings v.
United States Industries, Inc.,' reached the opposite conclusion with
respect to the effect of an arbitration award upon an employee's right
to bring suit under Title VII. Hutchings, a black employee of U.S. In-
3 304 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. Mich..1969).
4 The court held that the overtime requirement did not unlawfully discriminate
under Title VII since the contract provision allowing substitution by employees was a
reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of the employees. Moreover, the court
found that Reynolds did not have the intent to discriminate required under Title VII
before relief may be awarded. 429 F.2d at 330-31.
5 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970),
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dustries, had applied for promotion to a higher paying job when the
employee who held the job resigned. The company did not question
Hutchings' qualifications for the position, but denied his request for
promotion on the grounds that the job had been abolished. Hutchings
then filed a grievance under the procedures provided by the collective
bargaining contract then in force. This grievance was processed up to
the arbitration stage where the arbitrator held that the company had
not violated the collective bargaining agreement by refusing Hutch-
ings' request for promotion. Hutchings then filed a complaint with the
EEOC which held that there was reasonable cause to believe that the
company had violated Title VII. After efforts by the EEOC failed to
result in conciliation, Hutchings instituted suit in a federal district
court alleging violation of Title VII. The district court° granted the
company's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the ar-
bitration award denying Hutchings' claim was a bar to court action
under Title VII.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that
Hutchings was entitled to bring an action under Title VII independent
of an arbitration award under the collective bargaining agreement.
The court recognized that in this case the basic dispute was concur-
rently within the scope of the arbitration procedures and the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts under Title VII. However, the court stressed
the fact that "determinations under a contract grievance-arbitration
process will involve rights and remedies separate and distinct from
those involved in judicial proceedings under Title VII." 7 The distinc-
tion between these rights was illustrated by analysis of the roles of a
judge under Title VII and an arbitrator. The court noted that a judge
under Title VII acts to provide public relief and to "vindicate the pol-
icies of the Act, not merely to afford private relief to the employee." 8
An arbitrator, however, is limited to the role of carrying out the terms
of a collective bargaining contract. Thus, the court noted that an arbi-
trator may feel limited to enforcement of the provisions of the contract
even though it may contain anti-discrimination provisions, whereas a
judge under Title VII has wide discretion to enforce the policies of the
Act.
For these reasons, the court held that it is incorrect to interpret an
employee's utilization of grievance procedure, and a later suit under
Title VII, as an attempt "to enforce a single right in two forums."' 1
Yet, the court did not hold that matters relating to civil rights should
6 309 F. Supp. 691 (ED. Tex. 1969).




BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
not be taken up in the arbitral process. The court recognized that such
treatment was proper in view of the goal of Title VII to eliminate dis-
crimination by voluntary settlement whenever possible. However, the
court was explicit in holding that "the arbitrator's determination un-
der the contract has no effect upon the court's power to adjudicate a
violation of Title VII rights."1° Thus, the court concluded that even
though an employee utilizes the contractual grievance procedure to its
conclusion, he is not foreclosed from maintaining suit under Title VII.
The decision in Hutchings was considered by the Sixth Circuit
upon a petition for rehearing in Dewey." The court denied the petition
and re-affirmed its earlier position that an arbitral award bars resort to
court action under Title VII. The court disagreed with the decision
reached in Hutchings on the grounds that it did not comport with the
Supreme Court's recent emphasis of the importance of arbitration in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.12 The court
held that to adopt - the holding in Hutchings and allow employees to
maintain Title VII suits after an arbitration award has been granted
would undermine the arbitral process by making arbitration agree-
ments unattractive to employers in the same fashion that the lack of
enforceability of no-strike clauses was recognized in Boys Markets as
making arbitration agreements unattractive to employers.
It is suggested that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Hutchings is correct and should be adopted by the
Supreme Court. Criticism of the result in Hutchings on the grounds
that it "does not comport" with the Supreme Court's emphasis of the
importance of arbitration in Boys Markets18 is based upon an incorrect
interpretation of Boys Markets. It is true that Boys Markets stressed
"the importance which Congress has attached generally to the volun-
tary settlement of labor disputes . . . and more particularly to arbitra-
tion as a means to this end." 14 However, this policy is directed toward
settlement of disputes arising from the employment relationship and
based upon collective bargaining agreements. The policy of industrial
stabilization expressed in Boys Markets presents a different goal from
the preservation of the right to equal employment under Title VII.
This basic right is not derived from the employment relationship nor
from the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. It follows that the
protection of this right should not be limited to procedures concerned
primarily with the enforcement of contractual rights. Indeed, the pas-
10 Id.
11 429 F.2d 324 (1970).
12 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
18 429 F.2d at 336.
14 398 U.S. at 252.
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sage of Title VII was in itself an implicit recognition by Congress that
available contractual remedies were inadequate and ill-suited for the
elimination of inequality in employment."
Moreover, independent enforcement of the right to equal employ-
ment under Title VII would not interfere with the objectives of arbi-
tration as outlined in Boys Markets. The Court there stressed the effec-
tiveness of the arbitration technique as a method peacefully to resolve
industrial disputes "without resort to strikes, lockouts or other self-
help measures."' These goals are related to the crippling results of
large-scale economic warfare. Clearly, the policy considerations of
avoiding strikes and lockouts will not be undermined by individual
suits to protect the right to equal employment.
The distinction between contractual disputes and violations of
civil rights also has relevance to the application of the holding in Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox" that an employee must exhaust con-
tractual grievance procedures before bringing court action in contract
disputes. The authors of this Survey have suggested that the Maddox
exhaustion requirement should not be limited to disputes based solely
upon the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements." Thus,
we questioned the Court's holding in United States Bulk Carriers, Inc.
v. Arguelles 18
 that a seaman, although bound to a contract with griev-
ance procedures, may nonetheless bring suit under 46 U.S.C. § 596
without first exhausting the available contract grievance procedures.
We urged that the holding in Arguelles be limited to cases directly in-
volving section 596,20 and adopted the dissent's view that grievance
procedures must be exhausted "where . . . the availability of the statu-
tory remedy rests on disputed issues that are cognizable under the ar-
bitration clause."2' Following this reasoning, it could be argued that
Title VII rights should in some instances be conclusively settled
through arbitration.
However, in Arguelles, the seaman's right to certain wage claims
was dependent upon his contractual relationship with his employer.
Section 596 merely provided a statutory remedy to enforce that con-
tractual right. In Hutchings and Dewey the right to equal employment
was not dependent upon a contractual relationship. Title VII provides
an independent basis for the right to equal employment in addition to
18 Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. Pa. L. Rev. 40, 55 (1969).
10 398 U.S. at 249.
11 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
18 See p. 1072 supra.
10 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
20 sec p. 1073 supra.
21 400 U.S. at 374 (dissenting opinion).
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providing remedies for its enforcement. Thus, the broad application of
the Maddox exhaustion requirement to all basically contractual dis-
putes should not be interpreted as extending to controversies over dis-
crimination in employment since they have a basis independent of the
employment relationship.
The nature of a dispute grounded upon a violation of Title VII is
further distinguished by the public rights protected by Title VII. Con-
cern for the elimination of discrimination in employment reaches be-
yond an individual employer-employee controversy. The public policy
objective of eliminating inequality in employment should not be abdi-
cated to an arbitration process designed to reach reconciliation limited
to the parties involved." Therefore, the court in Hutchings was cor-
rect in its basic holding that no arbitrator "has the power to make the
ultimate determination of Title VII rights.""
V. FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF NO-STRIKE
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LMRA
Section 301(a) of the LMRA 1 expanded the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to include suits concerning violations of collective bar-
gaining agreements. This initial jurisdictional grant soon became the
source of a body of substantive federal labor law following the holding
in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills' that suits under
section 301 would be governed by federal law. As federal courts devel-
oped a body of law through adjudication of section 301 suits, arbitra-
tion emerged as the favored method for settling labor disputes. The
Supreme Court, in the Steelworkers Trilogy,5 clearly established,
through the application of section 301, that the effectiveness of the
arbitration process was essential to the federal policy of peaceful in-
dustrial stabilization'
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 5 the
22 Gould, supra note 15, at 58.
23 428 F.2d at 314.
1 Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
2 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960).
4 363 U.S. at 578.
5 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For a more complete examination of this decision, see Note,
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Supreme Court reemphasized the importance of the effective enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements, and held that the Norris-La Guardia
Act does not bar injunctive relief for strikes in breach of no-strike
clauses in collective bargaining agreements which contain provisions
for mandatory grievance adjustment or binding arbitration. In reach-
ing its decision, the Court expressly overruled its decision in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson.° The dispute in Boys Markets arose from the
employer's use of non-union workers to pack a frozen food container
despite union demands that the container be emptied and refilled by
union workers. The union and the employer were bound by a collective
bargaining agreement which contained provisions for grievance hear-
ings, binding arbitration and a no-strike clause. Following the employ-
er's refusal to allow union members to empty the food cases, the union
called a strike and picketed the employer's place of business.
The employer then obtained a temporary restraining order from a
state court forbidding continuation of the strike. The union removed
the case to federal district court and requested that the state order be
quashed. The district court enjoined the union from striking and or-
dered both parties to arbitration under the agreement. The 'Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this order on the grounds that
the federal injunction violated the Norris La-Guardia Act as applied
by Sinclair.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded with instructions to reinstate the district court
order.
The Court's reversal of Sinclair was based in part upon the effect
of the holding in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 7358 that section 301
suits could be removed from state courts to federal courts. It was
found that removal in effect negated state jurisdiction of 301 suits
since federal courts felt bound by Sinclair. to dissolve state injunctions
brought before them. This result was seen by the Court as being con-
trary to the congressional intention that section 301 supplement but
not displace state jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreements.
In addition, the Court noted that the availability of the federal courts
to circumvent state injunctions would lead to a practice of forum shop-
ping that would hinder the goal of uniformity in national labor policy.
However, the Court recognized that the effect of Avco and Sin-
clair upon state court jurisdiction and uniformity in labor law could
be remedied by an extension of Sinclair to hold that state as well as
federal courts were prohibited from enjoining breaches of no-strike
Federal Courts May Enjoin Strikes in Breach of No-Strike Agreements, 12 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 295 (1970).
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
7 416 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1969).
8 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 	 t =
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clauses under section 301. This suggestion was rejected by' the Court
since neither the Norris-La Guardia Act nor section 301 were meant
to impose such a limitation upon state courts. More importantly, the
Court noted that such an extension of Sinclair would result in "deva-
stating implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements
and their accompanying no-strike obligations."° Therefore, since Sin-
clair after Avco seriously undermined the effectiveness of arbitration
as the primary method for settling labor disputes, the Court held that
the Sinclair holding must be overturned.
The Court reasoned that these policy objectives could be
achieved, and federal courts could be granted the power to enjoin
strikes under section 301, despite the explicit language of Section 4 of
the Norris-La Guardia Act" that no federal court may issue an injunc-
tion against a strike growing out of a labor dispute. It was held that
"Mlle literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act must be ac-
commodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration.""
The Court noted that the Norris-La Guardia Act was designed to cor-
rect abusive practices that no longer exist in the federal courts. As la-
bor organizations grew in strength, the congressional purpose in labor
legislation moved from protection of labor groups to enforcement of
the collective bargaining process. The Court noted that since this tran-
sition was made without altering older statutes, the courts were given
the responsibility of effectuating this legislation by accommodating the
older statutes to the newer statutes.
The Court found precedent for such accommodation in the hold-
ing of Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.
Co.12 that federal courts were not barred by the Norris-La Guardia Act
from enjoining a strike which violated the statutory duty to arbitrate
under the Railway Labor Act." In that case, it was held that strikes
in violation of the duty to arbitrate imposed by the Railway Labor Act
did not present the type of situation that the Norris-La Guardia Act
was designed to remedy. Thus, it was held that the anti-injunction pro-
hibitions of the Norris-La Guardia Act could be accommodated with
the statutory policy of settling the dispute through arbitration to allow
injunctive relief.
The Court recognized the fact that the arbitration procedures in
Chicago River were statutorily created under the Railway Labor Act,
whereas the arbitration procedures in Boys Markets arose from a col-
9 398 US. at 247.
10 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
11 398 U.S. at 250.
12 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
is 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
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lective bargaining agreement. However, the Court held that effective
enforcement of voluntary arbitration is as essential to federal labor
policy as was the enforcement of the statutory duty to arbitrate in Chi-
cago River. Moreover, the Court noted that the core purpose of the
Norris-La Guardia Act—the protection of organized labor—would not
be sacrificed by the enforcement of no-strike obligations freely entered
into by unions. The Court concluded that since the enforcement of
no-strike clauses was vital to national labor policy, and since the core
purpose of the Norris-La Guardia Act would not be defeated by such
enforcement, the Norris-La Guardia Act did not bar injunctive relief
in the situation presented in Boys Markets.
The Court stated that its holding was limited to cases involving
collective bargaining contracts which contain provisions for mandatory
grievance adjustment or binding arbitration procedure. In addition,
the Court noted that even if these requirements were met, iniunctive
relief should not be granted as a matter of course in all cases of strikes
in breach of no-strike clauses. The Court adopted the following guide-
lines from the dissenting opinion in Sinclair as outlining the proper
circumstances for granting injunctive relief:
A District Court entertaining an action under 301 may
not grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless
and until it decides that the case is one in which an injunc-
tion would be appropriate despite the Norris-La Guardia
Act. When a strike is sought to be enforced because it is over
a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to
arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order
until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and
the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of
his obtaining an injunction 'against the strike. Beyond this,
the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance
of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary prin-
ciples of equity—whether breaches are occurring and will
continue, or have been threatened and will be committed;
whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to
the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more
from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its
issuance."
The most direct impact of the Boys Markets decision will, of
course, be the increased enforceability of no-strike clauses. Conse-
quently, as the majority in Boys Markets indicated, arbitration provi-
14 398 U.S. at 234, citing 370 U.S. at 228' (dissenting opinion).
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sions should become more attractive to employers? In addition, the
method of statutory accommodation used by the Court may have sig-
nificant impact upon future developments in labor law. The accommo-
dation approach is not unprecedented, as demonstrated by the Court's
analogy to Chicago River. However, the Court's accommodation of a
specific statutory mandate of the Norris-La Guardia Act to a policy
favoring contractual arbitration must be recognized as a significant
expansion of the accommodation approach used to reconcile conflict-
ing statutory designs in Chicago River. •
Moreover, it is significant that the Court in Boys Markets chose
the accommodation method rather than a re-evaluation of its interpre-
tation in Sinclair of the scope of a "labor dispute" as defined in Sec-
tion 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act? In both Sinclair and Boys
Markets the Court treated a breach of a no:strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement containing provisions for binding arbitration as
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
Of course, it is only after this initial determination has been made that
it becomes necessary to reconcile the plain anti-injunction language of
the Norris-La Guardia Act with federal attempts to enjoin strikes in
breach of no-strike clauses. Yet, it would seem that the Court's recog-
nition that the Norris-La Guardia Act was designed to meet a situa-
tion different from that presented today would support a finding that
breaches of no-strike clauses in the narrow circumstances outlined by
the Court in Boys Markets are beyond the scope of a "labor dispute"
as originally intended by Congress." A finding that strikes in breach
of no-strike clauses in contracts with arbitration provisions were not
"labor disputes" within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act
would have had a relatively narrow range of application. For the most
part, such an interpretation would be limited to cases involving the
Norris-La Guardia Act itself.
However, by holding that the literal anti-injunction prohibition
of the Norris-La Guardia Act did apply, but was negated through a
process of accommodation, the Court in Boys Markets has approved
a method of statutory interpretation of much broader significance. The
accommodation approach used in Boys Markets could be applied to
15 398 U.S. at 252.
1e Section 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act defines "labor dispute" as including
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.
29 U.S.C. '113(c) (1964).
17
 See Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 645-46
(1959); Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law; 34 Marg. L. Rev. 233, 250 (1951)
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virtually every instance of conflict between a strong federal labor pol-
icy and an otherwise controlling statutory provision. Thus, the holding
in Boys Markets raises the possibility of further judicial accommoda-
tion of other statutes and policies beyond the instant reconciliation of
the Norris-La Guardia Act with federal injunctive relief against strikes
in breach of no-strike clauses under section 301.
VI. FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE ENFORCEMENT
OF STATE COURT INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,' considered
the validity of a federal district court injunction against the enforce-
ment of a state court injunction in a labor dispute under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (Federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1793) which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunc-
tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 2
The dispute in Atlantic Coast Line arose in 1967 when the Broth-
erhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) began picketing the Mon-
crief Yard, a switching yard operated by the Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Co. (ACL). After being denied relief in federal district court,
ACL obtained an injunction in a state court against the picketing. Nei-
ther party instituted any other legal proceedings until 1969, after the
Court in Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 3
 held that
BLE picketing at a yard next to the Moncrief Yard was federally pro-
tected under the Railway Labor Act4 against state court interference.
Based upon the Jacksonville Terminal holding, BLE brought an ac-
tion in state court to dissolve the injunction against the Moncrief Yard
picketing. The state court refused to grant relief, and BLE then ob-
tained a federal district court injunction against enforcement of the
state court injunction. The issues before the Supreme Court were lim-
ited to the questions whether the federal district court injunction in
1969 was valid under section 2283 either because it was "necessary in
aid of the district court's jurisdiction," or "to protect or effectuate the
judgments" of the district court in its 1967 order allowing picketing at
the Moncrief Yard.
A majority of the Court held that the district court injunction in
1 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
2 28 U.S.C. 1 2283 (1964).
8 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
4 45 U.S.C. 1 151 et seq. (1964).
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1969 was not "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" of the dispute in
1967. While it was recognized that the federal district court did have
jurisdiction in the dispute, the Court held that section 2283 requires
more than that the requested injunction be merely related to the fed-
eral court's jurisdiction. It was held that a federal court can enjoin
state court proceedings only if the state action seriously impedes the
federal court's ability and authority to decide the case. However, the
majority held that in the instant case the state court also had jurisdic-
tion over the dispute. Since the federal and the state courts had con-
current jurisdiction it was held that the state proceedings did not un-
duly interfere with federal jurisdiction.
The Court also held that the 1969 district court injunction was
not granted "to protect or effectuate" the 1967 judgment of the district
court within the meaning of section 2283. The majority's determina-
tion of this issue rested upon its interpretation of the meaning of the
district court's 1967 order denying an ACL request for a federal in-
junction against the picketing. The union argued before the Court that
the district court's 1967 order should be interpreted as a determination
by the district court that the union had a federally protected right to
picket that could not be abrogated by state court proceedings. The ma-
jority of the Court rejected this interpretation and held that the dis7
trict court order in 1967 defined a right to picket free from federal in-
terference only and left undecided the question of state interference.
In support of this interpretation, the majority noted that the union had
based its argument before the district court on the theory that the
Norris-La Guardia Act prevented the district court from enjoining the
picketing. Moreover, the majority held that the district court finding
that the union had fulfilled its obligation under the Railway Labor Act
and was, therefore, free to engage in self-help meant only that the
union was free from federal court interference.
The majority also rejected the union's argument that the wording
of the district court's 1969 injunction against enforcement of the state
injunction indicated that the 1967 district court order was meant to
pr6tect the union's right to picket from state as well as federal inter-
ference. In his 1969 order, the district court .judge stated:
In its Order of April 26, 1967, this Court found that
Plaintiff's Moncrief Yard, the area in question, 'is an integral
and necessary part of [ACL's] operations'. . The Court con-
cluded furthermore that Defendants herein `are now free to
engage in self-help'. . . . The injunction of the state court, if
allowed to continue in force, would effectively nullify this
Court's findings and delineation of rights, of the partiei. The
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categorization of Defendants' activities as "secondary" does
not alter this state of affairs. See [Jacksonville Terminal] .
The majority interpreted this reference to Jacksonville Terminal as in-
dicating only that the district court, in 1969 concluded that Jackson-
ville Terminal had amplified its 1967 order with the result that state
as well as federal interference with picketing at the Moncrief Yard was
prohibited in 1969. The Court rejected the argument that the 1969
reference to Jacksonville Terminal indicated that the 1967 order was
meant at that time to prohibit both state and federal interference. The
majority held that it was only the 1969 amplification of the 1967 dis-
trict court order that needed protection from state court interference
within the terms of section 2283. The unmodified 1967 order was in-
terpreted as prohibiting only federal interference, and, therefore, the
1969 injunction against state court interference with that order was
held to be beyond the "protect or effectuate" exception of section 2283.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the 1969 in-
junction against state court interference should have been upheld as
being necessary to "protect or effectuate" the district court's 1967
judgment within the meaning of section 2283. In Justice Brennan's
view, the 1967 district court order, by finding that the union had a fed-
erally protected right to picket, necessarily decided by implication that
this protected right could not be defeated by state court proceedings.
Moreover, the language of the district court's 1969 order was seen by
Justice Brennan as supporting the interpretation of the 1967 order as
protecting the picketing from state as well as federal interference. He
would also find that the union's argument before the district court in
1967 should be interpreted as outlining a broader request for protec-
tion than merely an assertion of the Norris-La Guardia prohibition
against federal injunctive relief.
Beyond disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of the lan-
guage of the district court orders, Justice Brennan criticized the ma-
jority's reasoning that any doubts of the validity of injunctions against
state proceedings under section 2283 should be decided against uphold-
ing the federal order. He pointed out that in addition to the limitations
imposed by section 2283, that section also represents a congressional
intent that federal judgments be upheld and effectively implemented.
In the instant case, the district court's basic determination that the
union could picket was rendered ineffectual by the state court injunc-
tion. Justice Brennan argued that this result places restrictions upon
the district court that are contrary to the language and policies of sec-
tion 2283.
5 398 U.S. at 292.
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The decision in Atlantic Coast Line is unusual in that it relies so
heavily upon the interpretation of the language of a district court
judge's order and the arguments raised by counsel at the lower court
hearing. Moreover, the factual setting of the case is virtually unique
in that a substantively similar controversy was decided by the Court
at a site next to the locus of the present dispute after the lower court
proceedings in the instant case had been initiated. The decision in At-
lantic Coast Line thus appears to be extremely limited because it is
essentially an application of section 2283 made noteworthy by the un-
usual underlying factual circumstances. The limited scope of the deci-
sion is evidenced by Justice Brennan's remark that his disagreement
with the Court was "a relatively narrow one."' His dissenting opinion
substantiates this comment by its intense concentration upon the ques-
tion of the scope of the district court order.
However, the decision may have broader impact in that it seems
to run contrary to a current emphasis in recent Court decisions involv-
ing questions of statutory interpretation in the labor law area. In the
recent Boys Markets 7
 decision, also decided during the Survey year,
the Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, heavily
stressed the importance of considering "the total corpus of federal la-
bor law"' when deciding the effect of one piece of labor legislation
upon another. Similar stress was placed upon the need for uniformity
in the administration of national labor policy. This reasoning sup-
ported the Court's conclusion in Boys Markets that the plain anti-
injunction language of Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act could
be accommodated with Section 301 of the LMRA to allow federal in-
junctive relief in certain 301 suits.
Of course, the accommodation reached in Boys Markets con-
cerned the interaction between two congressional enactments that bad
evolved in the context of a developing web of federal control of labor
relations. The argument for accommodation of two federal labor law
statutes is more persuasive than a similar argument directed toward
the accommodation of a general jurisdictional statute such as sec-
tion 2283 and federal district court enforcement of national labor
policy. Furthermore, as Justice Brennan pointed out, "federal courts
do not have authority to enjoin state proceedings merely because it is
asserted that the state court is improperly asserting jurisdiction in an
area pre-empted by federal law or federal procedures"' such as labor
law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that many of the policy considera-
0 Id. at 297 (dissenting .opinion).
7 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
8 Id. at 250..
9 398 U.S. at 289-90 (dissenting opinion).
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tions behind the decision in Boys Markets have application to the is-
sue presented in Atlantic Coast Line. In an area such as labor law,
there are present considerations of the effectiveness of a national pol-
icy, and uniformity of administration of that policy, that are absent in
other areas. While the reliance upon these policy considerations in
Boys Markets was limited to the reconciliation of two federal . labor
statutes, these policy considerations do not lose their relevance when
applied to the question of the limitations under section 2283 of federal
court authority in labor disputes.
Thus, it is at least arguable that the goal of uniformity in national
labor policy should be considered when applying section 2283 to cases
involving federal proceedings in labor disputes. The majority in At-
lantic Coast Line, however, treated section 2283 almost exclusively in
the context of the problem of the separation of federal and state au-
thority. The Court stated that
any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise
proper under general equitable principles must be based on
one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be
upheld. Moreover since the statutory prohibition against
such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitu-
tional independence of the States and their courts, the excep-
tions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.
Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to
continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal
courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appel-
late courts and ultimately this Court. 1°
While this interpretation is a proper. assessment of the basic purpose
of section 2283, it is an interpretation that does not consider the need
for uniformity through federal enforcement in the area of labor rela-
tions.
The majority's emphasis on respect for the integrity of state court
authority as the controlling consideration in the application of sec-
tion 2283 is also apparent from the Court's statement that:
Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against
state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permit-
ting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to fi-
nally determine the controversy. The explicit wording of
§ 2283 itself implies as much and the fundamental principle
of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclu-
sion.11
10 Id. at 287.
11 Id. at 297.
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The majority's emphasis upon the integrity of the state court system
may readily apply to questions of state versus federal jurisdiction
which do not affect a body of law designed to promote nationwide
uniformity. However, it is questionable whether this approach should
be followed in cases involving labor disputes where uniformity de-
mands that federal court enforcement be supported. In this context,
Justice Brennan's criticism of the "crippling restrictions'" 2 imposed
by the majority in Atlantic Coast Line assumes a greater significance
than his "narrow" dissent from the conclusion reached in that case. It
is submitted that Justice Brennan's criticism of the approach used by
the majority is correct because the majority rationale fails to give suf-
ficient weight to policy considerations peculiar to cases which affect
national labor policy. The majority's application of section 2283 to
cases involving labor disputes as if those cases are no different from
other jurisdictional controversies under section 2283 ignores the im-
portance of the policy of uniformity in labor relations through federal
enforcement that was recently reemphasized in Boys Markets. Where,
as in Atlantic Coast Line, the question of the validity of a federal in-
junction in a labor dispute "is by no means an easy one, 113 the issue
should be resolved in light of policy considerations in favor of federal
enforcement that are not necessarily overborne by the jurisdictional
limitations of section 2283.
VII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Duty to Bargain
1. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
An employer is required under section 8(a) (5) to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees. His duty to bargain
is mandatory as to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment" as provided in section 8(d). In McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 1
decided during the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the Board and held that the price of food served from
vending machines in the employer's plant was not a "condition of em-
ployment" when the machines were owned by an independent con-
tractor and when other food sources were available.
The majority of the court stressed the fact that the employees
were not limited to the vending machines as a source of food for
lunches. The plant itself was not isolated and outside eating places
were accessible. In addition, facilities were available to employees who
12 Id. at 305 (dissenting opinion).
la Id. at 296.
1 432 KR! 187, 75 L.R.R.M. 1223 (4th Cir. 1970).
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brought their own lunch. The dissent, however, would uphold • the
Board's finding that the alternative food sources were not an adequate
alternative to in-plant facilities, and that prices of the vending ma-
chine food, therefore, materially affected the conditions of employ-
ment. Furthermore, the dissent noted that while the machines them-
selves were owned by an outside contractor, the employer furnished
the food for the machines and set the prices for the food itself. These
two elements of materiality and control by the employer led the dissent
to find that the price of the vending machine food was a mandatory
subject of bargaining under section 8(d).
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB,' the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board and held that unilateral changes
in retirement benefits affecting retired employees are not mandatory
subjects of bargaining within section 8(d). The court noted that it is
well established that retirement benefits to be paid following termina-
tion of employment constitute "conditions of employment," and are
mandatory subjects of bargaining while the employees are active.
However, once retirement benefits have been negotiated, further
changes may be unilaterally proposed by the employer. Thus, the
court held that retirees are not "employees" within the meaning of
section 2(3).
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the employer and union had reached
agreement upon a pension plan that called for monthly payments by
the employer to retired workers. After agreement had been reached,
the employer notified the union that it intended to substitute supple-
mental Medicare for the negotiated health plan. The company planned
to mail letters to individual retirees offering withdrawal from the nego-
tiated plan and acceptance of company contributions to Medicare. The
union objected to this unilateral action and insisted that any change
affecting the retired employees must be the subject of bargaining. The
company proceeded with the mailing and accepted a number of retired
employees into the supplemental program. This unilateral action was
approved by the court on the ground that the retirees were not "em-
ployees" for the purposes of mandatory bargaining.
The Board has not followed the Sixth Circuit's holding that re-
tired employees are not "employees" in terms of section 2 (3). In
Union Carbide Corp.,8 the union requested from the employer infor-
mation concerning retirees so that the union could bargain effectively
concerning proposed changes in an existing pension plan. However,
unlike the situation in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the union here sought
this information for the preparation of future negotiations, rather than
2 427 F.2d 936, 74 L.R.R.M. 2425 (6th Cir. 1970).
187 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 75 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1970).
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for application directly to retirees. The Board adopted the trial exam-
iner's holding that retirees are "employees" within the meaning of
section 2 (3), and that information concerning them is, therefore, pre-
sumptively relevant unless the employer can present convincing evi-
dence to the contrary. In upholding the trial order to furnish the re-
quested information, the Board expressly declined to reconsider its
Pittsburgh Plate Glass holding in light of the Sixth Circuit's reversal
of that decision.
2. Unilateral Union Regulation of Production
Under section 8(b) (3), unions are required to bargain collec-
tively as to "wages, hours and terms of employment" as stated in sec-
tion 8(d). A union's obligation to bargain thus parallels the duty to
bargain that an employer is bound to recognize under section 8(a) (5).
However, the scope of the union's duty to bargain must also be defined
in light of section 8(b) (1) (A) which protects a union's right to estab-
lish and enforce its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of union membership.
The effect of a union's right to regulate internal affairs upon its
duty to bargain was initially considered in Associated Home Builders
of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB.4 The union was bound to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement which contained no provisions for produc-
tion quotas. While the agreement was still in force, the union, without
notifying the employer, set quotas and fined members for failures to ob-
serve maximum and minimum limits. The case reached the court of ap-
peals upon a complaint alleging only a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A).
However, the court held that such unilateral adoption of production
quotas must also be considered in terms of a failure to bargain, and
remanded to the Board for adjudication under section 8 (b) (3). The
establishment of employee production quotas was then held to affect
"terms and conditions of employment" subject to the duty to bargain.
A union's right to regulate the production of its members was
again considered in Scofield v. NLRB.' The respondent union had be-
gun state court proceedings to collect fines against members who had
exceeded production quotas. The Board had reviewed a union mem-
ber's complaint against these proceedings and held that the union's ac-
tivity was properly within the provisions of section 8(h) (1) (A). The
Supreme Court upheld this determination, holding that a union's suit
to collect fines from members for failing to adhere to union production
limits does not constitute unlawful restraint or coercion within the
meaning of section 8 (b) (1) (A).
4 352 F.2d 745, 60 L.R.R.M. 2345 (9th Cir. 1965).
5 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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During the Survey year, the Board, in Painters District Coun-
cil,6
 considered the union's duty to bargain regarding production reg-
ulation as affected by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the union
right to regulate production in Sco field. The respondent union, while
bound to a collective bargaining agreement containing no quota provi-
sions, unilaterally instituted production quotas among its members.
The collective bargaining agreement provided for payment on a weekly
salary basis. Under the quota system, each member was prohibited
from painting more than ten rooms per week. The union claimed that
the quota was designed to provide better quality, not less work. Prior
to the institution of the quota, production had averaged over eleven
rooms per week. A majority of the Board held that this unilateral
change sufficiently affected the terms and conditions of employment so
as to violate section 8(b)(3).
The majority relied upon the reasoning in Associated Home
Builders that union production rules are not per se violations of sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (A). The Scofield holding was not seen as determinative
of bargaining problems under section 8(b) (3). However, dissenting
Member Fanning interpreted Scofield as controlling the issue of
whether union production regulations violate section 8(b) (3). He
cited the following language from Scofield as being determinative:
The union rule here left the collective bargaining pro-
cess unimpaired, breached no collective contract, required no
pay for unperformed services, induced no discrimination by
the employer against any class of employees, and represents
no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation.
In the light of this, and the acceptable manner in which the
rule was enforced, vindicating a legitimate union interest, it
is impossible to say that it contravened any policy of the
Act.7
As Member Fanning pointed out, the production regulations in
Scofield had as direct a bearing upon the terms of employment as did
the quotas in the case before the Board. It would follow, therefore,
that the regulations in Painters District Council met the standards ex-
pressed in Scofield, and that they should likewise be protected from
prohibition by "any policy of the Act." Member Fanning would thus
rely upon, Scofield as a basis for approving the instant quotas in terms
of 8(b)(3) as well as 8(b)(1)(A).
However, the position taken by the majority in distinguishing
6 186 N.L.R.B. No, 140, 75 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1970).
7 394 U.S. at 436, cited in 186 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1469 (dissenting
opinion).
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Scofield from the facts of Painters District Council is more convincing.
The majority points out that "in Scofield there was no 8(b) (3) charge,
and the Supreme Court found that the employer had virtually acqui-
esced and cooperated in the application and implementation of the
rule."° While the broad language in Sco field does significantly rein-
force a union's right to regulate production in terms of 8(b) (1) (A),
the majority appears to be correct in holding that Scofield does not
control questions concerning section 8(b) (3).
If limitation of Scofield to 8(b) (1) (A) violations is correct, the
reasoning in Associated Home Builders should maintain its viability.
Production quotas should be viewed as getting to the essence of the
terms and conditions of employment for which both unions and em-
ployers are bound to bargain. Limitations upon this essential aspect of
employer-employee relations are not exclusively the concern of internal
union regulation. The majority's holding in Painters District Council
properly recognizes that production regulations should be the subject
of mutual control through bargaining by both employers and unions.°
3. Duty of Successor Employers to Honor Existing Contracts
In 1963, the Supreme Court, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Liv-
ingston,'° held that in appropriate circumstances a purchasing em-
ployer is bound to arbitrate matters arising within the scope of an ar-
bitration clause in a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement. The
Court noted that collective bargaining agreements represent more than
a consensual relationship between the immediate parties. Collective
bargaining agreements must be considered in the context of a national
labor policy favoring arbitration that is not necessarily overborne by
the fact that the successor employer has not signed the existing agree-
ment. Upon this reasoning, the Court held that the disappearance by
merger of a corporate employer bound by a collective bargaining
agreement does not terminate that agreement, and, under the proper
circumstances, the successor employer is required to arbitrate under
the agreement. In John Wiley & Sons, the Court found the requisite
"proper circumstances" since there was a continuity of the identity of
the business after the change in ownership, as evidenced by the trans-
fer of employees from the old operation to the new merged business,
and since the union had made its bargaining position known prior to
the merger.
During the Survey year, the Board, in Burns Int'l Detective
8 186 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1467 n.6.
0 See Note, Unilateral Imposition of Production Quotas by a Union, 52 Va. L. Rev.
711, 716 (1966).
10 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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Agency, Inc.," relied upon the rationale in John Wiley & Sons to hold
that in certain circumstances a successor employer must honor the en-
tire collective bargaining agreement signed by his predecessor. In
Burns, the security services for an aircraft company had been per-
formed by the Wackenhut company, whose employees were covered by
a collective bargaining agreement with the petitioning union. As pro-
vided in the contract with the aircraft company, the security contract
was let out for bids. The prospective bidders, including Burns, were
advised by the aircraft company that the security guards then em-
ployed by Wackenhut were members of a certified union and were cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement with the petitioning union.
When Burns formally took over the security service, a majority of
Burns' work force consisted of guards who had worked for Wackenhut
and the nature of the service remained the same as under Wackenhut.
Burns refused demands that it recognize the pre-existing collective bar-
gaining agreement with Wackenhut, whereupon the union filed charges
alleging violation of section 8(a) (5).
The Board held that Burns was obligated under section 8(a) (5)
as if it had been a signatory of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Board stressed the fact that Burns had been aware that the busi-
ness operated under a collective bargaining agreement, and that the
operation of the business remained essentially the same after change in
ownership. Furthermore, the Board noted that under such circum-
stances there is no reason to believe that union members would not ac-
cept continuation of the terms of the existing agreement. Binding a
successor employer to an existing contract in this situation, therefore,
was held to achieve the goal of promoting industrial stability without
acting inequitably toward the incoming employer.
The scope of the successor employer's obligation was held in
Burns to include the duty to negotiate proposed changes in existing
terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore,, the successor em-
ployer was held to be prohibited from unilaterally changing wages and
other benefits established by the prior agreement even though that
agreement has expired. Thus, under the Board's holding, a successor
employer is bound to the terms of an expired contract in the same
manner as employers who have signed contracts are bound during pe-
riods between collective bargaining agreements.
In Davenport Insulation,'2 the Board clarified its holding in
Burns. The union had insisted that the successor employer adhere to
an existing contract which had been entered into without certification
of majority status of the union under the exception granted by sec-
11 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 74 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1970).
12 184 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 74 L.R.R.M. 1726 (1970).
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Lion 8(f).18
 The Board held that a contract entered into under sec-
tion 8(f) does not give rise to the presumption of a continuing major-
ity as in Burns. It was held, therefore, that where a predecessor has
entered into a contract under section 8(f), a successor employer is not
bound to honor the agreement unless there is independent proof of the




The Supreme Court, in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,'
held that an employer may temporarily lock out employees to bring
economic pressure to bear upon a union during an impasse in bargain-
ing without violating Sections 8(a) (1) or 8(a) (3) of the LMRA, 2
provided that the employer does not act with a discriminatory motive.
However, the Court noted that "there are some practices which are in-
herently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant
economic justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage
union membership or other antiunion animus is required." 8 The Su-
preme Court later held in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,' that
employer practices which are inherently destructive of important em-
ployee rights are unlawful without proof of anti-union motivation,
whereas practices whose destructive effects are "comparatively slight"
will not be held unlawful if the employer comes forward with evidence
of legitimate and substantial business justification for the conduct. 5
During the Survey year, the Board applied these principles to a
13 Section 8(f) provides in part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice .	 for an employer engaged
primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement .. .
with a labor organization . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor
organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this
title prior to the making of such agreement ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1964).
1 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2 Section 8 provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [71;
. .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(3) (1964).
3 380 U.S. at 311.
4 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
ri Id. at 34.
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partial economic lockout in Laclede Gas Co .° The employer, a public
utility, selectively began laying off employees in anticipation of a
strike after an impasse had been reached in negotiations for a new
contract. All employees engaged in excavation and construction in the
street department were locked out, while employees in other areas con-
tinued working. As a consequence of this selectivity, some employees
were locked out contrary to seniority provisions which normally would
have allowed them to "bump" into other jobs. The employer asserted
that this action was taken to leave as little street excavation open as
possible in order to reduce danger to the public and to lessen chances
of sabotage in the event of a strike after the impending expiration date
of the contract.
The Board examined the effects of this lockout in terms of the
standards established in Great Dane. It was found that while the ac-
tion may have adversely affected some employees with seniority pref-
erence, the lockouts were without regard to union status and were de-
termined entirely by the individual's job assignment. The Board held
that such lockouts, even though in contravention of normal seniority
practices, had only peripheral effects on the employees' rights. Since
there was no proof of anti-union motivation, and since the effects of
the lockout on employee rights were "comparatively slight," the Board
held that the lockout was not unlawful under Great Dane. The Board
further stated that even if the lockout were held to be seriously de-
structive of employee rights, the company had sustained its burden of
demonstrating legitimate business objectives for the lockout. The con-
struction work had become unproductive as the contract expiration
deadline drew near, and excavations left open during a strike would be
potentially dangerous to the public. A temporary lockout under these
conditions was held to be essentially defensive in nature and within the
scope of unlawful bargaining tactics.
However, dissenting Member Fanning was unconvinced that the
employer's action only peripherally affected important employee rights.
In his opinion, the employer's disregard of seniority rights by locking
out some but not all employees in the unit raised questions of legality
in light of the holding in Great Dane. Accordingly, since the issue of
the lawfulness of the lockout had not been fully treated, 7 he would re-
mand the case for further determination by a trial examiner.
p 187 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 75 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1970).
The case had originally been treated by the Board as a refusal to bargain under
§ 8(a)(5). 173 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 69 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1968). However, on appeal,
the Board's finding of a bargaining violation was reversed and the case was remanded
for consideration of whether the lockout violated § 8(a) (1) or 8(a)(3). 421 F.2d
610, 73 L.R.R.M. 2364 (8th Cir. 1970).
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2. Regulation of Union Solicitation
Although an employer has the basic right to exclude non-
employees from his property, the exercise of this property right must
be accommodated with the right of employees to organize under Sec-
tion 7 of the LMRA. Included within the right of employees to orga-
nize is their right to learn the advantages of organization from out-
side, non-employee sources. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,8 the
Supreme Court held that an employer could prohibit non-employee dis-
tribution of union literature on his property only "if reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication will
enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing
other distribution."° This second requirement of non-discrimination
was indirectly amplified by the Court's holding in Amalgamated Food
Employee's Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 10 In Logan Valley,
the Court held that the owner of a shopping center could not bar the
picketing of a store in the center by non-employee union organizers.
The center was found to be "quasi-public" in nature, and the owners,
therefore, could not discriminatorily interfere with the union's First
Amendment right to picket.
In 1968, the Board, in Solo Cup Co.," applied the rationales of
Babcock & Wilcox and Logan Valley to a case involving prohibition
of union solicitation of employees who worked at a plant located in a
privately owned industrial park. The industrial park had privately
maintained streets, street signs, speed zone signs and water lines. Vir-
tually all employees of employers in the park entered the area through
an intersection of a major public highway and a private street (Dor-
chester Avenue) running through the park. Because of traffic condi-
tions, it was unsafe for organizers to stand outside the entrance to the
park at the intersection of the highway and Dorchester Avenue. When
union organizers attempted to enter the industrial park and distribute
leaflets on the premises of the Solo plant, they were ordered to leave
by representatives of both Solo and the park management.
The Board found that since it was unsafe to stand at the Dor-
chester Avenue intersection at the entrance to the park, the only other
method of solicitation short of entering the industrial park itself would
be to use mass media to reach the employees at home. However, unlike
the situation in Babcock & Wilcox, the employees in Solo lived in
8 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
9 Id. at 112.
10 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
11 172 NI.R.B. No. 110, 68 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1968).
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widely separated sections of a large metropolitan area." The Board
found that solicitation through mass media under these circumstances
would not permit the union to reach the employees effectively. The
Board held, therefore, that prohibition of non-employee solicitation on
the premises of the plant violated section 8(a) (1).
Alternatively, the Board held that the industrial park in the in-
stant case was analogous to the "quasi-public" shopping center in Lo-
gan Valley. There were no fences, guard posts or other indications that
the industrial park was not freely accessible to the public. In addition,
catering services were freely allowed to enter the park area. The
Board found that these facts established the park as a "quasi-public"
area and, therefore, determined that denial of access to the premises to
union solicitation was unlawful within the holding in Logan Valley.
Upon these findings, the Board ordered the union organizers be al-
lowed to distribute union literature and other information on Solo's
plant premises outside the plant itself.
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in NLRB v. Solo Cup Co.," denied enforcement of the
Board's order. The court held that the Board's finding that the park
was "quasi-public" in nature was not supported by the evidence. Un-
like the shopping center in Logan Valley, it was held that the indus-
trial park was not held out as being open to the public. The court fur-
ther held that the serving of the park, by industrial caterers did not
alter the private nature of the area.
The court also held that the Babcock & Wilcox rationale had be-
come inapplicable since after the Board decision, the owners of the in-
dustrial park consented to allow union organizers to solicit Solo em-
ployees within the park on Dorchester Avenue. It was held that this
type of solicitation would be practical since Solo employees quit work
at a time different from other employees within the park, and would
thus be easily identifiable. The court concluded that since this reason-
able method of solicitation was now available, it would be unwarranted
to enforce the Board's order allowing solicitation of employees on the
premises of Solo's plant.
The court's finding that the industrial park in Solo was not a
"quasi-public" place in terms of the Logan Valley decision appears
correct. The nature of an industrial park, whose tenants are mainly
manufacturing companies, is distinguishable from the consumer-
oriented nature of a public shopping center, as was the case in Logan
12 In Babcock & Wilcox, 40% of the employees lived in a nearby town of only
21,000 people. In Solo Cup, the employees lived in the greater Chicago area which had
a population of over 4,000,000 people. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 68 L.R.R.M at 1386 n.2.
18 422 F.2d 1149, 73 L.R.R.M. 2789 (7th Cir. 1970).
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Valley. However, it is unclear to what extent the court rejected the
Board's finding that solicitation through the media would be ineffective
in the present case and, therefore, that solicitation on the premises was
required under the holding in Babcock & Wilcox. The Board's read-
ing of Babcock & Wilcox as requiring effective alternative methods of
communication, and not merely available alternative methods, is sig-
nificantly broader than prior interpretations of Babcock & Wilcox."
The court did expressly hold that this extension of Babcock & Wilcox
was unnecessary in the instant case because organizers were allowed to
solicit within the industrial plant limits. However, the court did not
comment upon the Board's underlying rationale that the Babcock &
Wilcox standard may not be satisfied even when the alternative of
mass media communication is available if that method is ineffective
because the employees are dispersed throughout a heavily populated
metropolitan area. Thus, the reversal of the Board in Solo Cup does
not diminish the prospect that the Board's expansive reading of Bab-
cock & Wilcox may significantly affect future decisions weighing the
right of employers to exclude non-employee organizers from plants lo-
cated in large metropolitan areas.
3. The Scope of Protected Activity
Under section 7, employees are guaranteed the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. The Supreme Court has recognized that there
is a broad range of activities that are protected under section 7. In
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.," the Court held that a walkout
by several employees in protest of poor heating conditions was pro-
tected under section 7 despite the fact that the employees had not pre-
sented a specific demand to their employer at the time of the walkout.
The Court held that the protection of section 7 extends to concerted
activities whether they occur before, after, or at the time a demand is
made.
The issue of what type of a demand is required to bring a con-
certed activity within the protection of section 7 arose in AHI Ma-
chine Tool & Die, Inc. v. NLRB." In response to a reprimand, an em-
ployee of AHI struck and knocked down his foreman. The foreman
immediately fired the employee who had assaulted him. As the fore-
man emerged from a discussion with a management official, another
employee asked the foreman to discuss the previous events leading to
14 Note, Nonemployee Union Organizers Granted Access to Company Property for
Solicitation Purposes, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 573, 579 (1969).
15 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
1 0 432 F.2d 190, 75 L.R.R.M. 2353 (6th Cir. 1970).
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the discharge. The foreman declined the invitation and four employees
shortly thereafter walked out along with the employee who had hit the
foreman. The four employees were required to sign "quit" slips prior
to receiving their final paychecks. Later, when the four employees were
not offered immediate reinstatement, they filed charges claiming a vio-
lation of section 8(a) (I). In support of this charge, the union claimed
that the discharge of the employee was unwarranted because the fore-
man had continually harassed the employees.
The court of appeals reversed the Board's finding that the walk-
out was protected activity to protest the firing of a fellow employee.
The majority of the court held that Washington Aluminum did not ap-
ply since, in that case, the employees, prior to the walkout, had com-
plained repeatedly to the employer about poor heating. The present
case was distinguished by the fact that there were no complaints at any
time concerning alleged harassment by the foreman. The court held
that the management learned that the employees were protesting the
discharge of a fellow employee only after the walkout and the signing
of the "quit" slips. The majority held that, partly because of this fail-
ure to communicate their grievance to the management, the employees'
walkout was not within section 7.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Celebrezze agreed with the Board's
finding that there was sufficient management awareness of the reasons
for the walkout to bring the activity within the protection of section
7. In his view, the company officials were aware of the fact that some
of the employees believed that the foreman had provoked the assault
through his attitude and harassment. Moreover, the lack of formal
grievance procedures in the shop, coupled with the earlier request to
discuss the events, created a reasonable inference that management
knew that the walkout was in protest of the discharge. For these
reasons, Judge Celebrezze would find the activity within the scope of
section 7 as defined in Washington Aluminum.
C. Economic Strikers
1. Retroactive Application of Laidlaw
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,' the Supreme Court held that
economic strikers retain their status as "employees" under Section
2(3) of the LMRA until they have found substantially equivalent
positions elsewhere. The Court held that failure to reinstate economic
strikers upon termination of a labor dispute presumptively will be
construed as an unfair labor practice because of its tendency to dis-
courage employees from engaging in protected concerted activity. In
388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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order to rebut the presumption, the employer has the burden of offer-
ing "legitimate and substantial business justifications"' such as the
elimination of the strikers' jobs or permanent replacement of the
strikers. The scope of section 2 (3) was further amplified by the hold-
ing in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers that the "employee" status of
economic strikers does not terminate solely because their initial ap-
plication for reinstatement has been legitimately denied by the em-
ployer. Employers are required to offer as yet unreplaced strikers
preference for any positions which become available until the striker
accepts regular and substantially equivalent employment elsewhere.
Following the reasoning of Fleetwood Trailer, the Board held
in Laidlaw Corp' that economic strikers who apply for reinstatement
at a time when their positions are filled by permanent replacements
are entitled to reinstatement when the replacements leave, unless the
strikers have accepted employment elsewhere or the employer can
prove that his failure to offer reinstatement was for legitimate and
substantial business reasons.a Thus, an employer must offer full rein-
statement (including undiminished seniority benefits, etc.) to eco-
nomic strikers as appropriate job vacancies occur. Furthermore, the
Board held that where economic strikers have made unconditional
applications for reinstatement and are readily available to return to
work, the employer must seek them out as job openings become avail-
able.
During the Survey year, the Board, in a two to one decision,
in Coca Cola Bottling Works,° held that the Laidlaw decision could
be applied retroactively. In Coca Cola, the union, after engaging in
an economic strike for several months, notified the employer that the
strike was being ended and requested reinstatement of the striking
employees. The company replied that reinstatement was impractical
until the union could furnish a list of those strikers who desired to be
re-employed. The union complied with this request and submitted the
names of 137 strikers who desired to be reinstated. The employer re-
plied that 12 of the 13 7 strikers would be reinstated and that of the
remaining strikers, either their jobs had been abolished or they had been
permanently replaced. The union alleged that this offer of reinstatement
violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8 (a) (3). However, at an unfair labor
practice hearing, the trial examiner found that with regard to the
reinstatement issue, the employer had not acted unlawfully.
The Board agreed with the trial examiner's findings that of all
2
 Id. at 34.
8 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
4 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968).
5 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1258.
186 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 75 L.R.R.M. 1551 (1970).
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strikers denied reinstatement, either their jobs had been abolished or
they had been permanently replaced at the time reinstatement was re-
quested. However, the Board noted that the trial examiner's approval
of the employer's reinstatement offer was necessarily based upon pre-
Laidlaw considerations. Therefore, the Board granted the employer's
petition to reconsider the reinstatement issue in light of Laidlaw. Further
findings by a trial examiner disclosed that job openings had become
available after the union's initial request for reinstatement. The em-
ployer had not notified the union of the subsequent openings, nor could
he offer substantial business justifications for his failure to reinstate
strikers to these openings. This failure to recall and reinstate strikers
as jobs became available was held, in light of Laidlaw, to be a violation
of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3).
In a dissenting opinion, Chairman Miller objected to the retro-
active application of Laidlaw as unfair since the employer had acted
in good faith and in accordance with prevailing Board precedent.
Furthermore, Chairman Miller criticized such retroactive application
as leading to confusion and uncertainty. He adopted the comment
of Judge Major who stated in Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB: 7
Enforcement of the Board's order means from now on
that an employer when faced with the problem of his rights
and obligations in a labor dispute cannot safely rely on the
advice of counsel, pronouncements of the Labor Board or
court decisions for the law by which he should charter his
course. Instead, he must be endowed with a power of proph-
ecy sufficiently great to enable him to anticipate that the
Board may change the law and make illegal that which was
legal.°
2. Continued Membership in Bargaining Unit
Under the National Labor Relations Act, workers who engage in
an economic strike may be permanently replaced by the employer
so that he may continue his operations. ° At the termination of the
strike, the employees that have been replaced retain their status as
"employees" until they find substantially similar work. i° This con-
tinued "employee" status requires employers to accord replaced eco-
7 414 F.2d 99, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054 (7th Cir. 1969).
8 Id. at 118, 71 L.R.R.M. at 3070 (dissenting opinion), cited in 186 N.L.R.B. No.
142, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1558.
9 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
10 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1964) provides:
The term "employee" . . . shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent emPloyment. . . .
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nomic strikers preference in hiring for any positions that may become
available and for which they are qualified."'
In Stoner Rubber Co.,12 the NLRB qualified the "employee"
status of permanently replaced economic strikers by ruling that such
status did not entitle them to be considered part of the bargaining unit
for purposes of determining a union's continued representational
status. The Board reasoned that Section 9(c) (3) of the Act," Which
then stated that striking employees not entitled to reinstatement were
not entitled to vote, compelled this result. Thus, at the termination of
an economic strike during which a substantial number of permanent
replacements had been hired, an employer might validly assert a
"good faith doubt" that the union continued to represent the em-
ployees and, therefore, refuse to bargain.
Subsequent to the Stoner decision, however, Congress amended
Section 9(c) (3) of the Act to provide that economic strikers could
vote in any election conducted within twelve months after the com-
mencement of the strike. Further, the amended provision empowers
the Board to issue such regulations as would effectuate the purpose of
the amendment. The Board complied with this legislative mandate
and, on occasion, has articulated principles governing voter eligi-
bility." Nevertheless, the Stoner ruling remained intact, and economic
strikers continued to be excluded from the bargaining unit for pur-
poses of determining the validity of an employer's alleged good faith
doubt."
During the Survey year, in Pioneer Flour Mills v. NLRB,' 6 the
Board successfully urged the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cirucuit
to enforce a ruling that departed from the policy announced in
Stoner. In Pioneer Mills, the employer refused to bargain with the
union at the termination of an economic strike because the appropriate
unit, which included sixty-two employees, consisted of forty-six per-
manent replacements and sixteen regular workers who refused to
strike.' At the Board level, the employer contended that this indicated
that the union no longer represented the employees in the unit, and,
therefore, that there was no obligation on its part to bargain. The
Board, however, found that the seventy-nine workers who actively
participated in the strike, and unconditionally sought reinstatement
upon termination of the work stoppage, would have been allowed to
11 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
12 123 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 44 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1959).
la 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
14 See NLRB Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 47 (1960), and NLRB Twenty-Eighth
Annual Report 54-55 (1963).
15 See, e.g., Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466 (1962).
le 427 F.2d 983, 74 L.R.R.M. 2343 (5th Cir. 1970).
17
 Pioneer Flour Mills, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 70 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1434 (1969).
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vote in an election under Section 9 of the Act, and, therefore, were
properly includable in the unit for the purpose of ascertaining the
union's majority status. 18
The Board admitted that its action was a departure from Stoner
and later cases, but it noted that the 1959 amendments to Section
9 (c)(3) compelled the revision. The Board reasoned that:
[a]lthough Section 9 (c) (3) deals with representation mat-
ters and the eligibility of voters in a Board conducted
election, we consider the provision pertinent to a Section
8(a) (5) allegation in determining whether an employer has
a reasonable basis for questioning an incumbent union's pre-
sumed majority status, since the ultimate basis for the em-
ployer's asserted doubt here is that a majority of the employ-
ees in the unit are not union adherents."
The Board continued by noting that failure to include economic
strikers when determining the representative status of a union would
defeat the purpose of the 1959 amendment.
On appeal, the company attacked the Board's action on two
grounds. First, it asserted that the abandonment of the Stoner policy
was tantamount to formulating a rule of continued prospective effect.
Therefore, the company urged, the requirements contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act should have been followed. Secondly,
the company contended that at the time of its refusal to bargain
Stoner was still good law, and that bad faith could not be inferred
retroactively.
The court of appeals found both of these arguments untenable.
The choice between rule-making by adjudication or by the provisions
of the APA, the court noted, is a question of judgment for the Board. 2°
Absent an abuse of discretion, or a clear violation of the APA, the
Board's choice will not be disturbed. As for the question of retroactive
application, the court adopted the position advanced in SEC v. Che-
nery Corp.,21 where the Supreme Court stated that "retroactivity must
be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is con-
trary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles.'
It seems clear that the abandonment of the Stoner doctrine was
not only proper, but long overdue. The 1959 legislative amendment
19 Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 1435.
19 Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 1434.
20 For an excellent discussion of the Board's rule-making powers, see Comment,
Rule-Making and Adjudication in Administrative Policy Making: NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 64 (1969).
21 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
22 Id. at 203.
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to Section 9(c) (3) clearly evidences the protection the Act is intended
to accord economic strikers.
D. Union Discipline
1. Fines Against Members
Under section 8(b) (1) (A) it is an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7. However, section 8(b) (1) provides that this
limitation upon union discipline shall not impair the right of a union
to regulate union membership. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 1
the Supreme Court balanced these two protected interests and held
that a union may fine members who cross a picket line to work for a
struck employer. The fines were held to be within the scope of pro-
tected union regulatory activity since the union action did not affect
the member's status as an employee, but was related to proper union
concern for the effectiveness of the strike. The holding in Allis-Chal-
mers was expanded in Scofield v. NLRB' where the Court held that
union fines for violation of production quotas were protected within
the proviso of section 8(b) (1). The Court recognized that the pro-
duction quotas were a bargainable issue and not a purely internal
union matter. However, union limitation of production was found to
be sufficiently related to the union's traditional function of protecting
the economic well being of its members to justify its enforcement as a
lawful union regulation.
During the Survey year, the Board, in two decisions, further
clarified the scope of permissible union discipline of strike-breaking
members who cross union picket lines. In Machinists, Local Lodge
504 (Arrow Development Co.)' the Board, with Member McCulloch
dissenting, held that a union fine of $500 on a member for crossing a
picket line did not violate section 8(b) (1) (A). The Board held that
the union action was properly related to the legitimate area of internal
union matters as defined by Allis-Chalmers and Scofield. The reason-
ableness of the amount of the fines was held to be beyond the purview
of the Board once the activity has been held to be lawful under
section 8(b) (1) (A). Thus, the Board interpreted Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield as establishing distinctions between lawful and unlawful dis-
cipline in terms of section 8(b) (1) (A), but not as extending that
section to regulate the severity of otherwise lawful fines.
Dissenting Member McCulloch viewed the reasonableness of
union fines as relevant to the question of their validity under section
1 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
2 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
8 185 111.12.11. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970).
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8(b) (1) (A). He noted that in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield the
Court frequently referred to the fines at issue as being "reasonable."
These cases, he argued, should not be read as supporting the majority's
holding that the Supreme Court has treated lawfulness apart from
reasonableness in applying section 8(b) (1) (A). Further, abdication
of the responsibility for deterinining the reasonableness of disciplinary
actions to the state courts was seen as inconsistent with the established
goal of uniformity in national labor law. Additional considerations,
such as the Board's expertise and the often prohibitive costs of state
court litigation, were urged by Member McCulloch as support for
Board adjudication of the question of the reasonableness of union
fines.
The Board was again presented with the question of the lawful-
ness of union fines against members who crossed picket lines in
Machinists, Lodge 405 (Boeing Co.).4 The union began a lawful strike
upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement then in
force. A number of employees, all of whom had been union members
during the contract period, crossed the picket line and reported for
work. Some of the strike-breaking employees resigned from the union
before crossing the picket line, while others resigned after crossing
the picket line but before institution of union disciplinary proceeding
against them, and others crossed the picket line without resigning
from the union at all. The union imposed fines on all strike-breaking
employees regardless of whether or when they had resigned. The
Board, with Member Brown dissenting in part, upheld the fines against
those employees who did not resign from the union, or who resigned
only after crossing the picket line. However, the fines against those
employees who had resigned before crossing the picket line were held
to be in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A).
The Board held that the membership relationship is critical in
determining the lawfulness of union sanctions against employees.
Membership was held to bind each member contractually to the con-
stitution and by-laws of the union he has chosen to join. Once this
relationship has been terminated (as by letters of resignation in the
instant case), the employee's contractual consent to submit to union
discipline is retracted. The Board held that employees who had so
renounced membership were not "union members" within the holdings
in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield. Therefore, from the moment the con-
tractual bond between union and employee was severed, union at-
tempts to discipline the employee were in violation of section 8 (b) (1)
(A)."
4 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970).
5 The importance of the exact timing of the'resignation is evidenced by the order
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Member Brown dissented from the majority's strictly contractual
approach. He argued that the duty owed by a member to his union
arises from the time a strike is declared, and that this duty is not
severed by a resignation from the contractual relationship of member-
ship at a later time. In his view, a resignation after a strike is called,
is, at that point, already a disloyal act subject to union discipline.
Thus, he would find that the union fines against all the strike-breaking
employees, including those who resigned from the union prior to
crossing the picket line, were not prohibited by section 8(b) (1)(A).
The result reached by the majority in Boeing appears to be cor-
rect. Union sanctions against employees who refuse to honor an autho-
rized strike while retaining full union membership are within the scope
of lawful union discipline under the holdings in Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield. However, it is questionable whether the proper standard for
the application of section 8(b) (1) (A) should be heavily grounded
upon contract concepts. As the Board has noted in cases dealing with
problems other than union discipline, labor contracts must be construed
not on the basis of contract theory alone, but in the context of national
labor policy .° Therefore, it is submitted that the question of whether
an employee is a "union member" for purposes of section 8(b) (1) (A)
should not determined in all cases by the status of the contractual
relationship between the union and the employee. Rather, the mem-
bership relationship should be viewed as one of many factors to be
considered in the broader determination of whether a particular union
sanction "reflects a legitimate union interest"' in regulating internal
union affairs. In this respect, Member Brown's dissenting opinion
properly focuses upon the questionable validity of relying upon an
employee's resignation as the test of lawfulness under section 8(b) (1)-
(A).
2. Sanctions for Seeking Decertification
The Board has in the past held that the proviso to section 8(b)
(1) (A) allows a union to discipline members who file petitions for de-
certification of the union. Thus, it has been held a union may lawfully
expel a member who has filed a decertification petition since expulsion
of a member who seeks to destroy the union is clearly a self-protective
action not prohibited by section 8(b) (1) (A).° On the other hand, a
issued by the Board. As to employees who had resigned after crossing the picket line,
the Board ordered the union "to remit a pro rata portion of the fine, so that what remains
reflects only preresignation conduct." 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
0 See, e.g., Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 74 L.R.R.M.
1098, 1100 (1970).
7 394 U.S. at 430.
8 Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
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union may not fine a member seeking decertification since the effect
of the fine is not to protect the integrity of the union but merely to
punish the employee.'
The Board further limited the right of a union to sanction a
member for filing a decertification petition in Steelworkers, Local 4186
(McGraw Edison Co.).'" Following disciplinary proceeding, the union
suspended a member's rights to attend meetings for one year and
indefinitely to hold office as sanctions against the member's filing an
unsuccessful petition for decertification. The member initially refused
to pay his union dues while these limitations upon his membership
were in effect. The union then threatened to invoke the union security
clause in force to secure the member's discharge for failure to pay
dues. Following this threat, the member paid his dues.
The Board found that this activity was in violation of section
8(b) (1) (A). The Board recognized that a reduction in membership
rights alone would not necessarily be unlawful activity. However, the
combination of impaired membership and the threat of discharge was
held to be unlawful coercion upon access to the Board's processes.
Furthermore, the threat of discharge while the employee's membership
rights had already been limited was held to be unnecessary to protect
the integrity of the union. Thus, the Board based its finding of unlaw-
ful activity on the grounds that the sanctions unduly coerced access to
Board relief, and that the union had acted beyond legitimate self-
protection.
3. Judicial Review of Union Disciplinary Hearings Under Section
101(a)(5) of LMRA
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Boilermakers v.
Hardeman," considered the issue of the proper standard of review
for cases under Section 101(a) (5) of the Labor Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act which provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined,
suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for non-
payment of dues by such organization or by any officer
thereof unless such member has been (A) served with writ-
ten specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare
his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.'
The companion section 102 18 provides that a suit for damages result-
Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969),
10 181 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 73 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1970).
11 401 U.S. 233.
12 29 U.S.C. § 411(n)(5) (1964).
13 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).
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ing from a violation of section 101(a) (5) may be brought in a United
States District Court.
In Hardeman, a union member became involved in an altercation
over a lack of job assignments with a union officer in charge of refer-
rals through a union hiring hall. The disagreement led to a fistfight
between the union member and the official. The union member was
tried by the union for this conduct upon the separate charges of
creating dissension among union members and of restraining a union
officer from discharging his duties. These offenses were proscribed by
two distinct provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the union."
However, the union trial committee returned a general "guilty as
charged" verdict that did not disclose whether the union member had
been found guilty of both charges or of one charge only. As a result
of this verdict, the union member was expelled from the union for an
indefinite period. When further internal union appeal proved fruitless,
the union member brought suit in federal district court under section
101(a) (5). This action resulted in a substantial jury award to the
sanctioned member which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.15
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court first considered the union's argument that the controversy was
within the exclusive competence of the Board. The union claimed that
the conduct involved was at least arguably unlawful discrimination
in job referral and was, therefore, an unfair labor practice under
Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) of the LMRA. The Court rejected
this contention, noting that the issue raised by the member's complaint
was the procedural fairness of the discipline proceedings, and was not
directed toward any underlying unfair labor practice. The Court held
that the question of procedural fairness fell squarely within the scope
of section 101(a) (5) and the action was, therefore, within the com-
petence of the district court.
The Court then considered the findings of the district court to
determine the validity of the judgment against the union. The Court
noted that the trial judge apparently had relied upon the holding in
14 The charge of creating dissension was based upon a union constitutional provi-
sion which provided in part that "Ia]ny member who endeavors to create dissension
among the members or who works against the interest and harmony of [the union] .
shall upon conviction thereof be punished by expulsion from the union." The charge of
interference with a union officer was based upon a union by-law which provided in
part that "Lilt shall be a violation of these By-laws for any member through the use
of force or violence .. . to restrain, coerce, or intimidate . . . any official of [the
union] . . . or to prevent him from properly discharging the duties of his office." Both
provisions are cited in 401 U.S. at 236 nn.3,4.
16 420 F.2d 485, 73 L.R.R.M. 2208 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Boilermakers v. Braswell" that union penal provisions must be
strictly construed. This holding led the trial court to construe the
union provisions against dissension as being limited to threats against
the union as an organization and not including merely personal alter-
cations. Upon this reasoning, the trial judge held that there was no
evidence to support a finding of guilty against the accused member
on the charge of creating dissension in the union. The trial court then
held that the union member had been denied a fair hearing within the
meaning of section 101(a) (5) since the general union verdict failed
to disclose that the guilty finding was not based upon the unproven
charge of the two separate charges brought.
This reasoning, which was affirmed by the court of appeals, was
rejected by the Supreme Court as contrary to the legislative intent of
section 101(a) (5). The holding of the lower court was reversed as an
unjustified "substitution of judicial for union authority to interpret
the union's regulations in order to determine the scope of offenses
warranting discipline of union members." 17 The Court limited judicial
review in section 101(a) (5) suits to considerations of the fairness of
the union proceedings themselves. The courts may examine specific
union provisions to determine if a union member has been misled in
preparation of his defense. However, the Court held that this pro-
cedural supervision does not warrant scrutiny of union regulations in
order to determine whether the particular conduct is punishable. The
Court held that the proper standard for review of sufficiency of evi-
dence in section 101(a) (5) suits is whether there is "some evidence
at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made." 18 Applying
this standard, the Court held that the uncontroverted evidence of the
union member's assault of the union official was sufficient to qualify the
union's guilty verdict as fair within the meaning of section 101(a) (5).
Justice Douglas dissented from the majority's limitation upon
the scope of review in section 101(a) (5) suits. In his view, a "fair
hearing" under that section requires that there be some evidence
directed toward the specific charges in issue. While a reviewing court
under section 101(a) (5) should not review the merits of the dispute,
nor grant a hearing de novo, the court must determine whether a
charge is supported by the evidence. The finding of "guilty as charged"
in the instant case, Justice Douglas argued, does not disclose whether
the suspension was supported by the evidence since it is impossible
for the reviewing court to determine the charge (or whether it was
both charges) upon which the guilty finding was based. Such a pro-
13 388 F.2d 193, 67 L.R.R.M. 2250 (5th Cir. 1968).
17 401 U.S. at 242-43.
18 Id. at 246.
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cedural infirmity is, in Justice Douglas's view, squarely within the
competence of a reviewing court under section 101(a) (5) and should
lead to a finding that the disciplinary proceeding cannot stand.
E. Secondary Boycotts
1. Common Situs Picketing
The thrust of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), 1
 is to protect neutral em-
ployers from the effects of labor disputes between other employers
and their employees. This protection, however, has been limited by
rulings which have recognized the right of striking employees, under
certain circumstances, to picket "common situs" locations where
neutral as well as primary employer activity is present. In Moore Dry
Dock Co.,' the Board attempted to establish a set of standards out-
lining what types of picketing are permissible in common situs situa-
tions. The Board ruled that picketing is primary and beyond the
prohibitions of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) if:
(a) the picketing is strictly limited to times when the sifts
of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's prem-
ises;
(b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is en-
gaged in its normal business at the situs;
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the
location of the situs; and
(d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer.'
These criteria were relied upon as a basis for the Supreme Court's
holding in Electrical Workers v. NLRB (General Electric)' that
striking employees may lawfully picket an entrance reserved for use
by outside contractors whose work is necessary to the normal opera-
tions of the primary employer.
1 Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) ... (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof
is—.
. .
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ..
29 U.S.C.
	 158(b)(4)(11)(B) (1964).
2 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
3 Id., 27 L.R.R.M. at 1110.
4 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
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In Auburndale Freezer Corp. v. NLRB, 5
 decided during the
Survey year, the scope of permissible common situs picketing was
again questioned. The common situs issue in Auburndale Freezer arose
when striking employees of Cypress Garden Citrus Products picketed
a warehouse owned by Auburndale and used by Cypress for storage
purposes. The Board, with two members dissenting, found that the
picketing of the Auburndale warehouse by Cypress employees was
within the common situs guidelines of Moore Dry Dock and, therefore,
was not prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). 6
 The majority of the
Board concluded that the control by Cypress over the storage and
eventual shipment of its products at the warehouse constituted suffi-
cient presence of the primary employer at the neutral site to justify
the picketing as primary activity. Use of the warehouse was seen as an
integrated step in the Cypress production process.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the
Board's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a
cease and desist order against the picketing. ? In reaching its decision,
the court stressed the fact that no employees of Cypress had ever
worked at the warehouse, the amount of Cypress products in the
warehouse constituted less than ten percent of the total warehouse
capacity, and the primary situs of the dispute, Cypress' processing
plant, was readily available for picketing only five miles from the
warehouse. The court further noted that nineteen other citrus pro-
ducers were using the Auburndale facilities at the time of the disputed
picketing.
Upon these facts, the court heldi that the inescapable purpose of
the picketing was to interfere with the other producers using ninety
percent of the warehouse space, and who were total strangers to the
primary dispute. This object was held to be prohibited by the plain
terms of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). Moreover, the court viewed its
decision as being of supreme public importance since to allow picket-
ing upon these facts would subject operators of public warehouses to
the labor disputes of all their customers, This result was viewed as
having a potentially critical impact upon the general welfare, espe-
cially in those cases where picketing could tie up the shipment of
perishable goods.
The distinction between the holding of the Board and that of the
majority of the court in Auburndale Freezer centers upon the effect
given to the presence of Cypress products in the neutral warehouse.
Both opininons agreed that the Moore Dry Dock characterization of
5 434 F.2d 1219, 75 L.R.R.M. 2752 (5th Cir. 1970).
6 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1969).
7 434 F.2d at 1222, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2755.
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permissible common situs picketing is not dependent upon the presence
of primary employees at the neutral situs. 8 However, the court in
Auburndale Freezer refused to accept the Board's holding that the
presence of the primary employer's goods alone in this case outweighed
the congressional intent to protect neutral employers. The court's
holding rested primarily upon the fact that picketing directed at the
relatively minimal presence of Cypress products could effectively tie
up a majority of the users of the warehouse who were neutrals to the
dispute. The Auburndale Freezer decision thus does not present an
addition to the specific requirements found in Moore Dry Dock, but
rather, is limited to a balancing of interests that is heavily dependent
upon the particular facts of the case. The decision leaves unanswered
the question of whether a more significant presence of a primary em-
ployer's products in a neutral warehouse would support picketing of
the warehouse as lawful primary activity.
2. Neutrality of Secondary Employers
In Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,e the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the question of
whether the requirement that a primary employer obtain written
consent from the secondary employer before making certain changes
in the business operation destroyed the secondary employer's neutral-
ity for purposes of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (13). For years prior to the
present dispute, Vulcan owned and operated a ready-mix concrete
plant and an adjacent slag plant which utilized materials from a
nearby steel company. The employees in the two operations were
represented under the same bargaining agreement. This agreement
expired by its terms in December, 1967. In November, 1967, Vulcan
made an oral agreement to sell its concrete products plant to Forman,
and the sale was completed shortly thereafter.
After the existing agreement covering the concrete plant em-
ployees expired, the unions and Forman operated under a temporary
agreement until a new agreement could be reached. In February,
1968, this temporary arrangement broke down and the Forman em-
ployees went on strike. A picket line was placed across an access road
leading to both the Forman and Vulcan sites even though separate
gates along the access road had been designated for each plant. The
picket line effectively shut down the Vulcan slag plant as well as the
Forman concrete plant. The question considered on appeal was
whether Vulcan was a neutral secondary employer entitled to the
protection of 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
8 See Brownfield Elec., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 55 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1964),
cited in 434 F.2d at 1226 (dissenting opinion).
0 430 F.2d 446, 74 L.R.R.M. 2818 (5th Ch. 1970).
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The unions contended that Vulcan could \not be considered a
neutral employer, separate from Forman, because of the restrictions
entered into between Vulcan and Forman as part of the sale transac-
tion. In part payment, Vulcan had received an installment note with
a provision requiring Vulcan's written consent before Forman could
make certain changes in its business operation, alter its structure, make
loans, pay dividends or increase certain salaries. The court rejected
the argument that these conditions destroyed Vulcan's neutrality. The
financial restrictions were held to be no more than commonplace safe-
guards to protect the interest of a lender. Such potential control,
which might be exercised to protect Vulcan's investment, fell short of
the actual control that must be shown to destroy neutrality.
The union argued that in addition to the incidents of financial
control by Vulcan, Vulcan and Forman were interrelated operationally
and economically. Before the sale, the two operations were carried on
by employees in a single bargaining unit under the same collective
bargaining agreement. After the sale, operations were carried on in
virtually the same manner as before the sale, utilizing the same em-
ployees, equipment and material as before the sale. There was no
sign or other indication that the concrete plant no longer was owned
by Vulcan, Forman's delivery truck carried Vulcan symbols, both
groups of employees utilized the same time-card racks and other
facilities, and Vulcan salesmen continued to take orders for both
companies.
The court rejected this evidence as falling short of destroying
Vulcan's neutrality. The operational similarities were dismissed as in-
cidental trappings rather than essential controls of Forman by Vulcan.
The two employers were held to be independent since the basic opera-
tions were carried out in different plants, a different product was sold
to different customers, neither employer was a customer of the other's
products, and capital and management were separately maintained.
For these reasons, the court held that Vulcan was a neutral employer
within the protection of 8(b) (4) (ii) (b), and upheld the recovery of
damages occasioned by the strike and picketing of the unions repre-
senting Forman employees.
The Board was presented with a similar question of determining
the status of a neutral secondary employer in Los Angeles Newspaper
Guild." The respondent unions were engaged in an economic strike
against a Los Angeles newspaper which was a division of the Hearst
Corporation. In furtherance of this strike, the premises of a San
Francisco newspaper, which was another separate division of Hearst,
were picketed by the unions. The picket line was honored by other
10 185 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 75 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1970).
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employees and resulted in a suspension of publication of the San
Francisco newspaper.
The issue presented for Board determination was whether the
San Francisco division of Hearst was a separate "person" under the
terms of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Board admitted that corporate
divisions are not mentioned in the applicable statutory definition which
provides:
The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receiv-
ers."
However, the Board noted that prior decisions have held that separate
corporate subsidiaries are separate persons under 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) if
neither the parent corporation nor the subsidiary exercises actual
control over the day-to-day operations of the other. To deprive cor-
porate divisions of the protection of 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) while including
subsidiaries would be to exalt form over substance. Therefore, it was
held that where a virtually autonomous division has all the qualities
of a person except separate incorporation, logic requires that the
division also be considered a person.
The Board examined the relationship between divisions within
Hearst in light of the actual control standards previously used to
determine the neutrality of corporation subsidiaries. It was found
that each Hearst division manager supervises staff salaries, promotions
and discharges. There is no transfer of employees among divisions.
Each division manager has full control over publication policies,
advertising and circulation programs. A manager may refuse to use
any of the Hearst-owned news services, and each division maintains
its own financial system. It was also found that although corporate
approval is required for expenditures over $10,000, such approval has
never been denied.
Upon these facts, the Board held that the corporation's authority
amounted to only potential control over the financial operations of
each division. This authority falls short of the active, actual control
standard previously applied to corporate subsidiaries. By this test,
each Hearst division is a separate and autonomous enterprise. The
San Francisco newspaper, therefore was held to be a "person" pro-
tected by section 8(b) (4) (ii)(B), and the unions' picketing of that
newspaper was unlawful secondary activity.
Member Brown, dissenting in part, viewed the picketing of the
San Francisco division as part of a lawful program of direct economic
11 29 U.S.C. 132(1) (1964).
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pressure upon a single corporate enterprise. The picketing of the
San Francisco paper was designed to impose economic sanctions upon
the Hearst Corporation in support of economic demands being negoti-
ated with another operating division of the same corporation. To ex-
tend the scope of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) to prohibit this activity
would insulate the corporate employer from the effects of its own dis-
pute.12
 In Member Brown's opinion, this result would be contrary to
the established policy against extending section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in a
manner which would restrict direct economic pressure in primary labor
disputes.
3. Work Preservation Agreements and Their Enforcement
The Board has consistently applied a "right to control" test in de-
termining whether enforcement of a work preservation agreement con-
stitutes prohibited secondary activity. Under this test, if, while seeking
to preserve job opportunities, a union stops or threatens to stop work-
ing for an employer, and that employer has no legal power to comply
with the demands of the union, the union violates the section 8(b) (4) -
(ii)(B) prohibition against secondary boycotts.' s This situation often
arises when a contractor is bound to follow a builder's specifications
requiring materials which have been assembled by non-union labor.
The Board has consistently adhered to this test despite language
in National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB" that the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary activity
cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all
the surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was
preservation of work for .. . [the unit's] employees, or
whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calcu-
lated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter
the case ... the boycotting employer would be a neutral by-
stander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the in-
tent of Congress, become secondary. . . . The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the
labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own
employees."'
Use of the "right to control" test after National Woodwork has been
12 185 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1017 (dissenting opinion).
18 See Local 1066, Longshoremen, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 50 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1962),
enforced, 331 F.2d 712, 56 L.R.R.M. 2200 (3d Cir. 1964). See also 1968-1969 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com, L. Rev. 882-85 (1969).
14 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
13 386 U.S. at 644-45.
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criticized both by commentators'° and by those courts which have di-
rectly considered the validity of the test."
In Local 636, Plumbers v. NLRB,18
 decided during the Survey
year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected the validity of the Board's "right to control" test. Local 636
had a collective bargaining agreement, covering the employees of Page
Plumbing and Heating Co., which contained a work preservation pro-
vision requiring that certain pipe must be installed on the job. This
clause had in substance appeared in agreements between the union and
area contractors since 1941. In 1966, Page entered into a contract to
build a hospital under specifications which required factory installa-
tion of pipes in the heating and air conditioning systems. The Board
found that Page, along with all other bidders for the contract, had been
advised of the factory pipe-fitting specification. Shortly after work be-
gan on the project, the union insisted that the employees of Page were
entitled to install the pipe at the job site in accordance with the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The hospital, however. refused to accede to
this demand, and insisted that Page adhere to the contract specifica-
tions requiring factory installation. The union then induced the em-
ployees of Page to cease handling the units with factory-installed pipe.
The Board applied its "right to control" test and found that the
union activity violated section 8(13)(4)(B)." The Board reasoned
that Page was a neutral party caught between the demands of the
union and the hospital, since Page had sought to comply with the union
demand but could not because the hospital insisted upon the contract
specifications. On these facts, the Board held that the obiect of the
union's conduct was to cause Page to break its contract with the hos-
pital. This objective was held to be unlawful secondary activity.
The court of appeals reversed the Board and found that its anal-
ysis of the dispute was "completely wide of the mark." 2° The Board's
finding that Page had no right to control was seen as based upon an
artificial structuring of the facts since Page was aware of the conflict
between the collective bargaining agreement and the specifications for
the hospital before the contract was signed. Page, rather than having
no control over the situation, had in fact created its own predicament.
The court reasoned that to allow an employer in this situation to claim
that he had no control over the conflict would encourage the solicita-
18 Note, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77 Yale L.J. 1401, 1416-17
(1968).
I7
 American Boiler Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 556, 69 L.R.R.M. 2858 (8th Cir.
1968).
18
 430 F.2d 906, 74 L.R.R.M. 2851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18 177 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 71 L.R.R.M. 1499 (1969).
20 430 F.2d at 908, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2853.
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tion of contracts whose terms would defeat legitimate work preserva-
tion demands.
The court held that such an application of the "right to control
test" completely ignores the holding of the Supreme Court in National
Woodwork,21
 and noted that a proper application of the National
Woodwork test should focus upon whether the employees have a dis-
pute with their own employer. In the present case, there was no evi-
dence that the union's objective was to influence the labor relations of
the hospital. The court recognized that the union activity will neces-
sarily have a "domino-like" effect by forcing employers not to contract
with builders who insist upon using pre-fabricated materials. 22
 How-
ever, the court held that this effect was ancillary to the union objective
of enforcing a work preservation agreement made with its own em-
ployer. Under the National Woodwork test such union activity is pri-
mary and lawful despite the fact that the union's immediate employer
may, as a result, cease doing business with a builder who requires the
use of pre-fabricated materials. Therefore, the court concluded that
the Board's "right to control" test must be abandoned because it con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's holding in National Woodwork.23
4. "Ceasing to do Business" under Section 8(b)(4)(B)
In NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers (Burns and Roe,
Inc.),24
 the Supreme Court considered the question of whether union
pressure upon neutral employers, with the objective of forcing a change
in work assignment by the primary employer, amounted to coercion to
"cease doing business" with the primary employer under section 8 (b)-
(4) (B). The general contractor for the construction site in controversy
(Burns and Roe, Inc.) subcontracted all of the construction work to
three other contractors (White, Chicago Bridge & Iron, and Poirier &
McClare). All three subcontractors had employees who were members
of Local 185, and all except White had collective bargaining agree-
ments with Local 185.
Local 185 protested the assignment by White of the job of push-
ing the buttons on a welding machine to the Ironworkers Union. When
White refused to change this assignment, Local 185 informed the gen-
eral contractor, Burns, that members of Local 185 would strike unless
Burns entered into a contract with all three subcontractors giving Lo-
cal 185 jurisdiction over all power ,
 machines, including the welding
machine. After Burns rejected this demand, the operating engineers
walked off the construction site and remained out for four days.
21 Id. at 909, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2853.
22 Id.
as Id. at 910, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2854.
24 400 U.S. 297 (1971).
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Shortly after their return, efforts at voluntary reconciliation failed,
and members of Local 185 physically encircled the welding machine
to prevent its operation. The Board found that this conduct was un-
lawful secondary activity under section 8(b) (4) (B), and a violation
of the jurisdictional provisions of section 8(b) (4) (D)." The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the Board's finding of a violation
of section 8(b) (4) (D), but reversed the Board's finding of unlawful
secondary activity.'
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals
that the union's conduct did not violate section 8(b) (4) (B), and up-
held the Board's finding that the union's conduct was unlawful sec-
ondary activity." It was clear that Local 185's coercive activity was
directed toward Burns and the other subcontractors not involved in
the work assignment dispute with White. The Court viewed this con-
duct as "unmistakably and flagrantly secondary"' in its objective of
forcing the neutral contractors to induce White to change the disputed
work assignment.
However, the Court recognized that it was not as clear that this
secondary activity amounted to coercion to "cease doing business"
with White as provided in section 8(b) (4) (B). As the dissent pointed
out, the union did not directly seek either the termination of White as
a subcontractor or White's replacement for another contractor 2 9 The
union demands that the neutral employers contractually agree to as-
sign the disputed work to Local 185 fell short of a specific request that
the neutral contractor cease doing business with White. The dissent
viewed this activity as failing to meet the "cease doing business" re-
quirement of section 8(b) (4)(B).
The majority of the Court rejected this reading of section 8(b):
(4) (B) as overly narrow. While some secondary activity could have
effects so slight as to fall short of the "cease doing business" require-
ment, the implications in the present case was to coerce the neutral
contractors to force a change in White's assignment or break off their
contractual relations with White. Thus, the Court held that the fact
that the union demands did not directly seek the termination of
White's contract by neutral contractors did not remove the disruptive
activity from the sanctions of section 8(b) (4) (B).
25 162 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 64 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1967).
20 410 F.2d 5, 71 L.R.R.M. 2079 (3d Cir. 1969).
27 400 U.S. at 306. The majority upheld the finding of the Board and the court of
appeals that the union conduct also violated the limitations upon jurisdictional disputes
provided in section 8(b) (4) (D). However, the Court held that the finding of an 8(b)
(4) (D) violation did not exclude a concurrent finding of unlawful secondary activity
under section 8(b) (4) (B).
28 Id. at 304.
29 Id. at 308 (dissenting opinion).
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F. Remedies
1. Parties to Section 10(k) Proceedings
Under section 8(b) (4) (D) it is an unfair labor practice for
unions to engage in strikes or work stoppages designed to force em-
ployers to assign particular work to members of one union rather than
to members of another union. This prohibition is the basis of section
10(k) which provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph
(4) (D) of section 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed
to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair
labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after
notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dis-
pute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have
adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjust-
ment of the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the
dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary
adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed. 1
In applying section 10(k), the Board has consistently held that the
term "parties' within that section includes employers as well as the
unions involved in a work assignment dispute. It is the Board's posi-
tion that the employer who has assigned the disputed work must be a
party to any voluntary settlement of the parties if the settlement is to
be accepted within the terms of section 10(k). Thus, the Board has
refused to accept voluntary settlement of a jurisdictional dispute by the
involved unions alone as a basis for quashing notice of a section 10(k)
hearing.
In Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB (Southwestern Construction
Co.) 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected the Board's view that employers are necessary parties to volun-
tary settlements under section 10(k). The dispute arose when the
Plasterers union claimed that work being performed by members of
the Tile Setters union in preparing wall surfaces for tiling should be
done by members of Plasterers. When the Tile Setters rejected this
demand, the dispute was submitted to the National Joint Board for
the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes.8 The Joint Board rendered
a decision which the Tile Setters interpreted as awarding the disputed
29 U.S.C.	 I60(k) (1964),
2 440 F.2d 174, 74 L.R.R.M. 2575 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3 The Joint Board is an arbitration panel established by the AFL-CIO, and is
comprised of both employer and union representatives. Both unions involved in South-
western Construction Co. were AFL-CIO affiliates. For a more complete description of
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work to them. The Plasterers disagreed with this interpretation and
picketed the job site in support of their claim to the disputed work.
The picketing resulted in a work stoppage and the employer, South-
western Construction Co., filed a charge of a section 8(b) (4) (D)
violation against the Plasterers. The Board obtained a district court
injunction and the pickets were removed. The Plasterers then requested
that the Joint Board clarify its earlier award. The clarification of the
award held that the disputed work was to be performed by the Plas-
terers and not the Tile Setters.
After this award to the Plasterers was issued, the Board held a
section 10(k) hearing to determine the dispute. The Board rejected
the argument of the Plasterers that the notice of section 10(k) hear-
ings should be quashed because the unions had agreed to voluntary
settlement through Joint Board arbitration. The Board held that this
method of settlement was not a basis for quashing notice of the section
10(k) hearing because the employer who had assigned the work in-
volved was not a party to the settlement. The Board then held a hear-
ing on the merits and awarded the disputed work to the Tile Setters.
When the Plasterers refused to abide by this award, the Board held an
unfair labor practice hearing and found that the Plasterers had vio-
lated section 8(b) (4) (D). The court of appeals refused to uphold the
Board's finding of a section 8 (b) (4) (D) violation on the grounds that
it was based upon an invalid section 10(k) hearing.
The court held that the Board had erred by invoking section 10(k)
proceedings to determine the jurisdictional dispute when the two unions
involved had agreed upon a method for voluntary settlement. This find-
ing was based upon the court's interpretation of legislative history
indicating that the purpose of section 8(b) (4) (D) and section 10(k)
together is to protect neutral employers from becoming involved in
work disputes between unions. The court held that a neutral employer
caught up in such a jurisdictional dispute is interested only in settle-
ment of the dispute, and not in the terms of the agreement between the
unions. It follows from this reasoning that the purpose of protecting
a neutral employer is fully served by any binding settlement between
the disputing employee groups.
However, the court recognized that there are many instances
where the employer is not truly neutral but is in fact dissatisfied with
the settlement reached by the rival unions. In these cases, the court
agreed with the Board's determination that the dispute is no longer
jurisdictional. 4 The court stressed that section 10(k) proceedings are
the makeup and operation of the Joint Board, see 440 F.2d at 180 n.10, 74 L.R.R.M. at
2579 n.10.
4 See Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 49 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1961), cited in
440 F.2d at 187, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2584. •
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inapplicable to such disputes, even though the employer is not satisfied
with the union's agreement and there was an initial 8(b) (4) (D) viola-
tion. Thus, the court held that the economic interests of an employer
not truly "neutral" are beyond the scope of protection intended by
Congress in enacting section 8(b) (4) (D) and section 10(k).
In a dissenting opinion, Judge MacKinnon objected to the ma-
jority's holding as being an unwarranted reversal of the Board's inter-
pretation of twenty years standing that agreements under section
10(k) require that the employer be a party. He argued that the ma-
jority overemphasized jurisdictional aspects of the dispute and did not
give sufficient weight to the fact that the dispute had gone beyond a
quarrel between the unions and had developed into a strike against
the employer. It is this dispute, a jurisdictional strike which directly
involves the employer, that typifies what is meant by the term "such
dispute" in section 10(k). Judge MacKinnon contends that since sec-
tion 10(k) is thus designed to remedy strikes that necessarily involve
the employer as a party, the employer must be a party to any settle-
ment under section 10(k).
The majority's reasoning in Southwestern Construction relies
heavily upon the interpretation of section 10(k) as being designed to
apply only to cases where the employer is "neutral," and the only
dispute to be remedied is limited to an inter-union quarrel. However,
this reasoning is unpersuasive in that it is clear that in reality there
are very few cases of truly "neutral" employers who are not directly
concerned with the eventual outcome of the dispute. It is unlikely that
Congress in enacting section 10(k) intended to preclude the application
of that section to the majority of work assignment disputes by limiting
its scope to those relatively rare cases where the employer's interest is
not involved. This interpretation of section 10(k) thus appears to be
overly strained and does not, as Judge MacKinnon pointed out, give
sufficient consideration to the fact that the section is not even invoked
until there has been a strike which directly involves the employer.
Moreover, the majority opinion itself does not clearly remove
consideration of the employer's interest in a union settlement under
section 10(k). The court states in a footnote:
Thus, we need not consider the efficacy for purposes of
§ 10(k) of an inter-union proceeding that made no realistic
provision for meaningful attention to the interest of the em-
ployer and to questions of efficiency. In the case before us we
have a joint board of employers and employees ... that takes
into account factors of economy and efficiency of operation. 5
5
 440 F.2d at 188 n.27, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2585 n.27.
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Thus, it appears that the majority recognized that some agreements
would be insufficient under section 10(k) because they fail to consider
the employer's interest. Yet, the court held that employers should not
be considered "parties" under section 10(k). This reasoning does
appear to be rather "finespun theory"° and should not displace the
well-founded Board practice of including employers as parties under
section 10 (k).
2. Make Whole Orders for Refusal to Bargain
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act 7 empowers the
Board to take affirmative action to remedy the effects of unfair labor
practices. The Board possesses wide discretion in this regard, and its
orders may range from requiring an employer to reinstate wrongfully
discharged workers, with or without back pay, to the simple publication
by the employer of a notice indicating that he promises to refrain from
committing the cited unfair practices in the future. The discretionary
grant of power in section 10(c) is not, however, unlimited. The Board
is specifically restricted to formulating remedial orders that "effectuate
the policies" of the Act. 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that
Board orders must not be punitive in nature.'
The actual limits of the Board's remedial power remain far from
clear. Recently, the line between remedies which are permissible—or
even required—under section 10(c), and those which exceed the
Board's power, has been the subject of controversy between the NLRB
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The disagreement has
centered upon the nature and scope of Board orders directed at em-
ployers who refuse to bargain with unions when obligated to do so
under the Act. The court of appeals has taken the position that the
Board's traditional remedy, which has been limited to ordering the
wrongdoer to "cease and desist" from his illegal conduct, is not suffi-
cient to offset the harm caused, and thus fails to effectuate the policies
of the Act. The NLRB, on the other hand, has maintained that the
cease and desist order represents the limits of its remedial authority
in this area.
The initial conflict arose in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB," where
the court of appeals directed the Board to compel an employer who
had been engaging in bad faith bargaining to agree to the union con-
tract demand on which the unjustified impasse was based. The Board
6 440 F.2d at 193, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2589 (dissenting opinion).
7 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
8 Id.
9 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1949).
10 H.R. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123, 71 L.R.R.M. 2207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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had contended that section 10(c) did not grant it authority to so act.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's position,' and
held that it was improper to remedy bad faith bargaining by requiring
agreement to substantive contract provisions." According to the Court,
the fundamental principle of the Act is the preservation of the parties'
freedom to contract. Section 8(d) of the Act," the Court noted, re-
flects this concern by stipulating that the duty to bargain imposed by
the Act requires neither an employer nor a union to agree to any pro-
posal or to make any concession. Thus, the Court concluded that the
function of the Board is "to oversee and referee the process of collec-
tive bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining
strength of the parties.'"
Although the Supreme Court's decision in H.K. Porter to some
extent clarified the scope of the NLRB's remedial powers, a number of
cases decided during the Survey year reflect the continuing disagree-
ment between the Board and the District of Columbia Circuit on this
matter. In I .0 .E. v. NLRB (Tiidee), 15
 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that when an employer clearly and flagrantly violates
its duty to bargain with a newly certified union, the appropriate remedy
for the Board to apply should include a "make whole" order. This
order would require that the employer compensate the employees for
any monetary benefits lost as a result of his wrongful refusal to bargain.
In Tiidee, the employer agreed to a Board-conducted consent elec-
tion. When the ballots were tallied the employees had selected the
union by a vote of nineteen to six. The company, however, protested to
the Board that a leaflet distributed by the union prior to the election
had influenced the outcome. The employer also claimed that three
employees not entitled to vote had cast ballots. The regional director
rejected the employer's first contention- on the merits. The second
objection he found to be mooted as a result of the clear plurality the
union achieved. Accordingly, the company was directed to commence
bargaining with the union on request.
The company persisted in its attempt to have the election set aside.
It alleged that the regional director had acted arbitrarily, and an-
nounced that it would refuse to meet with the union pending judicial
review. The case came before the court of appeals on a petition by
the Board for enforcement of its bargaining order. The union joined in
11 397 U.S. 99 (1969).
12 For a more detailed discussion of the H.K. Porter decision, see 1969-1970 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 916 (1970).
18 29 U.S.C. § I58(d) (1964).
14 397 U.S. at 108.
Is 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
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the action and sought modification of the Board's order to include a
"make whole" provision.
The court of appeals unanimously agreed that the company's ob-
jections were unwarranted and enforced the Board's order. The major-
ity of the court modified the Board's order to include the "make whole"
relief. The court reasoned that the employer's "objections to the elec-
tion were patently frivolous, and violated the express terms of the
Agreement for Consent Election entered into ... before the election, to
abide by the decision of the regional director."" The court was of the
opinion that limiting the remedy for such a flagrant refusal to bargain
to a cease and desist order permitted the employer to reap economic
benefit from his violation of the law. The proper remedy, the court
asserted, would "both compensate the party wronged and withhold
from the wrongdoer the 'fruits of its violation'." 17 Therefore, the court
concluded that the employees should be reinbursed for any losses that
might be attributed to the employer's wrongful delay." The court also
found that under the circumstances the Board's refusal, without satis-
factory justification to include a make whole provision in its remedial
order, constituted a failure to adhere to the obligation imposed by
Section 10(c), "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of [the Act].""
Essentially, two arguments were advanced in opposition to the
position adopted by the majority. First, it was asserted that the degree
of speculation involved in assessing the damage incurred by the em-
ployees was such as to make the remedy punitive in nature, and thus
beyond the scope of the Board's authority. Second, and more funda-
mental, was the argument that, in order to arrive at any damage figure,
it would be necessary to presuppose a contractual concession by the
employer. Such an assumption, it was asserted, would violate the H.R.
Porter rationale. The court of appeals considered both of these objec-
tions and found them untenable.
Initially, the court considered the speculative nature of the pro-
posed make whole order. The majority conceded that the Board would
have to base any remedy on what the employer would probably have
agreed to had he bargained in good faith, and, therefore, a degree of
10 Id. at 1248, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
17 Id. at 1249, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2874.
10 The court noted that employee support dissipates rapidly when unionism brings
no apparent improvements in their working conditions. Therefore, in addition to the
economic benefits derived from postponing meaningful negotiations, the employer may
also benefit at the bargaining table from the union's weakened condition. Still another
reason cited for requiring employers to "make whole" employees when only frivolous
arguments are advanced in justification of a refusal to bargain, is that it would clear
the Court dockets of nonmeritorious litigants. Id. at 1249-50, 73 L.R.R.M. 2874.
10 29	 § 160(c) (1964). 	 '
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speculation was involved. However, the court did not consider this
problem to be determinative because of prior case law in which com-
parable probabilities were properly considered when formulating rem-
edies for wrongful conduct. For instance, the court noted that in NLRB
v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc.," the Board computed the wages due under a
back pay order at a rate higher than that which the employee was
receiving at the time of his discharge because it determined that the
employee probably would have been promoted. The Tiidee court also
referred to Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures21 to rebut the assertion that
the speculative nature of the remedy should bar its implementation. In
Bigelow, the Supreme Court stated that:
where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more
precise computation, the jury may not render a verdict based
on speculation or guesswork. But the jury may make a just
and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data,
and render its verdict accordingly . . . . Any other rule would
enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the ex-
pense of the victim. It would be an inducement to make
wrongdoing so effective and complete in every case as to pre-
clude any recovery, by rendering the measure of damages un-
certain. Failure to apply it would mean that the more grievous
the wrong done, the less likelihood there would be of a re-
covery.
The most elementary conceptions of justice and public
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the
uncertainty which his own wrong has created.
That principle is an ancient one, and is not restricted to
proof of damage in antitrust suits, although their character is
such as frequently to call for its application.22 (Emphasis
added.)
Also, the court reasoned that the propriety of make whole orders in
the enforcement of the national labor policy is enhanced further by the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co." There,
the Supreme Court held that the Board may properly require an
employer to bear the full burden of compensating employees for losses
suffered as a result of the employer's wrongdoing, even when the
amount of the losses is magnified by an unusual and unforeseen Board
delay.
A major argument made by the employer in opposition to the
20 375 F.2d 402, 64 L.R.R.M. 2837 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 859 (1967).
21 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
22 Id. at 264-65.
28 396 U.S. 258 (1969).
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make whole order hinged upon Section 8(d) of the Act, which stipulates
that neither an employer nor a union is required by its obligation to
bargain to agree to any proposal or make any concession." In H.K.
Porter, the Supreme Court indicated that this section reflected the
fundamental principle of the Act that preservation of the parties'
freedom to contract is of paramount importance.
The court of appeals did not consider the restrictions of section
8 (d) applicable. It noted that the Tiidee case did not feature a refusal
to bargain based upon an unjustified impasse. In fact, no bargaining
had ever taken place. The singular issue, in the court's opinion, was
whether an employer who wrongfully withheld from employees a right
that is secured by law may be required by the Board to compensate the
employees for any injury thereby sustained. Answering this question
in the affirmative, the court stated that the distinction it was drawing
between the legality of imposing substantive contract provisions, as
opposed to make whole remedial orders, was not illusory, but real. To
illustrate this point, the court cited the widely accepted practice of
awarding damages to parties injured by antitrust violations. In deter-
mining such awards, the court noted, consideration is necessarily given
to agreements that probably would have been realized if the law had
not been violated. Yet, antitrust damage awards are not thought of as
imposing contractual obligations upon the parties.
A second example offered by the court to justify the distinction
being drawn made reference to the general rule of tort damages that
permits a court which is determining loss of earning power to look
beyond the plaintiff's current earnings and consider evidence pertain-
ing to what his earnings might have been were it not for the defendant's
wrongful conduct. According to the court, a make whole order serves
a similar purpose because, unlike the imposition of a contract term, a
make whole order vests no lasting future benefit. Indeed, once the
employer engages in good faith collective bargaining he may extract
whatever agreement from the union his economic position permits. The
only effect of the make whole order is to compensate employees for
the damages sustained as a result of the employees prior refusal to
bargain.
In assessing the amount of this damage, the court stressed that
the Board should not attempt to determine what the parties should have
agreed to, but instead should consider all relevant data indicating what
they likely would have agreed to if good faith bargaining had occurred.
If it appeared from the facts of a given case that, in all probability, no
agreement would have been reached even if collective bargaining had
taken place, a make whole order would be inappropriate. By limiting
24 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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the scope of the Board's fact finding in this manner, the court indicated,
the admonition in H.K. Porter against the imposition of contractual
terms could be heeded.
Judge MacKinnon, dissenting from the portion of the majority
opinion dealing with the legality of the make whole order, stated that
"[t]he fundamental error of the majority opinion is thus that it would
authorize damages on the likelihood that certain results would be
reached that the Act provides are not required to be reached!'" Judge
MacKinnon reasoned that a make whole order cannot be premised upon
a mere refusal to bargain because there is no legal duty incumbent
upon the company to agree to any union demand. Thus, there exists no
basis for assessing damages. Judge MacKinnon concluded that the
make whole remedy runs not to the refusal to bargain, but to the
refusal to agree, which under H.K. Porter is not in itself illegal.
Shortly after Tiidee was decided by the court of appeals, the
NLRB announced its decision in Ex-Cell-0 Corp." Ex-Cell-0 involved
a union request for "make whole" relief in addition to the traditional
bargaining order remedy. The Board unanimously agreed that a bar-
gaining order was appropriate. However, a majority of the Board
decided against the propriety of a make whole order. The Board, with
two members dissenting, reasoned that the requested relief was beyond
the statutory authority of the Board. The dissenters were of the opinion
that a make whole order was a permissible remedy and should issue if
the employees suffered any measurable losses as a result of the em-
ployer's wrongful conduct.
In arriving at its decision in Ex-Cell-0, the Board was cognizant
of the arguments advanced by the court of appeals in Tiidee, and
agreed that the traditional bargaining order is insufficient to eradicate
the effects of an unlawful delay of two or more years. However, the
majority noted that a make whole order may not necessarily further
the purposes of the Act. For instance, it was noted that the only way
an employer unquestionably can obtain judicial review of a Board
determination in a representational dispute is by refusing to bargain.
The Board suggested that the imposition on the employer of potentially
large monetary awards in representational challenges would have an
undesirable "tempering" effect on this procedural right.
The fact that make whole remedies issue in cases such as those
involving the wrongful discharge of an employee was thought to be
distinguishable because
[t] here are wrongdoers and wrongdoers. Where the wrong in
refusing to bargain is, at most, a debatable question, though
25 426 F.2d at 1257, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2880 (dissenting opinion).
20 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
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ultimately found a wrong, the imposition of a large financial
obligation on such a respondent may come close to a form of
punishment for having elected to pursue a representation
question beyond the Board and to the courts."
The majority found untenable any suggestions that a subjective deter-
mination regarding the "debatability" of an employer's position could
be made in order to justify a make whole order. Any such attempt was
thought by the Board to be futile because the Board and courts might
differ as to what was debatable and what was frivolous, and thus create
yet one more subject for litigation.
The primary objection of the majority rested upon their belief that
the imposition of a make whole order would conflict with the principles
of H.K. Porter. According to the Board, the distinction drawn in Tiidee
by the court of appeals was more illusory than real and was inconsistent
with the principles expressed in section 8(d). In their dissent, Members
McCulloch and Brown raised arguments similar to those advanced by
the court of appeals in Tiidee. That is, they asserted that in certain
cases involving a refusal to bargain, make whole relief is necessary to
effecuate the policies of the Act, and that such a remedy is permissible
under Section 10(c).
The questions raised in Tiidee and Ex-Cell-0 are more complex
than those resolved by the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter. For instance,
there is a substantial amount of case law both at the Board level and
from the courts that seems to support the Tiidee rationale. The persua-
sive comparison the Tiidee court made between the proposed make
whole orders and the practice of allowing compensatory damages in
civil antitrust cases also complicates the issues involved. Because nei-
ther the Board nor the District of Columbia Court of Appeals show
any signs of altering their respective positions, it appears that once
again the Supreme Court will be required to comment upon the Board's
power under section 10(c).
VIII. LABOR UNIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
When Congress enacted the Sherman Act,' it did not specifically
provide an exemption for the activities of organized labor. Conse-
quently, in Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters),2 the Supreme Court
held that concerted labor activities were subject to the antitrust laws.
In 1914, with the passage of the Clayton Act,' Congress clarified the
27 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1742.
1 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1964).
2 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
8 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. I 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
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status of labor unions under the antitrust laws. Section 6 of the Clayton
Act states that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce," and Section 20 provides that union activities such
as striking and picketing "shall . . . [not] be considered violations of
any law of the United States." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still
found the antitrust laws to be applicable to unions.' Congress responded
with the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act8 and the National
Labor Relations Act.° In these statutes Congress emphasized a national
policy of encouragement of union activity and further clarified the
union antitrust immunity.
Subsequent to the enactment of these laws, the Supreme Court
looked with deference upon concerted activities that conflicted with
antitrust principles.' Even after their enactment, the Court continued
to hold that organized labor's congressionally authorized immunity from
the antitrust laws was not absolute. According to the Court, the anti-
trust exemption applied only when the union acted in its own interests,
and not in combination with non-labor groups.° Thus, in Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,° the Court held that the Sherman Act was
violated when a union conspired with a group of employers to create
a monopoly, even though the - ultimate union objective was job security
and higher wages.
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington," the Supreme Court
once again attempted to balance the conflicting interests of the nation's
labor and antitrust policies. The Pennington case involved a contract
between the United Mine Workers and a group of large coal com-
panies. Under the terms of the agreement the union was to cease its
opposition to mechanization in the mines, and, as worker productivity
increased, the employers were to pay higher wages and additional
fringe benefits. The Phillips Coal Company, one of the smaller mine
operators, alleged that the union also had agreed to impose the higher
wage demands on all producers, regardless of their ability to pay. The
purpose of this plan, Phillips asserted, was to destroy the small pro-
ducers in order to give the larger operators control of the coal indus-
try. The Supreme Court held that a union would forfeit its exemp-
tion from the provisions of the Sherman Act if it acted as the Phillips
Coal Company alleged.
When the Supreme Court decided Pennington, it did not consider
4 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920).
5 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 102-15 (1964).
49 Stat. (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. H 151-66 (1964).
I See Apex Hoiscry Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson,
312 11.5. 219 (1941).
8 312 U.S. at 232.
9 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
io 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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the elements of proof required to prove an antitrust violation by a
labor union. Civil antitrust actions require a plaintiff to establish a
violation and injury only by a preponderance of the evidence. Section
6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, however provides that:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and
no association or organization participating or interested in a
labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court
of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual offi-
cers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of
ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
In Ramsey v. United Mine Workers," an antitrust suit brought in the
wake of Pennington, the union asserted that section 6 required a
plaintiff to show by "clear proof' that the alleged acts occurred, that
they amounted to a conspiracy, and that the plaintiff was injured
thereby.
The trial judge accepted this interpretation of section 6 and dis-
missed the case for want of proof." On appeal, a panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed? Upon a rehearing en banc,
however, the court split four-four and thus affirmed the district court
decision." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue."
In a five-four decision, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held
that section 6 "requires clear and convincing evidence only as to the
Union's authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts,"
and does not provide "any basis for . ... fashioning a new standard
of proof applicable in antitrust actions against labor unions!" 10 The
Court indicated that there was nothing in the language of section. 6.
or in its legislative history that warranted any other interpretation."
The intent of Congress in enacting the section, the Court noted, was to
protect labor unions from being held responsible for everything that
might occur during a strike. The Court found nothing in the legislative
history supporting the contention that Congress intended to modify
the standard of  proof in civil actions for damages against labor
unions.18
Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Black, Harlan and Marshall
concurred, dissented. Justice Douglas argued that a proper inter-
11 265 F. Supp. 388, 64 L.R.R.M. 2498 (1967).
12 Id. at 432, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2534.
15 416 F.2d 655, 70 L.R.R.M. 3281 (6th Cir. 1969).
14 Id., 72 L.R.R.M. 2321 (6th Cir. 1969).
15 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
le Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 311 (1971).
17 Id. at 309-10.
18 Id.
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pretation of section 6 requires clear proof that the union had "full
complicity in the scheme."" Therefore, he reasoned that a union which
authorizes its agents to seek an industry-wide pay scale, which in
itself is not illegal, cannot be found liable unless there is clear proof of
an illegal purpose." Because there was no clear proof of such an intent
in Ramsey, Justice Douglas concluded that the opinion of the district
court should be affirmed.
There can be no doubt that the effect of the majority's holding
in Ramsey is to make labor unions considerably more vulnerable to
liability under the antitrust laws for conduct that is beyond the scope
of their statutory immunity. Whether the Court has properly ascer-
tained the congressional intent of section 6 is not clear. The ambiguity
of the "clear proof" issue is amply evidenced by the fact that the
eighteen judges and justices who considered the case divided evenly in
their interpretation of section 6.
As Pennington aptly illustrates, labor costs may have a significant
effect upon a company's competitive position. Thus, it is understand-
able that employers should be concerned about agreements between a
union and the employer's competitors. During the Survey . year, the
NLRB ruled in Dolly Madison Industries" that employers might pro-
tect themselves from injury as a result of discriminatory collective
bargaining agreements by means of a "Most Favored Nation" clause.
The Board also ruled that such a clause constitutes a mandatory sub-
ject for bargaining; that is, an employer may insist upon such a con-
tract provision to the point of impasse.
A "Most Favored Nation'clause is often found in international
trade agreements. These clauses provide that the participating countries
will grant to one another tariff and quota restrictions as preferential
as those accorded to any other country. In the labor context, such a
clause would assure the contracting employer that no competitor will
acquire an economic advantage as a result of a more favorable col-
lective bargaining contract, because the employer would be able to
assimilate the preferential conditions into his own bargaining agree-
ment.
In Dolly Madison, the Board distinguished the "Most Favored
Nation" provision from the agreement condemned in Pennington on
two grounds. First, the clause was not considered a restraining factor
on the union's freedom to negotiate. In the course of subsequent bar-
gaining a union, if it so chose, could reduce its demands or insist upon
greater employer concessions. The only obligation incumbent upon
10 Id. at 315.
20 Id. at 318-19.
21 182 N.L.R.13. No. 147, 74 L,R.R.M. 1230 (1970).
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the union was to extend to the first employer any arrangements more
favorable than those previously negotiated. Second, the Board noted
that there was no evidence of any predatory intent. In accordance
with this reasoning, the Board suggested that no "tribunal of com-
petent jurisdiction would find [the clause] to be violative of any
Federal antitrust laws." 22
The reasoning offered by the Board in support of the Dolly
Madison ruling is legally and logically persuasive. However, closer
analysis suggests that permitting the use of "Most Favored Nation"
clauses in labor contracts may lead to the same evil condemned by
Pennington. For instance, it is likely that unions will attempt to obtain
the most economically advantageous agreements from the large, effi-
cient producers. Also, large producers will surely insist on, and have
the bargaining power to secure, a "Most Favored Nation" clause. It
is conceivable then, that a union which negotiates such a contract will
make those terms the floor in future bargaining. Indeed, if the terms
are more than small producers can match, it is possible that the union
will choose to sacrifice the marginal operator rather than forfeit any
benefits secured from industry leaders. Thus, the "Most Favored
Nation" clause may constitute a de facto surrender by a union of its
right to bargain and, more importantly, a means of legally effectuating
the predatory destruction of small competitors.
Although unions enjoy a special deference under the antitrust
laws, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pennington and Ramsey
indicated that agreements between unions and employers that have
predatory overtones are subject to special scrutiny. The "Most Fa-
vored Nation" clause approved by the Board in Dolly Madison cer-
tainly has the potential for such abuse. Therefore, any assumption
that the clause is per se legal may be premature.
ROBERT A. O'NEIL
RICHARD A. PERRAS
22 Id., 74 L.R.R.M. at 1231.
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